Posts by Maciej

If you recollect the moment when it was in pain and compare to the moment when it was absent then you cannot say that latter is not better than the former. You said that yourself that it is better. This feeling better is your sensation. Recollection of past sensation is sensation as well as far as mind is concerned.

Now when your teeth are not aching you can eat an apple or drink cold water. Or just meditate on the fact that they are in their present state. Pleasure can vary in kind but not in intensity or degree.

What does the freedom from pain means? Cassius everyone who have ever had a toothache knows what freedom from pain means if he understands relation between words and meaning that underlie them.

I agree that to be without pain is enough to constitute good life. Because:

Quote

"Our every action is done so that we will not be in pain or fear. As soon as we achieve this, the soul is released from every storm, since a living being has no other need and must seek nothing else to complete the goodness of body and soul. Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure."

What do you mean?

I see here 4 observations about "free will" in this fragment:

1. It is one of the three powers that determine course of events.

2. It gives us control over some events.

3. What is in our control is subject to no master (other than us). Implicitly it depends on us.

4. To that which is in our control is naturally attached praise and blame.

Another fragment from lucretius Drn 4.878 -898 same translation

"Now I will explain how it is that we can step forward when we wish,

and move our limbs at will, and what the force is that propels the huge

bulk of our body. I want you to take in what I say.

I maintain, as I have maintained before, that first of all images of

movement present themselves to the mind and impinge on it. Then

comes the act of will: no one can begin to do anything until the mind has

foreseen what it wills to do; and what it foresees is determined by the

image. So, as soon as the mind stirs itself in such a way that it wishes to

move forward, it acts on the spirit, whose force is disseminated through

all the limbs and members of the body; and this is easily done, since mind

and spirit are intimately connected. The spirit in its turn acts on the body.

and so little by little a forward motion is imparted to the whole mass.

Moreover, once in motion, the body becomes rarefied and air, as

one would expect of a substance that is always quick to move, penetrates

the opened pores in an abundant stream and is thus distributed to every

minute part of the body. So the body is driven forward by these two

separate forces like a vessel propelled by the action of wind upon its

sails."

Hicks uses the word acumulated instead condensed.

Cassius please remember. It is just a quick guess. And i do not believe that your criticism gave it justice. Fact that pleasures are different qualitatively it is not my conclusion, it is premise of principle doctrine.

Nevertheless lets wait for someone else to add to the discussion.

And Cassius. Please bear in mind that pd 10 and 11 have hypothethical structure as well and are generally understood in the same pattern.

Quick guess: That they can be added to themselves like for example 3 apples to 2 apples as opposite to adding apples and oranges which cannot be properly added to themselves because they are qualitatively different.

I really do not know myself what to think about this doctrine. As isolated sentence it is understandable: if pleasures could condensed they would not differ. But pleasures do differ. Therefore they cannot be condensed.

What does it means that pleasure can be condensed? I am clueless.

(In my last post i misspoke. The conclusion is not that pleasures differ but that pleasures cannot be condensed. But it makes no difference for our discussion. The fact that pleasures differ is taken as self evident premise of the judgement.)

I doubt that dewitt interprets this doctrine correctly. He seems to think that the conlusion is that pleasure is a unit. But anyone who reads pd9 have to admit that is not the case in context of this doctrine.

I suppose that because it is pd it should be understandable for common greek in time of formationof list of doctrines. This was the most public of epicerean texts, introduction to philosophy. On the other hand it could be reply to some obscure statement in platos dialogues or aristotle nicomachean ethics or of the megarian logicians or cyrenaics

Yes:)

Setting aside of what you say which is generally correct exposition of part of epicurean ethics, do you agree that epicurus's conclusion in pd9 is that pleasures differ?

I thought that this doctrine suggest something exacly opposite. Hypothethical structure implies that Pleasures actually differ, so they cannot be condensed.

This seems right. It psychologically makes sense as well because subject recollects memory of past desire that has been satisfied, pain that was alleviated in order to avoid pain of present desire. I would not be surprised if there are other fragments from epicurus and epicurenas that could confirmed dewitts and peter saint andre's translations.

Thank you cassius. More than less, this is my point.

However not progression (which seems to be your idea) but Isonomy generally speaking.

Necessity of existence of all possibilities is consequence of infinity of universe. What forbids those possibilities to realize when appropriate bodies meet each other at some place. Appropriate bodies cannot be exhaused because there are infinite. There is sufficient amount for space and time for them to make such and such combinations.

Hiram: exacly. And according to epicurus gods are in the range of limited number of combinations. Nothing in our experience forbids them to exist and physics shows us that they can exist. This is how in general terms epicurus thought about gods.

And dreams of pious people which are perceptions of mind are attesting for/confirming truth of this inference.

This is what in my opinion is the problem with so called third interpretation. Their proponents do not appreciate how cannonicaly sound epicurus theology is. 1. Blissful and imperishable beeing is possible. 2. What is conceivably possible to exist in infinite universe necessarily somewhere exist. C: Blissfull and imperishable beeing necesarily somewhere exist.

I would love to hear real arguement for 3rd interpretation. What was said to this day is insufficient in my opinion.

Cassius. Your idea of epicurean theology is the same as mine exept I think that epicurean gods are deathless and painless by nature and not by succes "in those fields" through progress or evolution as you seems to imply.

I like the idea of workings with actual epicurean texts. This way student will have opportunity to write and present his or her commentary and reflect on commentary presented by others. So aproach of existing gardens in greece sounds more interesting to me.

For me it is in bad taste.

In my opinion accidental relation of temporary properties in no way makes room for existence of chance in way you suggest (as causal agent). However, Metrodorus in Vs 47 speaks about chance as if it were a real cause.

I will try to look into the article if i find something that would add to the discussion i will quote it here.

And yet temporary qualities are accidental in a way. To be more precise they are accidental in relation to the nature of the body they are temporalily attached to. So like i wrote earlier you will blur this meaning by changing the term.

But to change a subject a bit. Epicurus clearly takes this distinction from aristotle and improoves on it. IF there is more to be said about this it would be good idea to find in aristotle this distinction and compare it with letter to H and de rerum natura.