Posts by Titus

I especially like the new find of Herculanean scripture: "They have nothing to say about pleasure." This is a simple but very powerful statement that unveils the emptiness of every argument that isn't rooted in our fundamental nature ( the opponents would disagree, but it's still hard to disagree with something elemental like searching for positive emotions).

Quote from Joshua

Very cool! There are some good articles in that book, I'm happy to see it accessible to a wider audience!

This is off-topic and I don't have time for further discussion at the moment:

On page 40 one of the authors is arguing that Cicero often disguises the Epicureans with phrases instead of naming them directly. The author states this is some kind of a rhetoric method.

"But at other times, both in these works and others where Epicurean doctrines, though not the focus, still come under some consideration, the interlocutor regularly invokes the Epicureans obliquely, using a periphrasis that identifies them as “those who refer all things to pleasure” or the like. Cicero uses a formulation of this sort at least twenty times in his theoretical works."

It strikes me, because this is something DeWitt suggests St. Paul is doing the same way in his epistles!

Quote from Don

I would agree that there may be some word games going on, but "flourishing" seems to be the academic consensus of what word to use for eudaimonia.

Okay, so Prof. Eller relates to an already established term.

Quote from Don

But then you're back at square one in needing to define what the "good life" is.

Quote from Peter Konstans

For the ancient Greeks,
however, eudaimonia, which is usually translated by ‘happiness’ but which
rather should be translated by something like ‘human flourishing’, was not an emotional state, but rather about whether a human being had attained virtue and excellence, achieved his aims, and truly made the most of his life.

The same question (what the good life is) hit my brain when I answered for the first time in this thread. I remember Prof. Malte Hossenfelder arguing, that eudaimonia was an unifying aim of all the Hellenistic philosophies (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Scepticism, Cynicism) to show a way to the "good life". Obviously, they differ in their methods and what they define as primary goal or content of the good life.

From my point of view, as a comparative term, taking different traditions into account and the possible motivation of a seeker and to-come diciple of a philosophical sect, flourishing doesn't fit so badly. Conversely, as a word defining the end of eudaimonia in itself as defined by a specific tradition, more substantive content is needed. For Epicureanism this might be defined as "fullness of pleasure".

Quote from Don

Flourishing is primarily defined as (Merriam-Webster) "marked by vigorous and healthy growth" (a flourishing garden); "very active and successful."

I could maybe accept it if one goes with the sense of "successful" as in " having attained a desired end or state of good fortune" but I don't normally get that sense from "flourishing." To me, that definition is better attached to "well-being" "the state of doing well especially in relation to one's happiness or success"

Although I assume a philologist to be sensible about words, this could simply be an issue of word games because Prof. Erler isn't a native speaker of English. I remember that the tenor in the German literature on eudaimonia tends to interpret the term as "living/having achieved the good life", which is close to your definition, Don.

In this episode I learnt that I don't have to listen to the approximately 200 episodes I've missed so far to experience the maximum of this pleasurable podcast

Quote from Cassius

As Dawkins says "we feel as if we are not deterministic -- and that's all that matters."

Isn't this the position of Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus?

"(He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame." (Bailey translation)

I especially remind a German translation by Laskowsky. He renders the bold print as follows:

"und es an uns stehe, ob wir uns einem Herrn unterwerfen wollen!"

"and it is up to us whether we want to submit to a master!"

Laskowsky's translation might be questioned, but I like his wording very much, because it centers self-reliance and independent personal reasoning. It's in particular important, because I think otherwise we are in danger of appreciating every kind of logic that is approaching us in an beguiling way.

It's how Ca(t/ss)ius Cat would tell us: "And yet others will say that, "No thing can be known!" All the while they will offer their own truth to loan."

Quote from Cassius

It may be that one's mix of stimulative pleasures and pains changes constantly, but if you are wisely philosophical about life then you are constantly appreciating that you are alive and that certain parts of your mind and body are functioning well even while others are not, and you consider yourself happy no matter how bad the temporary painful stilmulations are because, all things considered, you focus on the many types of pleasures available to you while you are alive, and you realize that stimulative pains are short if intense and manageable if long.

EP is like a toolbox which enables us to fix any broken part. Knowing to have such a powerful item in your hands, you're able to confront any given difficulties with a positive attitude. Therefore one could say, happiness is always within reach.

Quote from Cassius

"You have said Ataraxia is desirable. Is all Ataraxia the same?" How should I consider any differences in the experience of ataraxia in determining how I am going to live my life? Does the pleasantness of my experiences while I am not disturbed have anything to do with it? Am I supposed to consider the location, duration, and intensity of pleasures, or are all pleasures of equal significance to me so long as I am not disturbed?

How would you articulate the answer to that question to someone?

Have we already discussed PD 18? There, Epicurus states after reaching the quantitative maximum of pleasure it only differs in quality.

It seems to me, as long as I am mentally undisturbed and in a state of corporeal well-being, pleasureful sensations are "adding up" as an optional seasoning. This may be practically adressed in PD 29, where the natural but not necessary category of pleasures addresses also a qualitative matter. We can find relieve from thirst by simply drinking water or we could also spice our experience e.g. with additional flavour to our drink, heating or cooling it.

I think we also have to take into respect, that this is not only a theoretical discussion of ideas, but of experiences that are fundamental to our being. The idea of fulfilling natural and necessary needs while sitting in a cave by drinking water and eating bread is a state of idealized sanctification. While it focuses on the relatively low hardware requirements concerning human material needs, it ignores all the other variables to our lives in our ever-changing material conditions.

While the natural but not necessary entities are somewhat "optional", they reflect our interaction with our environment. There we have to make decisions continously. So while ataraxia seems to me somewhat equal as a comparable term, it is also confronted by a physical reality that has to be adressed by personal choices and avoidances.

I read their announcement just a few minutes ago on their website. I've checked it every day since the beginning of the year. This is a great day!

Quote from Cassius

"GOOD WITHOUT GOD"

That should be an immediate tipoff that feeling - pleasure and pain - are not at the center of Humanism. What's at the center is "being good."

Yesterday, I visited the "Philosophical Breakfast" for the second time. It would have been an interesting event for you, Cassius, as it dealt with Paul Rée, a nearly forgotten philosopher who is said to have inspired Nietzsche to start his materialistic phase. He finally got another direction than the later madman Nietzsche, becoming a philantropic physician for the poor and died falling from a cliff - one say it was an accident, the other say it was suicide.

More importantly, through my observations I've started to recognize that they are really concerned about being atheist. They are in fact a secular version of theism as they deal with various points they exclusively have in common with the established churches. Firstly, they are registered as a church and they offer secular rituals as substitutes to classical Christian ones. Secondly, they share some stunning patterns with their religious counterparts. They try to meet the same societally consensus to be "good" under the current definition.

Ironically, with the established churches in Germany dropping their faith in sin and the afterlife, they start becoming even closer to the Humanists than mainline Christianity to the the free churches. (The American equivalents e.g. mainline doesn't fit exactly, but they are relatively the same. The American Humanists also use a quite similar logo as their German counterpart and both take part in the same international conferences on Humanism).

I have to say that I enjoyed the atmosphere and speaker was quite talented. I might visit this format again. What they definitely lack is the concept of the happy life. They don't know about the remedies and although many of them would acknoledge some wisdom in Epicureanism, they are far more centered on current topics which finally gets political.

In my opinion, Epicurean Philosophy is a system of thought which tries to guide the individual towards wisdom and gives practical advice how to accomplish a happy life. In the end, Humanism seems to be a complex of atheist ideas which tries to develop influence in society.

A very good summary of DeWitt's arguments that gets to the point.

I remember Hegel's quick run through Epicureanism.

In one of his lectures on the history of philosophy he interprets the natural but not necessary category of Epicurus as simply dealing with sexual desire and forgets about what I (and Diogenes in his scholion, probably) would define instead: The amplification and variation of a necessary need. For example, tasty drinks instead of water or especial sexual experiences instead of simple ways of getting satisfaction.

I also know that in law it is called proportionality. It means to look whether something is adequate in comparison to another good or more simple: The pleasure-pain calculus.

Apart from that, the introductory post made me laugh, because I always hear the opposite about Asia, especially the Eastern part.

I haven't read the book, but it seems it is kind of an "individual" work of the author, his own thoughts on Epicurus. Springer is a reputable publisher. The author has his own wikipedia entry.

At a glance, the author seems to summarize contents which seem to be already known to ordinary students of Epicurus. The table of contents features current political issues he discusses in relation to Epicureanism.

I would buy on sale

Quote from Godfrey

To my understanding, ataraxia enhances resilience. It isn't the same thing as resilience, and resilience doesn't necessarily promote ataraxia. Ataraxia reduces the background noise which causes undue stress, anxiety and panic, so when a challenging event occurs you're more able to assess the situation and respond effectively.

My interest in the topic comes from the sphere,

a.) that I've always considered ataraxia as not only a tranquil stopover to the all-over happy life, but also a resisting force towards disturbing elements, so I definitively agree with your statement.

b.) that the concept of ataraxia must finally find some resonance in science, because I experience it to be working.

Quote from Godfrey

The list in the article of how to build resilience strikes me as more Aristotelian than Epicurean.

Can you specify what you mean with Aristotelian?

Quote from Godfrey

What healthy thoughts are, of course, depends on your overarching philosophy

Thus it seems, there may be the main difference. Ataraxia is embedded in the Epicurean system of thought, while resilience is a concept that strikes for curative matters only, preventing to align with a partisan philosophy.

Quote from Kalosyni

I would understand "serenity of the soul" as being the same as a healthy mind (a mind not filled with fear or anxiety), and within this healthy mind arises a feeling of ataraxia. So ataraxia is not something you do, but it is a feeling which is a result of wise living.

I think so quite similarly, but being in this state also requires to have access to the tools which build up and maintain it.

I've come across the concept resilience through a paper I found in a pile of documents and it reminded me of my recent interest on clearing my personal definition of ataraxia.

The American Psychological Association (APA) describes in its Dictionary of Psychology resilience as follows:

"n. the process and outcome of successfully adapting to difficult or challenging life experiences, especially through mental, emotional, and behavioral flexibility and adjustment to external and internal demands. A number of factors contribute to how well people adapt to adversities, predominant among them (a) the ways in which individuals view and engage with the world, (b) the availability and quality of social resources, and (c) specific coping strategies. Psychological research demonstrates that the resources and skills associated with more positive adaptation (i.e., greater resilience) can be cultivated and practiced. Also called psychological resilience. See also coping behavior; coping-skills training. —resilient adj."

APA describes in a short article main pillars of how to build resilience. While they promote the obligatory stoic-like "Accepting circumstances that cannot be changed can help you focus on circumstances that you can alter", resilience sounds all-over more like a modern-day version of Epicurean ataraxia. Taking care of one's body and prioritizing healthy relationships with others for the sake of strengthening one's adaptibility to life's difficulties sounds very Epicurean.

What are your thoughts on this topic?

I am looking for a thread in which to post my definition of ataraxia, which I came to think about through a discussion on katastematic pleasure:

Speaking from my own experience, I would define ataraxia as an attribute to one's character. It's achieved through a process of learning and studying the way things are. Unlike the Stoics, it's not about indifference or accepting one's fate, but empowerment through understanding how the world works and how I can coordinate within. This underpins self-esteem and gives a feeling of freedom and relaxation. Although it's a relatively stable state, it needs nurishment, as we're living in an ever changing universe.

Quote from Cassius

Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?

You could go even further and define hell as "absence of god"... um... katastematic pleasure  

Quote from Don

The kinetic/katastematic distinction, from my perspective, was most helpful in distinguishing the Epicurus's school from the Cyrenaics. It established the Garden as embracing ALL pleasure as the good, not just the kinetic of the Cyrenaics.

This sounds very sound to me. The thing to be careful about is, not to go in the opposite direction and even begin to embrace katastematic for the sake of reaching a "nirvana-like state of ataraxia".

Verse 134 catches my eye:

Because of this, it is better to follow the stories of the gods than to be enslaved by the deterministic decrees of the old natural philosophers, because necessity is not moved by prayer;

φυσικῶν "of the inquirers into nature, natural philosophers esp. of the Ionic and other pre-Socratic philosophers"

τῇτῶνφυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ "the decrees of the old natural philosophers" i.e., determinists, those decreeing fate is all-powerful

Is there anything more to it than Epicurus simply criticising believe in fate and therefore criticising giving up on deciding one's own destiny? (Consequently, emphasising the importance of artisting one's own life)

Is there any given evidence that these philosophers drove their own agendas by declaring what the fates are? If yes, is there anything comparable to it nowadays?

One could also think of it as a critique of the argument: "This is science!" (and therefore truth - trust me, not your senses). Do you think this is appropriate or does it overstretch the argument?

Quote from Cassius

But I wager that is what the "humanists" will always do, because like Cicero they insist on seeing "being human" as something higher than pleasure.

They definitely do and from their point of view, Epicureans adhere to some kind of dogma or be just the unfinished raw diamond or just an example of the past (while still a good one!).

Quote from Cassius

And that's the problem with those who aren't willing to straightforwardly identify freedom from pain as pleasure and see that the overall goal is not some kind of definition of "freedom from pain" that conflicts with or is superior to pleasure, but "pleasure" itself.

I tend to think they might understand the constellation between "freedom from pain" and "pleasure" as you do. The authors I refer to rather argue Epicurus promotes self-sufficiency over excesses, because in the end they cause more unpleasure than create pleasure. Perhaps their main difference is, they emphasize Epicurus' search for painlessness and self-sufficiency (for the reason to be always available of pleasure) rather than calling it pleasure directly (this way would be more antizipating of the canonical structure of the philosophy itself, but makes it even more difficult for the external reader to understand), although they mean the same. Perhaps the devil is just in the details. Especially when it comes to different languages.

They don't seem to speak of pleasure, but indeed they do. But I agree, without a proper understanding, "freedom from pain" can stroll apart and be seen as something different than pleasure.