Posts by Eikadistes

Quote from Kalosyni

and the extant texts of Epicurus do not provide any guidance for this.

This is an interesting perspective because (agreeably so) Epicurus does not prescribe a verbal mantra like the Lord's Prayer, nor strict recommendations about prayer times, or gestures as is the case with Salah in Islam. There might be a lose kind of correspondence between memorizing the Doxai and Christian breviaries, but I might be making a bit of a stretch there.

One important difference is the origin of prayer within the context of each tradition. For Christians, prayer isn't necessarily natural. We only know how to pray (correctly) because a super-being came to Earth, and taught us how. Allegedly, humans existed for thousands of years before any one of them figured out how to pray properly. In this regard, Jesus Christ acts kind of like Prometheus.

With Epicurus, however, prayer is natural, and comes from Nature, and arises spontaneously in human beings the same way we each independently discover masturbation or any other number of development behaviors. In that regard, those philosophers who believe in natural prayer shouldn't prescribe a mantra, because it doesn't come from teachers, its just genetic, human behavior.

He does provide some guidelines, though in terms of how not to get hurt praying: no expectation of wish fulfillment, no expectation of supernatural intervention, no expectation of holding a dialogue.

I think this brings me, personally, to a place where I start to think ... (having been raised as a Methodist) ... what good is prayer if no one is listening? Why bother praying at all if someone isn't considering fulfilling your wishes? Why not just skip the whole, weird, archaic, pseudo-magical ritual altogether? It's not like it's ever been a necessary or important part of my own life.

I entertain the idea that the functional mechanism by which prayer operates is the placebo effect. I think Epicurus whittled down the concept of prayer to the bare-bones: positive thinking is healthy, and believing in a divine nature that you can access through self-improvement is positive. The other stuff (like praying to God for wishes like a genie) are all colorful, cultural additions.

Now, all that being said, let me also add: I don't think most Christians are really reciting their prayer honestly. I think ritualized soliloquies like the Lord's Prayer just puts people's brains on auto-pilot, and they aren't really, devotedly, observantly engaged. So, in that regard, I don't want to give the impression that they are more genuine than our observances. They might be empty.

That's definitely the case with grace before dinner (based my childhood). From personal experience, that's the case with the Pledge of Allegiance in school, too. After a while, they run the risk of losing their authenticity, and become as mundane, barely-conscious, habituated behavior as locking the door when you leave the house. So I think we own prayer just as much as anyone else.

I've taken it upon myself to continue translating all of the Epistles, and about halfway through Pythokles, I came across a fantastic word that is not only entertaining but also educational, and memorable! When describing the expulsion of thunderbolts from a storm cloud, Epicurus employs the word κατάρρηξιν (katárrēxin), which means (you guessed it), "Explosive Diarrhea".

This really exemplifies Epicurus' approach to science in de-mystifying extraordinary phenomena by relating it to mundane, daily activities, of which we show neither fear nor existential dread. Earlier in Pythokles, Epicurus also uses the imagery of bloating from eating grain, and then the indigestion and expulsion of vapors that followed to represent an analogy for thunder.

I also really appreciate the colorful example. I'll always maintain that funny, gross, and colorful examples are some of the best, most memorable, most demonstrative teachings tools. Philosophy shouldn't have to be abstract to the point of relying on purely theoretical language. Knowing that clouds get gas, just like people, seems to be enough to make the point.

Quote from Kalosyni

I have some evidence that complicates things, and points to a possiblity that Philodemus held different views than Epicurus did.

One other thing I want to suggest is that we should believe Philodemos, for at least two, good reasons: (1) Philodemus pre-dates the other source by 300 years, so he had better sources, (2) Diogenes, himself, relied on Philodemus' own biography on Epicurus, so Philodemus is the real source here.

(And, of course, the best source is Epicurus, in his own words, in Menoikeus).

Still though, I don't think there's a disagreement. I don't think Diogenes was suggesting that Epicurus was actually an atheist in one sentence in Book 2, when he spend pages and pages in Book 10 sharing Epicurus, in his own words, who makes point after point arguing against Theodorean atheism.

This statement comes from Book 2: "Theodorus did all he could to overturn people's beliefs about the gods, and we came across a book of his entitled On Gods, which is not easy to dismiss; they say Epicurus took from it most of what he said." (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 2.97)

The last line, "they say Epicurus took from it most of what he said...", to me, means that Epicurus was using On Gods as source material against which to argue, not material to support.

Theodorus' theological propositions were incompatible with Epicurus, as shown in Menoikeus:

"First and foremost consider the deity⁶ an incorruptible and blessed figure as the common conception of a deity prescribes; attribute to him nothing either hostile to incorruptibility or alien to blessedness rather believe anything about him that is able to preserve his incorruptibility and blessedness"

"Since it is better to comply with the myths of the deities than it is to become a slave of physical inevitability; for indeed subscribing in earnest prayer to an expectation of dignity from the deities [encourages agency], but she has not [once] been moved by prayers to necessity."

On Piety will be the big resource here:

"Furthermore, | it will appear that Epíkouros loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not only on account of the laws but for physical reasons¹⁰⁵ as well. For in On Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural¹⁰⁶ | for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our¹⁰⁷ fulfilments | and social conformity with the laws. And besides writing this as well, in On Gods he¹⁰⁸ says that as being both the greatest thing, and that which as it were excels in sovereignty, it possesses everything: for every wise man holds pure and | holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature¹⁰⁹ is great and august. And it is particularly at festivals that he, progressing to an understanding of it,¹¹⁰ through having its name the whole time | on his lips, embraces¹¹¹ with conviction more seriously […] not from things¹¹² (several words missing) of some things better by effectively preserving one’s conception of the gods during certain | times.¹¹³ And not only did he¹¹⁴ teach these things but also by his very deeds he is found to have taken part in all the traditional festivals and sacrifices. In the archonship of Aristonymus,¹¹⁵ for instance, writing to Phyrson about a countryman of | his¹¹⁶, Theodotus, he¹¹⁷ says that he shared in all the festivals (several words missing), and that while he¹¹⁸ was joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes¹¹⁹ and the urban mysteries¹²⁰ | and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him¹²¹ to celebrate this feast of the twentieth¹²² for distinguished revellers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations¹²³ to host a feast for all of them. | Now it would be absurd to relate in addition that they¹²⁴ thought it right to make use of oaths and epithets of the gods, since their philosophical writing is filled with them. But it is proper to say that he¹²⁵ advised | them to retain asseverations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeús himself in this open manner,¹²⁶ and not writing ‘by the twin shoots!’¹²⁷ or merely ‘it must be so’. Moreover to Kolotes he took pains with regard to all forms of oaths and | speaking about the gods. And in the archonship of Charinus¹²⁸ and that of Diotimus¹²⁹ he warns against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table. | […] But also writing to Polýainos that the Anthḗsteria too must be celebrated and that it is necessary to make mention of the gods (one word missing) | of many […] to conceive of their¹³⁰ nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard. And, lest I extend my discussion, again: ‘Let us sacrifice | to the gods‘, he¹³¹ says, ‘devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of being. Moreover, | let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeús, to live like Zeús, as it seems.’ [...] And in his Symposium concerning the rites²⁴⁵ (he says): ‘Let us celebrate the festivals‘, | and ‘Make fine sacrifices to a god‘, […] from the holy rites in prayers against these cities..." (Philodemos, On Piety, translated by Obbink)

Quote from Kalosyni

We do not have evidence of any of the above in ancient Epicureans, and the extant texts of Epicurus do not provide any guidance for this.

I think we have a lot of material from the Epicureans, but, from our eyes (I'm speaking from mine, in particular), Epicurean spirituality doesn't look like "spirituality" because of the historical victory of anti-Epicureans in appropriating terminology. "Spirituality" in general, should mean something closer to "psychology", but, instead, has taken on the connotation of "metaphysics" and "mysticism". "Religion" should mean something more like "wisdom tradition", but is often weaponized to mean "Proper Observance of The God". Still, I think we qualify:

• Beliefs and Practices:

  Religions typically involve a set of beliefs about the nature of reality (countless particles in an infinite void), the divine (blessedness, defined as pure, uninterruptible pleasure), and the afterlife (a non-conscious re-arrangement of particles), along with practices like prayer (heavily encouraged by Epicurus and Philodemos in On Piety), rituals (civic festivals such as the City Dionysia and Anthesteria as well as personal cults to deceased family members and close friends), and ceremonies (Eikas and Hegemon Day).

• Sacred Things:

  Durkheim's definition emphasizes the concept of "sacred things," which are objects, places, or ideas that are set apart and treated with reverence and respect. (Greece in general and Athens in particular, for its historical significant based on the salvific mortals who lived there, as well as using pictures of our Leaders as decorations. We treat Herculaneum, itself, as a sort of necropolis, and privilege true knowledge over vain fantasies, as well as referring to bad habits as "sins" that must be extinguished to protect our happiness).

• Moral Codes:

  Many religions also include a system of ethics or moral guidelines that dictate how individuals should behave and interact with others. (The Epistle to Menoikeus covers the general guidelines en masse, and the fragments provide specific pieces of advice, such as a general warning against holding political office, rejecting betraying friends, approving of sacrifice for loved ones, and caution against careless attitudes toward casual sex).

• Community:

  Religion often fosters a sense of community among believers, who share common beliefs and practices. (This is something the Epicurean tradition does better than other traditions, and may be seen as one of the founding traditions that emphasized a unique, community of initiates who lived together. Though, they were not judgmentally exclusive. The primary rituals of our tradition are communal. We are encouraged to study with others along with ourselves. Our holidays are meant to be shared).

• Worship:

  While not always a defining feature, many religions involve the worship of a deity or deities. (Epicurean worship looks different than most other forms of worship. I think that's fair. Our expressions of deity-worship look a bit more like Jain and Buddhist expressions, minus the intensive, psycho-psychical, meditative practices), but, again, the culture in which we live sometimes even rejects Jains and Buddhists as proper examples of religious worshippers, so ... this is being gate-kept by Jews, Christians, and Muslims. That's my biggest comment on this section. Science is its own form of spirituality. Deities don't have to be magical, and worship doesn't have to be wish-fulfillment.)

I think we check all of the boxes.

I think that the pleasure that is having choice can be properly called freedom.

In that sense, the pleasure of having freedom is different from the pleasures had from doing things while free. In that regard, I might argue, then, that freedom is a katestamatic pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Quote

In Democritus we recognize not merely a keener intellect, but also, in almost every way, a nobler, fuller, and stronger nature than that of Epicurus. It is only the passionate sympathy of Epicurus with the suffering, with the ignorant, and those who through their ignorance are deceived and terrified, with all who are sore beaten by the storms of life, which alone relieves a system hardly deserving to be called a philosophy.

That's a bold statement about a historical figure for whom we have no original works.

Sounds like the author is projecting his own narrative onto history.

Quote from Bryan

This is excellent and I love it! Thank you. This version is much better than Hicks and the recent Oxford translation (by Pamela Mensch).

It should not seem like a relief that Epíkouros says he wanted to eat the cheese in his potlet -- until we consider that others, while practicing tyromancy, were staring into their cheese pots like crystal balls!

minor notes:

"...of friends [is] public..." I don't think you want that "i" italicized.

"On Nature" is rubricated but the other titles are not.

Thank you so much for that compliment! I appreciate the feedback!

All right, the spirit moved me, so I took a shot at translating Book X of Lives of Eminent Philosophers (with the exceptions of the Epistles to Herodotos and Pythokles).

Find it HERE.

Unfortunately, I did something and deleted all of my footnotes.

I'm re-building them now.

(I think I did a particularly fair job at re-rendering the poems in modern verse:)

"Farewell, and remember the doctrines" — Epíkouros [therewith ends,]
[He] said these final words [and] passed [among] his [dearest] friends;
For he went into a warm bathtub and drew [much] unmixed [wine],
Then drawn was [he to] frigid Hádēs [from which no one can climb].

DeWitt has a lot to say on the matter, but I feel like it's largely suppositional fiction.

I thought this might be better as a forum post.

I am very interested if anyone has specific evidence or documentation of Epicurus' time in Teos with Nausiphanes. Colophon is 16 hours on-foot from Teos, and just a short time in a boat to Mytilene, from which Praxiphanes hailed, his second teacher, a Peripatetic whom he may have been inspired to meet while Theophrastus spoke during his consciption in Athens ... all being pure speculation, because Praxiphanes spent most of his adult life in Rhodes. Still, it may have given Epicurus a reason to visit Mytilene in the first place, and then he decided that he liked it, and tried to teach there half-a-decade later, after he got fed up with Nausiphanes' skepticism.)

I sort of wonder ... was Epicurus repelled by Platonism as represented to him as a teenager by Pamphilius, but then re-invigorated by Philosophy when he heard Aristotelians speak against the Platonic gymnasiums during his two years in Athens? And then perhaps that compelled him to visit an Aristotelian after he completed his term of service. He rejected that as well, either in Mytilene, or Rhodes ... unless Praxiphanes was briefly teaching in Ionia ... it's interesting that Teos is really close in distance to Colophon. Epicurus may have accidentally found Nausiphanes on vacation.

Was there any kind of gathering of philosophers throughout the Hellenic area? I'm still curious if Epicurus physically relocated for a significant time to any of those cities on the West Coast of modern-day Turkey in his 20s.

Anyway, I am considering whether (1) Epicurus moved from his parents' property in Colophon to Teos for several months-to-years in his 20s to study under Nausiphanes, or (2) was Epicurus stationed with his family in Colophon, and made brief trips to Teos to hear Nausiphanes lecture, or (3) did Epicurus and his brothers back-pack monthly trips to Teos, and while they were there, they spent considerable time with Nausiphanes, before ultimately rejecting him. (There is also speculation that Epicurus travelled to Rhodes to study under Praxiphanes in his early-20s.). Or (4) did Nausiphanes come to him? Did Nausiphanes and/or Praxiphanes travel occasionally to other cities to lecture? (I'm not sure, but I'm looking into it). And if so, did Epicurus follow him back? Or were their interactions limited?

Rhodes also became a center of Epicurean thought, so Epicurus' early presence there would be contextually appropriate, if he planted the seeds for a future garden on that island. At the same time (as I recall), they were accused of being heterodox, Epicurean sophists, so the community there was not founded by Epicurus? Rhodes is pretty far away from the other locations. Then again, sailing was common. Epicurus got in (at least) one shipwreck.

Then again, then again, perhaps we should believe Epicurus in his claim of him being a self-taught thinker. I would like to better understand what sorts of resources he had at his disposal. He was not only an insightful thinker, but he was a true historian of several hundred years of philosophy, and deeply fascinated by each thinker's arguments. This doesn't necessarily require a teacher, but it does require a lot of literature ... which perhaps his father had as a schoolteacher? Or perhaps his father was the source, himself. Perhaps his time with Praxiphanes and Nausiphanes was very brief, and he disliked them within weeks, and the core of his learning had to do with personal study of each philosophers' literature. Perhaps his atomism wasn't inherited from Nausiphanes, but from much Democritus' literature. Perhaps his interest in Pyrrho had to do with the fact that orthodox, Indian philosophers were atomists, and they were (somehow) an influence. Perhaps his hedonistic ethics was inspired by some of the literature of Aristippus and his fellow Kyrenaiks. Maybe he just took Nausiphanes' "tripod" as a useful teaching model and rejected his Nausiphanes' physics, thus, representing himself as a unique thinker. I am sort of surprised that Diogenes doesn't mention more about Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes. I'd like to.

One more thing to add: According to Leonteus, Epicurus thought of himself as a “Democritean” as a younger man (Plutarch, Against Colotes 3, 1108e–f) before founding his own, dogmatic school. Thus, we note his simultaneous admiration of Pyrrho and his rejection of Skepticism. So I'm considering that, as well.

Quote from Novem

Has anyone identified as Epicurean in official surveys when asked by a pollster? Even the Census?

The census doesn't like it.

I wonder how many astrology-and-tarot "Nones" are going back to their childhood religion.

Out of curiosity, do you know what the general, demographic spread is of religious involvement in your area? I am so pleased with the response to your invitation, and surprised. I am mired in (as I think is the case with a few of us) a Southern Christian swamp (literally) near the genitals of the Bible Belt, and the ideological bubble in which I find myself is thick with criticism toward the Other.

The practice of memorizing the Doxai and other exercises of ancient Epicureans seems to parallel a certain human, religious behavior, cross-culturally that I equate (to an extent) with something like a Catholic rosary, and the memorization of certain prayers (even the "Serenity" prayer in AA), the idea behind it being employing remembrance of truths to overcome temporary obstacles.

I heavily used that when my wife was faced with death two years ago.

Not the rosary, of course. But when someone you love is dying, and you have done everything you can to solve the problem, the problem-solving facet of the human mind keeps on working, and you keep on believing there is a solution, and that naturally leads our minds to begin searching for answers beyond the logistically-possible, and the empirically-probable. The mind reaches for an ultimate, reality-overcoming answer that will change the conditions of mortality, and solve everything. I think it there is a tendency to explore the possibility of divine intervention.

Here's how Epicurean wisdom helped me in that situation: it removed fear.

Magical thinking feeds fear. It is also a crutch. If I held that agreement (between me, and the superstitious idea in my mind), it would have been me assigning human agency to an idea that would be incapable of any sort of intervention. I would be holding an idea in my head for the most important responsibilities in our lives, caring for our health and the health of our friends. That idea fails us, because ideas don't cure sepsis, antibiotics do. God doesn't cure the sick, MDs do. Mysticism doesn't reinforce physical health, practical decisions do. And when magical thinking becomes tantalizing because it offers a solution (albeit fake) for the fear of death, the teachings of Epicurus address that exact same fear, but don't rely on the crutch of magical thinking.

Truly, Epicurus saves us from the fear that comes from a collapse into superstitious thinking.

Some people feel that ... ugh, what did George H. W. Bush say ... "There are no atheists in foxholes", implying that everyone, when faced with death, has a "coming to Jesus" moment. A family member of mine suffered the death of one of their best friends, and that incident persuaded them, after many years, to go back to church and find peace. And they did. And they (believe that they) found peace. I believe it is just a bandaid. It doesn't actually cure us of fearing death. It's just a comfy narrative to deal with the overwhelming, existential fear that we all face. I felt that same fear, and that same, strong desire to put my faith in "Everything happening for a reason", beyond the realm of scientific understanding. At that time (and those times, previously) I go out of my way to practice everything I know to be true: materialism, hedonism, empiricism: reject superstition.

At the end of the day, those things reinforce true confidence, not just a spiritual bandaid.

The practice of memorizing the Doxai and other exercises of ancient Epicureans seems to parallel a certain human, religious behavior, cross-culturally that I equate (to an extent) with something like a Catholic rosary, and the memorization of certain prayers (even the "Serenity" prayer in AA), the idea behind it being employing remembrance of truths to overcome temporary obstacles.

I heavily used that when my wife was faced with death two years ago.

Not the rosary, of course. But when someone you love is dying, and you have done everything you can to solve the problem, the problem-solving facet of the human mind keeps on working, and you keep on believing there is a solution, and that naturally leads our minds to begin searching for answers beyond the logistically-possible, and the empirically-probable. The mind reaches for an ultimate, reality-overcoming answer that will change the conditions of mortality, and solve everything. I think it there is a tendency to explore the possibility of divine intervention.

Here's how Epicurean wisdom helped me in that situation: it removed fear.

Magical thinking feeds fear. It is also a crutch. If I held that agreement (between me, and the superstitious idea in my mind), it would have been me assigning human agency to an idea that would be incapable of any sort of intervention. I would be holding an idea in my head for the most important responsibilities in our lives, caring for our health and the health of our friends. That idea fails us, because ideas don't cure sepsis, antibiotics do. God doesn't cure the sick, MDs do. Mysticism doesn't reinforce physical health, practical decisions do. And when magical thinking becomes tantalizing because it offers a solution (albeit fake) for the fear of death, the teachings of Epicurus address that exact same fear, but don't rely on the crutch of magical thinking.

Truly, Epicurus saves us from the fear that comes from a collapse into superstitious thinking.

Some people feel that ... ugh, what did George H. W. Bush say ... "There are no atheists in foxholes", implying that everyone, when faced with death, has a "coming to Jesus" moment. A family member of mine suffered the death of one of their best friends, and that incident persuaded them, after many years, to go back to church and find peace. And they did. And they (believe that they) found peace. I believe it is just a bandaid. It doesn't actually cure us of fearing death. It's just a comfy narrative to deal with the overwhelming, existential fear that we all face. I felt that same fear, and that same, strong desire to put my faith in "Everything happening for a reason", beyond the realm of scientific understanding. At that time (and those times, previously) I go out of my way to practice everything I know to be true: materialism, hedonism, empiricism: reject superstition.

At the end of the day, those things reinforce true confidence, not just a spiritual bandaid.

Just a few holiday and seasonal-themed Waning Gibbouses I've been using.

Quote from Cassius

Today in the podcast recording Joshua brought up the letter to Idomeus, and one phrasing caught my eye, the underline

Quote

The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity:

This is interesting, because the way this is translated suggests "lacking nothing of their natural severity" as a dependent clause, descriptive of "The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course." The original does not have a dependent clause quite like that. Here's the phrase:

στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη
ὑπερβολὴν οὐκἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους.

στραγγουρία - (n. nom. sing.) "strangury"
     τε - (conj.) "both"
     παρηκολουθήκει - (v. perf.) "had followed", "had understood"
     καὶ - (conj.) "and"
     δυσεντερικὰ - "dysentery"

     πάθη - (n. nom. sing.) "feeling", "suffering"
     ὑπερβολὴν - (n. acc. sing) an "overshooting", "excess", "extremity", "hyperbole"
     οὐκ - (neg.) "not"
     ἀπολείποντα - (v. pres. act. part.) "leaving [behind]", "deserting", "departing", "remaining"

    τοῦ - (art. gen. sing.) "of the"
     ἐν - (prep.) "in", "within"
     ἑαυτοῖς (pron. dat. pl.) "themselves", "yourselves", "ourselves"
    μεγέθους (n. gen. sing.) "greatness", "magnitude", "size"

I would translate it something closer to something like (literally) "[The] suffering [that] has followed [from] both strangury and dysentery is not abating in extremity of their greatness."