I don't know Greek nor am I able to verify the source versus any translations to see whether the original mentioned virtuous or pleasant life, although the pleasant life proposed by the ancient Epicureans WAS virtuous by their own definition … but I also know that many modern song-writers often sing songs and choose the words for their songs so that they rhyme, and not necessarily with didactic purposes.
Posts by Hiram
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In that last paragraph, "existence" is an easier word to grasp than "essence," with "essence" carrying a lot more controversial implication, I would expect, as in some contexts I gather "essence" is comparable to a platonic form, which Epicurus would/did reject. I gather that there is an Aristotelian sense of "essence" that Epicurus also rejected.
I don't think essence here is Platonic. It's CREATIVE. In other words, what's being said here is that first we have our material / social conditions (existence), and then we develop our characters and choices over those conditions as we gain responsibility for creating ourselves and our lives (essence, which is our creation to a great extent).
Some of the philosophers who accept a radical form of freedom say that we SCULPT OUR SELVES, and that our lives as our great works of art. Onfray wrote about this in aesthetic terms in his "Sculpture de soi".
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Hiram what are you talking about here?
Book 25 of "On Nature" (it's in Les Epicuréens)
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Sartre in particular elaborated some of the complicated issues raised by the Epicurean view on freedom, and the creativity and responsibility that comes from those views which are terrifying for some people (which is why they invent mythical narratives to excuse themselves from owning these powers).
Sartre said: "you are what you make of what life gives you"--which is basically a summary of Epicurus' sermon "On Moral Development". And like Epicurus in that sermon, Sartre and De Beauvoir worried about evaluating the extent to which we are free, and the extent to which we are bound by societal and natural conditions (freedom versus facticity / gravity).
Epicurus evaluated freedom in On Moral Development in terms of our anticipation of agency and responsibility. But Sartre evaluated freedom in terms of POWER over others, and its inevitability in social relations. He evaluated our freedom in terms of how we objectify others, and the difficulties of having true inter-subjectivity. He explained this by saying that as soon as we LOOK at someone, that person becomes an object, and he argued that this is almost always uncomfortable for the person being objectified.
And, obviously, his philosophical discussions and relationship with De Beauvoir and his other associates in Parisian cafés are examples of friendships based on philosophical interests, which is an important part of Epicurean practice also.
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This plays into several threads we are talking about -- we are not going to convert people like Sam Harris, or Ayn Rand (even if she were alive) but especially those who embrace some form of nihilism / nothingness like runs rampart through the "eastern" viewpoints.
And it's fine if you don't want to engage "them", but many of their followers are sincere students who are not sold on this or that view and it's advantageous for Epicureans to posit their alternative theories and narratives and to capitalize on the visibility that these discussions and these celebrities have to present and contrast our views to theirs. Many of these readers DO NOT KNOW what Epicureans have to say, so they have no way of judging it.
(I was once an avid reader of the "new atheists", and found Epicurean teachings in Hitchens' "Portable Atheist")
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Ok, I have my book, chapter on contemplation, and the source I cited is:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7669835 - The effects of running and meditation on beta-endorphin, corticotropin-releasing hormone and cortisol in plasma, and on mood.
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1361002/ - on neuroplasticity and how the brain's physical structure changes with meditation --- here, both Epicurus and Lucretius predicted the field of neuroplasticity when they argued that people are able to change the shape of their brain. Lucretius said people do this via habituation or when they memorize certain movements / games; Epicurus expressed moral development in material terms by arguing that a morally mature person was RESPONSIBLE for transforming the "atomic structure" of her brain in “On Nature”, Book 25: On Moral Development.
Here is Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus - by Susanne Bobzien
https://www.academia.edu/275084/Moral_R…ent_in_Epicurus
Here is Lucretius' Book 4
QuoteAnd to whate’er pursuit
A man most clings absorbed, or what the affairs
On which we theretofore have tarried much,
And mind hath strained upon the more, we seem
In sleep not rarely to go at the same.
The lawyers seem to plead and cite decrees,
Commanders they to fight and go at frays,
Sailors to live in combat with the winds,
And we ourselves indeed to make this book,
And still to seek the nature of the world
And set it down, when once discovered, here
In these my country’s leaves. Thus all pursuits,
All arts in general seem in sleeps to mock
And master the minds of men. And whosoever
Day after day for long to games have given
Attention undivided, still they keep
(As oft we note), even when they’ve ceased to grasp
Those games with their own senses, open paths
Within the mind wherethrough the idol-films
Of just those games can come. And thus it is
For many a day thereafter those appear
Floating before the eyes, that even awake
They think they view the dancers moving round
Their supple limbs, and catch with both the ears
The liquid song of harp and speaking chords …
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This reminds me of a point I may have omitted to make before: I have a problem with the terminology "the chief goods." I do not recall this phrasing in the Epicurean texts, and it implies that there is a list of "goods" which is higher or more important than others. I think that's a repetition of the same issue commented on before.
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The bottom line here is that i suspect that "chief good" is just a phase that has been picked up for convenience in Society of Epicurus discussion rather than being based on a clear text. As always, please correct me if I am incorrect.
The doctrine of the "kyriotatai" (= chief goods) was articulated in Philodemus' scroll "On Choices and Avoidances". He was adamant that we should keep the distinction between these natural and necessary goods and vain ones in our minds.
I don't have this in front of me but we have to keep in mind that many of these scrolls were notes that Philodemus took while studying under Zeno of Sidon, who was the Scholarch at the time, so this would have been part of how the teaching was imparted to him.
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SOE12 There are three acceptable interpretations of the Epicurean gods: the realist interpretation, the idealist interpretation, and the atheist interpretation.
- I think the most plausible explanation is the realist; no personal god(s)
That's the atheist interpretation. The realist says that gods are blissful extraterrestrial immortals made of particles.
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SOE10 All that exists, exists within nature. There is no super-natural or un-natural “realm”; it would not have a way of existing outside of nature. Nature is reality.
- I'm a scientific and objective realist. I don't think within/without are appropriate and can instil more sense of confusion than clarity. To say something is "within" means you know the boundary or edge of reality? Epicurus taught us to wisely that reality is eternal and infinite. There is only reality, so I personally, don't use the word "within".
(Objective/subjective categories were removed some time ago from Tenets 1 and 2) This is an affirmation that there is no "otherworldly" reality, and a rejection of the empty words of theologians who might say "God exists outside of nature", or something along those lines.
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Hiram, I personally do not subscribe to nor view myself as belonging to the continental tradition. I presume you're aware of the split between analytical and continental philosophy.
... I'm concerned with anti-natalist thinkers (would you say Onfray is in that camp?) who think: "I wish I'd never been born" - since, I'm happy to be born and happy to live my life with pleasure.
I am unfamiliar with the differences between the analytical / continental traditions, but European intellectuals have WIDELY divergent views and it's not too easy to categorize them all. I only have some familiarity with a few of the existentialists (Nietzsche, Sartre), and I know OF the German idealists and the Marxist tradition but not too in depth.
Also, Onfray has a variety of interests, not only Epicurus--which makes classification even more difficult. He is also Nietzschean. No one claims he's ONLY Epicurean in his interests. But he's most likely the most vocal defender of Epicurus and the most vocal enemy of Plato in the world today.
If Onfray ever expressed "I wish I had never been born" at one point, he may have changed his mind during his intellectual evolution. I know that DURING HIS CATHOLIC UPBRINGING, the Church made him feel like life wasn't worth living, and he goes into his biography and how much damage he suffered by the Church (they sent him to a Catholic boarding school where he was emotionally, physically, and psychologically abused) in the first chapter of Hedonist Manifesto.
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I also want to say a point on Michel Onfray's counter-history of philosophy before I forget, because Onfray wants Epicureans to become more engaged in public discourse, but oftentimes your censorship of so many issues keeps you from being able to form people intellectually to show how to use philosophy.
http://societyofepicurus.com/michel-onfrays…-of-philosophy/
Onfray mentions instances where Plato used omission, or mis-representation of the pleasure view, in order to make it look ridiculous. He discusses and exposes the (often dishonest) techniques used by Plato.
Onfray's arguments throughout "counter-history" are that voice is important, speaking up is important and powerful, and that if the people who adhere to a perspective of "friends of Epicurus, enemies of Plato" do not become proficient at employing the arts of historiography in the same manner as Platonists have become proficient (history is written by the winners, and they HAVE BEEN the winners so far), then we don't have a right to complain that our views are invisible and attacked and mis-represented.
And so Onfray teaches philosophers to engage in historiography, and also encourages Epicureans to SPEAK UP, to become engaged in public discourse and talk about contemporary issues and about history / past issues from an Epicurean perspective. He wants to prepare intellectuals to strike blows for Epicurus more effectively!
This is a point I've tried to explain to you. It's also why I want to help form intellectuals capable of commenting on moral problems of our day using the tools of philosophy.
We do not say "THIS is the Epicurean stance on vegetarianism, or on politics", but we HAVE to be able to say "These are the tools that you can use as an Epicurean for this or that problem", and empower intellectuals to demonstrate the methods and the usefulness of EP.
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Hiram, one possibility would be to have the Tenets as headers with short summary explanations.
Yes, that's the plan, but I have a menu of pleasures to attend to these days, plus a neighbor with panic attacks, plus a neighbor's cat to cat-sit, so I will do that as time allows.
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his guest says something along the lines of well then Epicurus must be true, and SH totally ignores this and moves topic. SH lost all my respect that day. I won't listen and recommend him since he's a salesman and I'm not interested in buying what he's selling.
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Of course I encourage listening to the whole conversation but we're all short on time and so the context is SH is talking with his guest, who attempts to refute the Epicurean argument about death being nothing to us...his guest presses SH to explain and accept the Epicurean argument which SH, at least to my senses seems to, disingenuously pretend to know and accept.
Shortly before the 55 minute mark, his guest again repeats "that's the Epicurean argument" to which SH seems so confused.
Sam Harris has ALWAYS ignored or been ignorant about Epicurus and is 100 % sold on secular Buddhism.
That's always been one of my main critiques of him. In my review of his "Moral Landscape" I argue that when he discusses the need for a nature-based morality, he is completely oblivious to Polystratus and Epicurus' case for pleasure-based morality. I often feel that he's trying to reinvent the wheel
In my review of his "Waking Up" I also say that he's selling the Buddhist doctrine of no-self and that we need to posit a materialist theory of self to counter it.
Even then, he makes a few good points, and I give him credit for calling for a "science of contemplation", BUT I insist that Epicurus was the first one to call for a science of contemplation. He didn't say: "that's idealism and so we shouldn't talk about it!". He called for the study of religiosity as a material, natural phenomenon and referred the study of religious practices to what happens in the mind and IN THE BODY when people engage in religious practices. That's why these quotes from "On Piety" are so important to me, because they an help us to continue the work of Epicurus in the modern age, and also to insert ourselves into these modern conversations and show how Epicurus had something to say and how he's being vindicated.
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I know of the benefits of chanting from experience, so this passed the test of the canon for me many years ago, but I specifically cited Diamond in my book, but a quick google search gives others:
Neuro-scientist Marian Diamond from the University of California found that chanting helps block the release of stress hormones and increases immune function. It also keeps our muscles and joints flexible for a long time.For our purposes, we are looking for psycho-somatic effects of pious activities, in other words bodily and mental effects. Diamond proved that Epicurus was on to something there, that we can cultivate certain pleasant / healthy and happy dispositions through ethical / pious practices.
I want to stress here that the point is not to say "Epicurans should do this", but to say "see, Epicurus was on to something" and to show how he placed piety in the body. And that this is a unique contribution of Epicurus to ethics.
(I cite a Marian Diamond source in my book, but I don't have my book with me, I'm at work. But Diamond died in 2017 and was also a neuroscientist, so the study of chanting and contemplation is mainly happening in that field, and Sam Harris is probably the main proponent)
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A study by Dr Alan Watkins [senior lecturer in neuroscience at Imperial College London] revealed that while chanting, our heart rate and blood pressure dip to its lowest in the day. Doctors say that even listening to chants normalises adrenalin levels, brain wave pattern and lowers cholesterol levels.
(I searched for this, there's a study on Gregorian chants in particular but he also did a study on sports and endurance that I can't open because it's PDF and my browser is acting up)
Also, atheist author and neuroscientist Sam Harris has participated in studies on the brain while meditating. This is a whole emerging science. His essay Killing the Buddha inspired, in part, the chapter on contemplation in my book. He was arguing that if contemplation is scientific, then it is NOT merely Buddhist, just as alchemy became chemistry and is no longer Islamic. He says there needs to be a "SCIENCE of contemplation". In his essay How to Meditate, Harris cites many studies here:
Cultivating this quality of mind has been shown to modulate pain, mitigate anxiety and depression, improve cognitive function, and even produce changes in gray matter density in regions of the brain related to learning and memory, emotional regulation, and self awareness.
The science here is still emerging.
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I think we have had this discussion before and I have the same issue. Is every breach of every agreement "unjust?"...
hmmm I don't know if EVERY breach of an agreement is unjust, but PD 37 does not shy away from saying "whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all". So the justness is tied to the utility in mutual association.
In the case of rabbits that overrun a field and eat the farmers' carrots, it's useful to kill them for the farmers (who get to keep, eat, and sell more carrots) and for the people who enjoy rotisserie rabbit. So here, the PD is saying positively that killing and eating the rabbits is "just" for as long as this utility persists ("for the time being, it was just", it says).
PD 38 also does not shy away from saying that, as per EP, there are laws that are NOT just when judged by their consequences. Presumably, what is being said here (to answer your question) is that "breaching that agreement" would be just, because the law is unjust?
The point, in the end, is that the original Epicureans DID pass moral judgment on laws and policies, and that they appealed to the material utility and the observable consequences of the laws. Notice this is consistent with how Epicurus says that we think empirically concerning the actions based on the results observed from any course of action (On Nature, Book 18)
Quote38. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just....
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Concerning Cassius ' feedback:
SOE15: Under normal circumstances, we are in control of our mental dispositions.
Objection to SOE15: The "under normal circumstances" probably is so ambiguous that it negates any benefit from this tenet. The Epicurean point in my understanding is that we should work to remain in control of our mental dispositions (like we work to control everything else) so that we maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By mentioning mental dispositions without really stating anything significant about them, the implication is that you are endorsing some kind of Stoic mind control that leads to suppression of emotions. Presumably you would only want to suggest that painful emotions should be kept under control, but even that would likely be a non-Epicurean interpretation, since it is recorded in DIogenes Laertius that Epicurus said that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than others, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom.
I was mainly thinking of Fragment 112 Diogenes, which states that the “sum of happiness is our disposition, of which we are masters". I considered this against PD 20 in one essay, so this is not a Stoic insight at all. The goal of each Tenet is to start a more in depth conversation and commentary on each, not to close the discussion where the Tenet ends (as I mention in the introduction of the Tenets, where I discuss the problem of over-simplification).
When Philodemus addresses habitual fury or arrogance as moral diseases, he also refers to it as diathesis (a bad disposition) which needs to be replaced by a better, friendly, kind, disposition.
So diathesis / dispositions are an important concept in moral development, and they deserve further discussion.
I say "under normal circumstances" because of problems like drug use, addiction, and some mental health issues that I am not fully an expert on, but last night my neighbor texted me because he had a panic attack, and sometimes people (like when they lack sleep) can lose control of their dispositions. There are people who feel, maybe at times, unable to control their disposition. I can also think of diabetes and the emotional / mental problems that diabetes can generate. So it seems to me that, if we do not take care of our health (which is a natural and necessary pleasure), this affects our habitual disposition.
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Concerning Cassius ' feedback:
QuoteSOE9: All things operate within the laws of nature, which apply everywhere.
Objection to SOE9: The concept of "laws of nature" is very troublesome today. It is my opinion that this is regularly interpreted to be the equivalent of saying "laws of nature's god" or even "laws of god" in the sense that it implies that there is some being "Nature" which has adopted a set of rules about how everything must work. I think the proper statement is that the universe operates according to the properties of the essential particles, motion, and void, and that everything that we see arises from the interactions of those three things. There really is no such thing as a "law of nature" that applies everywhere; perhaps if you can somehow stipulate that under exactly the same conditions then the elements will respond the same way, but that seems very different from saying that "the laws of nature apply everywhere."
I finally have some time to address more feedback
Concerning "nature's God" or the "laws of god", that's not consistent with Epicurean theology even in the realist interpretation, so not sure that I need to address it.
I was mainly thinking of the "doctrine of innumerable worlds" and its tacit understanding and view (expressed in LHerodotus) that we can infer about what is beyond in the heavens based on what we can see here on Earth.
Also, the study of nature does teach us that there are laws of nature: gravity will always pull bodies, there are laws that govern what molecules are able to combine to form what elements, etc. Our sources say that there are innumerable particles but LIMITED possible combinations of particles--THIS is limited by the laws of nature, which will not allow every imaginable thing to happen, only certain things. Water becomes ice at a certain temperature, and methane becomes ice at a much colder temperature (which is why the moon Titan has methane lakes and we have water oceans and methane gas).
The doctrine of innumerable worlds is based on the opinion that these laws operate always and everywhere, which is why the Epicureans in antiquity were confident in saying that there are other planets similar and different from our own, with beings similar and different from the ones on Earth.
This is the line of empirical logic employed there: the same laws of nature operate everywhere. (with the additional conclusion implying that the planets / moons / stars are not gods who rule our fates but bodies like our own planetary body.)
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The way you frame it is as if your desired behaviors apply to all Epicureans, and that's not true.
I guess the question of should each modern Epicurean engage in these "experiments in piety" is a separate question, that can be asked separately by different individuals or groups.
But the point I'm making is a different one: that the ideas attributed to Epicurus in On Piety (that true, material, natural piety has psycho-somatic, observable repercussions) has a solid foundation of empirical evidence. That certain ethical or pious practices do seem to affect the health of mind and body. And modern Epicureans should be happy to accept that vindication with curiosity, and referring it back to the sources. We should be happy to say: "Look! Epicurus was on to something here!"
Also, chanting happens in both Catholic rosaries and Buddhist and Hindu mantras, so this is not a vindication of a particular culture or chant. These studies vindicate a NATURAL process, not the cultures in case.
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No doubt you would reply that you think I am promoting a "Cassius Amicus Interpretation of Epicurus." But in dealing with that back and forth, the important distinction is that I recognize that some or all of your preferences are legitimate lifestyle choices if they bring you (and people like you) pleasure. All I am saying is that not everyone agrees with those lifestyle choices and I think it is improper to suggest that Epicurean philosophy leads to a single set for everyone.
I suppose I disagree in that when you have empirical evidence for something (in this case, a study on the benefits of any number of pious practices), you are not discussing culture, but nature. And you are also dismissing canonic (because, empirical) insight.
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Which is not to say that the analysis can't be done. Not only can it be done, it MUST be done by the people involved. It's urgent that it be done! It's essential that it be done! If you back away from doing it you're not a man, you're a worm! (Let me not go too far in emphasizing my Nietzschean variation on the Epicurean tune that you have but one life to live and that nihilism for losers and so you must live as vigorously as you can!
)Thank you!
But do you agree that EP offers the tools to help a lawmaker consider the advantages and disadvantages in a particular moment and circumstance to make his choices and avoidances (to pass a law)? And that it gives us the tools to determine whether an existing law is JUST for now, or for a given time?
Because if that's not the case, then we convict Epicurean philosophy of being escapist and impractical. The tools are there, in PD 37-38, and you keep imposing censorship on any attempt to use those tools, and accusing me of idealism when I am applying the CONCRETE, MATERIAL methodology--is this useful or necessary to mutual association, does this produce mutual advantage? Here they are, for the record:
Quote37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, ***whether or not it be the same for all***; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.
38. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were useful for the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful.
