This placement in 10.62 is interesting: he presents a scenario where the ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ (épibolēn lampanómenon têi dianoíai), the "apprehending being grasped [by] the intellect" ἐστι ἀληθές or "is true", verus it being false under dissimilar conditions.
More and more, it seems to me that there is no, true "Fourth Criterion" of the Kanon because Epíkouros, himself, writes that one such apprehension "is true" but another such "is false". However, that does not mean this, true apprehension is un-useful in having coherence with reality.
Also, based on the consistency with which this phrase is re-employed, combined with the naturalistic language he uses when making analogies, I think he supposes that thinking, itself, can reliably be said to be like a fisherman purposefully casting a net in meaningful directions to catch thoughts.