Posts by Pivot

You mention, "He had also previously stated, in PD3, that the limit in QUANTITY of pleasure is the absence of pain." Where is the word "quantity" mentioned? Magnitude, as stated in the quote, does not necessarily imply quantity. I tried to do some investigating, and the word we're contesting is "μεγέθους." Perseus.uchicago.edu defines this to be "greatness, magnitude, size, height, stature." This is very different from quantity in my opinion, and the alternative definitions show that "quantity" would be a bit of a mistranslation. Here's where I got the Greek-English principle doctrines: http://monadnock.net/epicurus/principal-doctrines.html

It is interesting you bring up the results of reading the quote explicitly. But I do not think taking them at face-value is misreading them. The language itself prevents the reader from construing them in any fashion other than what is written, unless we should say "Epicurus MEANT to write __." And that may be fine, perhaps in his lost writings he consolidated these views.

You mention, "Viewed from the perspective of quantity, any Epicurean who sees that pain has been reduced to zero also knows that it has been reduced to zero by filling the human experience completely with pleasure, so as to drive out all pain. In Cicero's phrase, 'Nothing is preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.'"

But should we think that pain can be driven out by pleasurable experience? We think of a man drinking away his sorrows, or someone going to a party to drive away his depression. Mental pain must be extinguished before we can experience ultimate pleasure in life, as ataraxia is the highest state of pleasure. Ataraxia is not achievable if there are underlying troubles in one's mind. Cicero's quote requires first, before the cramming full of pleasures, a "life of tranquility."

And again in Torquatus, there is this condition of the pleasurable life: "undisturbed by the presence ... of pain."

You mention, " ... before you choose to do something that entails a lot of effort, you better be sure that you will in fact get a lot of pleasure, and you better be sure that you do it in such a way as to minimize pain."

This is precisely why I argue deep friendships are impossible in Epicurean thought. Relationships require immense effort. However, often it is without the promise of a lot of pleasure. Often it is impossible to be sure one will receive anything at all in return. Even after weighing all the pleasure associated with the totality of one's friend/partner, the conclusion may be that the sacrifice outweighs the reward. The man who cuts off the friendship may be losing much more than the man who keeps the friendship and endures the suffering. As I worded it to Hiram, some rewards can only be received by those who do not endeavor for them.

To answer your last post - I've enjoyed all of Lucretius. It is probably my favorite work of philosophy. I would say that my favorite part of it is more to do with his arguments against the lamentation of death. Whether we wasted our lives, or lived full lives, the end of life should not be lamented. This was shocking to read, yet the arguments he made were very moving -- particularly when Lucretius directly addresses "the nature of things," and quotes her responses to the man lamenting his death.

Apart from his ideas of death, the arguments against immortality and the existence of gods were also very fascinating to read. The reasoning he uses is very simple and intuitive but impactful. One example: the soul is “begotten along and grows along with the body” (3.457); therefore, when the body deteriorates and dies, the soul does the same.

I was attracted to Epicurus through Lucretius, as I read his work before any of Epicurus' works. But Lucretius was a devout follower of Epicurus, and I was equally attracted by many of Epicurus' ideas once I began looking into them.

I think PD3 can be read in another way without disturbing the body of Epicurean thought. As per PD3, the limit of the magnitude of pleasure is freedom from pain. Let's assume there is no more pleasurable a state than ataraxia, total freedom of pain. Does this reduce the Epicurean to an ascetic, called to live a dull, boring life? I would say no, because of the following: is it possible for a human being to be happy with a totally empty, pleasure-free life? The absence of all pleasure surely should be the worst suffering one can endure! True "freedom from pain" IMPLIES the existence of a multitude of pleasures, both simple and complex.

Apologies for my infrequency here. I would like to preface by saying that, while my intention may come across as trying to pin down and prove Epicurean thought as wrong, my goal is only to examine it in order to understand certain claims; that I may see them clearer after discussion.

Cassius:

Hiram:

Without making this post absolutely unreadable... I'd like to just respond to JAWS' point:

I agree my framing was misleading. I should amend "ultimate goal" to "ultimate end." That is, "But what if in striving solely for happiness as the ultimate end, we end up not truly achieving it"?

I don't mean to imply happiness is a summit to be reached. I mean to highlight the fact that happiness is the true end behind all of our actions. You mention, "Our friends etc. are not means to an end, but part of what makes the climb [of life] enjoyable." Then what happens when our friends no longer make our climb enjoyable? We ought to drop them and find new ones that are more fun. The discussion should go similarly to the one with Hiram above.

The reason I put "strong ambitions" is because it seems that certain endeavors require extreme sacrifice without any visible potential for future reward of long-term happiness. An Epicurean would likely abandon the ambition if it looked like it would involve more pain than happiness. But for the strongest of ambitions happiness must be largely disregarded, and the ambition must be put at the forefront. This, as I define it, is an altruistic sacrifice for an ambition. Altruistic sounds a bit strange here, I agree. I am using altruistic to describe the sacrifice of one's happiness for an ambition/person.

Take Elon Musk for example. If he wanted to maximize his net happiness, he would surely leave Tesla and SpaceX and live out a relaxing, extravagant life with his many billions. But he chooses to work day and night, year-round, in order that his ambitions (space travel, smart cars, etc) might become a reality. He values his ambitions more than his happiness, and because of this he is able to put his happiness aside for his ambitions to come true. You might argue that his happiness is inextricably linked to his ambitions, and when he pursues his ambition he is actually pursuing happiness: "And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure." I agree with this! However, my point is this: if happiness is the sole consideration for one's decisions, he is not likely to embark on ambitions which require great long-term sacrifice. "Whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win." Yet those things which are hard to win are sometimes the most valuable - imagine if Elon Musk takes humanity to Mars with SpaceX.

As to the second issue, the source I'm attempting to appeal to is intuition based in reason. Using your example, the murderer who tortures babies: surely this is unjust. If the definition of injustice does not include horrible acts such as this, we should think the definition is improper. To a certain degree, our arguments must coincide with our intuition in order to make sense. Intuition, I think, is the primary basis for Epicurean thought entirely: pleasure is the highest good. Why? It does not need an answer as to "why," because it is self-evident. Likewise, it is self-evident that the prolonged torture of babies is unjust.

(I modified the example from the killing of babies to the torture of babies because it may be argued that death alone is not a misfortune)

Hiram: I think I would agree with you on all of those points. Interestingly, the Aristotelian measure of virtue as it relates to anger (and other emotions) is that the behavior is tempered to the situation. It also seems that tempering our behavior appropriately coincides with greater happiness in the long term.

Cassius: Sure - my post was a bit all over the place so I will try to distill it down to concrete premises and conclusions.

Issue 1: An Epicurean cannot have deep friendships and strong ambitions

1. An altruistic sacrifice is a sacrifice in which an individual gives up his own happiness for someone/something.

2. If an individual sacrifices his own happiness in order to eventually increase his long-term happiness, the sacrifice is not altruistic.

3. Deep relationships and strong ambitions require altruistic sacrifices.

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4. Altruistic sacrifices are necessary in order to have the deepest sort of relationships and ambitions.

5. An Epicurean cannot rationally sacrifice his long-term happiness without the reward of greater happiness.

6. An Epicurean is not able to have the deepest sort of relationships and strong ambitions.

Issue 2: Horrible acts are considered permissible under Epicurean thought

1. A horrible act is a preventable action which severely harms another individual.

2. Injustice, as defined by Epicurus, is only an evil "... in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions."

3. Horrible acts can be committed without apprehension of being discovered.

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4. If a horrible act is done without apprehension of being discovered, it is not unjust.

5. Certain horrible acts are not unjust.

I think we already agreed on Issue 2, and then moved on, but I just thought I'd lay my two arguments out formally so it's more clear.

Cassius - good to speak with you again. The new forum updates look great.

What I'm trying to argue is that no matter how sophisticated the Epicurean in calculating his means to happiness, he will be barred from achieving it. Your first point (1) is the distinction I was drawing between the foolish Epicurean who pursues short-term pleasures versus the sophisticated Epicurean who carefully calculates the action leading best to his longterm happiness.

You describe virtue ethics as a tool "that may work at one moment, but be disastrous at the next moment." My contention is that: if a virtue can be momentarily dropped the instant it is deemed contrary to longterm happiness, the benefits of that virtue for one's character will not be fully achieved (if at all).

I ought to modify my conclusion a bit. Initially I claimed that a decision procedure of virtue ethics and a belief system (value structure) of Epicureanism is the best way to live, and now thanks to your Laertius quote that is considered not at all controversial. It is actually a bit exciting to see such affirmation in that quote. But the objection I am levying, I think, has deeper implications that make it impossible to have virtue ethics as an effective decision-procedure if the true end goal is happiness.

I am an honest man - but when my longterm happiness suffers from telling the truth, I lie.

I am a loyal man - but when my longterm happiness suffers from the endeavor, I abandon it.

I am a courageous man - but I would never do something that I calculate to be overly hard to win. "Whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win." (Letter to Menoeceus)

These virtues are only virtues insofar as they contribute to the end goal. This may not be a problem for an Epicurean. But it is clear that these virtues are not firm if they are conditional to that degree. If a virtue is not firm, you are unreliable in your ability to manifest them. It is very apparent in everyday life when someone does something of seemingly no benefit whatsoever to themself, because they believe it is a virtuous thing to do. Likewise it is even more obvious when someone does something virtuous that also perfectly correlates with their longterm happiness. People who see this don't necessary think much of the virtuous act because it was prudent anyway. We revere the man who jumps on the grenade but scowl at the politician who publicly donates $1m to Africa. It's the motive.

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I noticed as I was writing my reply that you responded to my response to Hiram. I don't want to send you a wall of text, but I should add on with my response to that post:

Your responses to my three analogies are very interesting and I have not heard those positions before, so I am excited to explore the new territory. Please correct me if I misinterpret what you're claiming.

"Ultimately [nature] gives us nothing more than pleasure and pain by which to judge the desirability of all things."

Does she not also give us rationality? Without rationality, we would all be heroin addicts, injecting a substance that causes immense pleasure until a sudden death (forgive me for using this example but it is very convenient). We need not only the capacities for pleasure and pain, and the intuitive abilities to distinguish them, but also the rational capacity in order to be sophisticated and calculated in our pursuit of them. Things which seemingly have no "pleasure content" must be pursued, of a variety of sorts, for greater pleasure in the end. We are not born masters of this skill, and it requires a great amount of rationality. Even with rationality we make mistakes and are always improving.

Now if we accept rationality as a guide for action, along with pleasure and pain, we may get sucked into a Kantian ethical theory which decides to take rationality as the guiding principle of action, instead of pleasure and pain... But that's a bit off-topic (would be interesting to explore elsewhere).

If we must look only at pleasure and pain to show the sociopath's killings to be truly immoral, it seems very simple. The amount of pain he is inflicting in killing many babies is astronomical and is surely greater than the pleasure he receives from the killing. That is a utilitarian argument which might be another can of worms, so feel free to ignore it because there is a more important one:

In the end we cannot live or organize society without this intuitive appeal to right and wrong I am suggesting. You appeal to it as well: "If we think that some mechanism ought to be in place to discourage those results..." But why should we think anything at all of it? There is no absolute to point to, as you said - only pleasure and pain. And if we are not adopting a utilitarian interpretation of Epicureanism, we have no reason at all to think a mechanism discouraging those horrific results should be in place.

If the regulating mechanism ought to be in place, then you open Epicureanism either to intuitionism or to utilitarianism. Without getting too flowery, I can't help but draw a parallel with the Declaration of Independence:

“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness…"

There must be intuitive truths about how humans ought to conduct behavior toward one another that goes outside the limit of the hedonistic calculus. Any regulatory mechanism in society must appeal to these. I believe these truths are based fundamentally in our biology, and that our intuition is a result of natural selection, and partially this is why Epicureanism seems so intuitive to its followers (it does to me).

Very interesting thoughts Hiram. Thank you for correcting my view of Epicurean ethics - PD5 shows the necessity for justice in the decision procedure, as you pointed out. Some problems are still there though as I see it.

PD5 is a bit difficult to believe. It is likely there are sociopaths or others who go through life incredibly unjustly, but who are cunning enough to escape detection without worry. At the very least there are certainly isolated incidents where an opportunity to act unjustly for pleasure presents itself to an individual. Imagine finding a wallet with thousands of dollars in it in a dark alley - is it unjust to steal it as opposed to returning it to the owner?

Looking at the PDs, justice is "...something found mutually beneficial in men's dealings." Also that "if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just." Finally, combining his definition of injustice: "Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions." It appears we have all the conditions necessary for it to be just to steal the wallet.

The situation of the married man, miserable with his job and life, is still troubling because it seems the hedonistic calculus would allow him to flee his family, even if they were not doing anything wrong and it was only his job and the burden of providing that contributed to his misery. I do not quite understand how to DeWitt quote would apply if the man finds himself in this unexpected situation. Situations arise that cannot be planned for.

If the highest good is pleasure and death is nothing to us, then I can perfectly see how an Epicurean could sacrifice himself for a friend. But I know that friendship is cherished only because of its great contribution to a man's happiness. It still seems that this is valuing relationships in the wrong sort of way. This is an objection from alienation levied by Railton (https://pages.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarnes…quentialism.pdf). Imagine you ask your best friend why he helped you out in your time of need, and he answered "because your friendship is integral for my sustained happiness." It just seems like this sort of valuation, as a means to an end, is the wrong kind. Unless Epicurus makes an exception for friendship as an end in itself along with happiness, I can't see a way around it.

Again I should say I am an Epicurean, but am always looking to sharpen my understanding in light of objections.

Hi friends, I would love to hear your input on this subject.

Epicureanism, although best described as a school of thought rather than a code of conduct, has definite ethical implications. In asking, "what ought I do," the Epicurean might advise "that which contributes most to your happiness." All ethical theories have an underlying value structure. Hedonism and utilitarianism value happiness as the sole good, although their theories differ considerably in how that happiness ought be distributed.

Epicureanism also values happiness/pleasure as the sole good. It is the ultimate good by which all other goods claim their worth. Here is the counter-intuitive part: in striving solely for happiness, do we end up falling short of the goal?

A foolish Epicurean might engage in illicit behavior, for example, injecting heroin, as that action elevates his happiness to extreme heights. But this is unsustainable and results in less happiness in the long-run. A sophisticated Epicurean, then, would recognize that he must often times seek happiness in a more roundabout way - indeed, even through suffering.

There is no problem with this so far. But what if, in striving solely for happiness as the ultimate goal, we end up not truly achieving it? If we are to prioritize happiness over all else, then everything else becomes a means to an end. Our relationships, our loved ones, our talents, careers, and projects, are only valuable in their ultimate ability to bring us happiness to us. Is this the right way to view them? I understand that this is a fact if happiness should be seen as the ultimate good. I believe it should be. But in viewing all of these aspects of life as a means to an end, do we lose a certain connection with them that is only possible if they are viewed as ends in themselves?

Let me try to make this less abstract of a discussion. Pretend, for example, that I am a man with a wife, two kids, and a horrible job. I work because I need to provide for my family. But I am miserable all the time, as I work most of my days and only come home to watch TV for an hour and sleep. If I am only tending to a family and job as a means to an ultimate end - my own happiness - should I not simply quit my job and leave my family, move to Costa Rica with my savings, and live a relaxing life on the beach? Surely friends are integral for happiness, but it would be easy to make new friends. If I have no moral integrity nor empathy, my knowledge of the immense pain I must have brought my family would not even bother me. Maybe I am a more effective Epicurean for lacking this moral character altogether. Let's assume I am snide enough to hide my nature.

I have found in my own life that if I conduct my life in a manner that I can be proud of (ie, with strong moral principles), then generally I find my relationships improve. There are certain sacrifices that must be made that are irrational in a framework of happiness as one's only true goal. These sacrifices may not immediately appear to eventually increase one's own net happiness, but in fact do. Sometimes certain sacrifices and struggles appear to lead only to more sacrifice and struggle, rather than to happiness. A sophisticated Epicurean may very well abandon these toils for the path that visibly leads to happiness. But what if, at the end of the tunnel, the light that exposed itself is dimmer than the light that hid in the darkness?

I have arrived personally at this conclusion: to truly achieve happiness, I should live by virtue ethics and become the best person I can be. Become a virtuous person - honest, resilient, tempered, loyal - and a happy life will follow. It seems happiness is most attracted to the good man, rather than the man who is not willing to do things which have an obscured connection to happiness. This is just my opinion that I have arrived at through personal experience.

So - the decision procedure for action: virtue ethics. The sole good, and the truth about our existence: Epicureanism. I have always noticed a huge amount of interplay between Stoicism and Epicureanism despite their differences and fights.

What do you all think? Are certain toils impossible to rationally engage under an Epicurean framework? Does moral character allow for more happiness, or does it restrict happiness? Looking forward to your input.

Along the lines of the most common misunderstandings you mentioned in our discussion months ago!

They distort PD3 "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful," and take it as a call to celibacy.

Well-said Hiram. In fact I would say that even those who claim they are living a life solely for others, and not for their own pleasure, are in reality putting their own pleasure above and beyond that of others. For if he did not derive pleasure in helping others, he would not attempt it. If it suddenly became painful for him to help others, that is, if even after toiling he derived no inner satisfaction from knowing that he had helped another, I believe he would no longer help them.

Although this is very interesting to discuss I will restrain myself from going on, because Daniel is preparing a substantial thread about it.

Cassius: "If we are Epicureans who fully endorse and do not suppress pleasure, then we equate 'freedom from pain' with an experience full of active and ordinary and contemplative and mental and physical pleasures - all types, and we all understand that this is the goal."

I am definitely on board with you there, up until when you say "all types."

"IF, unfortunately, we don't accept the meaning of 'freedom from pain' to be 'pleasure' and 'complete freedom from pain' to be 'full pleasure,'"

I would accept this!

"I hate to think we have people who will come to the forum, read 'I agree with you that Epicurus was not against having much, but I believe he was against actively toiling for more than is necessary for one's freedom from pain,' and think that this is an instruction to lie on a cot in a cave with a supply of bread and water."

Certainly not! It would be foolish to throw away those pleasures which you are fortunate enough to have in your life. It is enough that we may be contended with lying in a cot with a supply of only bread and water, and perhaps a pot of cheese. Isn't this among the most beautiful of Epicurus' doctrines? That in this seemingly lacking state we are more contented, even, then the Hollywood millionaire who chases fame, wealth, and fortune, the one who "flees himself, but he cannot, of course, escape the one he flees, but clings to him unwillingly and hates him because he is sick and does not understand the cause of his disease" (DRM 3.1068-1070).

To be in constant pursuit of unnecessary pleasures results in pain. This in no way suppresses pleasure - it is the only way to attain complete freedom from pain, which is the limit of pleasure. That is why that I disagree that all pleasures must be sought. Fame, wealth, and immortality are pleasures, but you agree they should not be sought. In the same way, a lobster for dinner every day can be reasonably enjoyed if you become rich or fortune befalls you; however, if you were to eat a lobster for dinner every day you would eventually become accustomed to it and it would no longer become a pleasure!

Those natural and unnecessary pleasures we should pursue in intervals. The newcomer may misinterpret this idea that "freedom from pain" should be pursued, instead falsely gleaning that Epicureanism means pursuing asceticism. And just as easily, a newcomer may misinterpret the idea that "all pleasure should be pursued," instead falsely believing that Epicureanism means pursuing empty pleasures such as wealth, fame, honor, immortality, and a host of others than one cannot begin to warn against.

My interpretation is that one should not seek out the cot with bread and water if he is better off; however, if a misfortune befalls him and he is left in a cot with nothing but bread and water, he ought to find contentment, unless there is a pleasure which he is lacking that is necessary for him to be happy.

Daniel, I am incredibly sorry I did not mention this in my post, but the entirety of my post was a direct response to Cassius' numerated reply to my previous post. All of the "you's" and "yours" would have been addressed to Cassius there.

I do not think I have a disagreement with any of the ideas in your previous post (the one before last), except the claim that your perspective goes against PD3.

If one accepts the view that the natural and necessary pleasures are the only sort which should be actively toiled for, then one is able to make sense of PD3 (while also keeping that freedom from pain is not directly proportional to pleasure). Pursuing natural but unnecessary desires is only beneficial to do in intervals, and while it will increase our pleasure, it does not increase our overall net pleasure. That is what I believe PD3 is saying. "The magnitude of pleasure..." where pleasure is net pleasure in one's life. I do not believe Epicurus means the magnitude of an INDIVIDUAL pleasure. There is a hedonist principle called the "hedonist treadmill," which is "the tendency of humans to quickly return to a relatively stable level of happiness despite major positive or negative events or life changes." That is along what I was attempting to say, that our baseline for freedom from pain will adjust if we continually pursue natural but unnecessary desires.

I agree with you that Epicurus was not against having much, but I believe he was against actively toiling for more than is necessary for one's freedom from pain. Those things which are natural but unnecessary should be enjoyed if they come to you, but not constantly sought, because 1) fortune is fickle, and 2) in attaining these pleasures through pain, we become acclimated to them and no longer enjoy them as pleasures.

In response to your statement: "As long as one fully appreciates having much in some pleasure (a fine taste to enjoy costly meals or a love of big TV screens or a personal library full of enjoyable literature), I think Epicurus would have been fine with them enjoying much."

Enjoying much is different from seeking for much in my opinion. If you win the lottery and are able to eat a lobster and steak every day at the finest restaurant, indeed you should enjoy this pleasure, but it is of the natural and unnecessary sort. The money has come to you and therefore Epicurus would not oppose you allowing those luxuries which result to wash over you. However, after enough time eating this fine dinner every day, it will become the baseline, and will no longer be enjoyed as pleasure. It will become necessary maintenance for freedom from pain.

That is why these unnecessary things should be pursued only in intervals. That is the only way to ensure maximum pleasure. From Diogenes Laertius on Epicurus:

"In his correspondence he himself mentions that he was
content with plain bread and water. And again : 'Send me a little
pot of cheese, that, when I like, I may fare sumptuously.' Such was
the man who laid down that pleasure was the end of life. And here is the epigram in which Athenaeus eulogizes him :

Ye toil, O men, for paltry things and incessantly begin strife and war for gain ; but nature's wealth extends to a moderate bound, whereas vain judgements have a limitless range. This message Neocles' wise son heard from the Muses or from the sacred tripod at Delphi."

It seems to me that is a very sensible argument against the principle of maximal utility, Daniel.

I would agree - it's a matter of personal preference. However, I would like to make the claim that even the man who orders his actions to the maximizing of the happiness of others is doing so only because it is maximizing his own happiness.

I find one would be very hardpressed to find a person who acts out of accord of what he thinks to be for his own pleasure. Of course, irrationality is a trait that all people share at some time in their lives, so I am not trying to claim it is impossible for someone to choose the act that doesn't maximize their own pleasure.

If you would like to make a topic regarding the issue I find it very interesting and would certainly not be opposed!

I used to be very attracted to the ideas of the Stoics. One of my favorite books which had a great effect on me was Seneca's Letters to Lucilius. Indeed I still find it beautiful - specifically, its arguments for why one should not worry, and its meditations on enduring pain and turmoil.

In many ways I find there would be agreement with Epicureanism. Of course, I disagree with its position of virtue as the end of action. That is unable to be reconciled. If one were to consolidate these two ends by claiming that what is virtuous for an Epicurean is what maximizes pleasure, it seems that there is much agreement.

For example, a main tenet of Stoicism is that one must order one's will to be in accord with nature. I would say Epicurus agrees with this. It is natural to pursue pleasure over pain. So ordering one's will towards nature is simply ordering it towards pleasure.

I am not very well acquainted with Stoic philosophy, indeed I have much more to learn about even Epicurean philosophy, but from my perspective I believe there to be a great deal of overlap since virtue, for an Epicurean, may very well be the end if it is what is pleasurable. Like the man who toils to provide food for his family - a virtuous act, but one that he pursues because it is pleasurable.

In fact now that I think about it, this topic is mentioned somewhat in Lucretius. I will restrain myself from quoting a paragraph since there is not a short sound-byte about it, but in Book 3 he mentions that life on earth becomes hell for he who acts outside of what is morally just: "But in this life there exists remarkable fear of punishment for remarkable misdeeds." Apart from great pain in punishment, the fear of being caught having committed a reproachable act often outweighs the pleasure attained from the act.

As for how I found the website, I believe I searched up "Epicurean forum" or something similar on Google

It is very fortunate that we have reached an agreement Cassius!

I understand what you mean that it can be confusing for the new student to prioritize freedom from pain. The key is certainly in showing that this is pleasurable in itself.

There are many beautiful quotes from De Rerum Natura that outline this very eloquently. One of the strongest and most surprising implications of this is that death should not be feared. I've been studying that issue rather intensely lately, of course it is another can of worms entirely.

I very much appreciate the deep back-and-forth on this topic. It has served to make my understanding clearer and more precise, so I must thank you for the wonderful exchange.

Thanks for the welcome Daniel!

I would like to elaborate on what I said about the utilitarian perspective. I should have been more specific - I meant the sort of utilitarian like Peter Singer, where although they believe happiness should be maximized, they believe it should be maximized for as many people as possible. That is, the moral action is that which maximizes total human happiness, not just one's own pleasure or happiness.

I found this to be an unnatural and irrational motivation, and that is what I meant. However, the utilitarian perspective that pleasure should be maximized for the individual according to Epicurus is one that I agree with. Sorry for not making this clear.

I could not agree more that this is an extremely important issue because of the implications of each of our viewpoints. It's an argument about the best way to live in the end - a life free from pain, or a life minimizing pain but striving for pleasures?

It can be reasonably assumed Epicurus underwent significant struggle and difficulty in creating and defending these doctrines which have survived for millennia. If he were to weigh freedom from pain as the highest pleasure, wouldn't he have been better off to live a withdrawn life free from all struggles?

I would say no. Perhaps to be free from pain, Epicurus NEEDED to do these things and go through these struggles (ie, natural and necessary desire). To live any other way would leave him unfulfilled and in a state of constant pain or emptiness. Perhaps his motivation was freedom from pain, too.

1. I agree that absence of pain is a measure of quantity in that the quantity of painful experiences is 0 or near 0. "But nothing is more delightful than to possess sanctuaries which are lofty, peaceful, and well fortified by the teachings of the wise" (DRN 2.7). Sanctuaries of course meaning freedom from pain. I do not think that quote from the Letter to Menoeceus contradicts this. Before it reads: "The thought of life is no offense to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil." I do not think this quote is saying that intensity of pleasure outweighs freedom from pain, as freedom from pain is not necessarily implied in the longer lifespan. I agree in that it says magnitude trumps length.

2. The quote "And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure” is in congruence with the interpretation that freedom from pain is the most important consideration, I believe. Let us imagine a simple case where a man must farm wheat and slaughter cattle to have food for his family. This is a pain he chooses because the pleasure afterwards outweighs it. To be most free from pain, the man must pursue this inconvenience.

There is a distinction between types of pleasure: natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, unnatural and necessary, and unnatural and unnecessary. It is advisable to go through pain for a greater pleasure when that pleasure is natural and necessary, such as food for one’s family. However, when you suggest that natural and unnecessary pleasures should be sought out, implying that it is okay to desire them, I have to disagree. I have gathered that you are a very strict utilitarian when it comes to these things – greater pleasure should always be sought and desired. I do not think Epicurus believes this – I think he believes natural and unnecessary pleasures should not be desired, nor sought except at intervals; in fact, this is one of his most beautiful and enlightening doctrines that I’ve come to admire. But allow me to extend an olive branch before making my argument that this is indeed what Epicurus believes: I would say that Epicurus believes that seeking for natural and unnecessary pleasures is NOT maximizing OVERALL greater pleasure.

Here is the quote which supports my argument. It is long, but you have read it before, no doubt, and I would like to put it here because it is so pertinent:

“Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.”

A costly diet would be a natural and unnecessary desire. Epicurus says here that removing the desire for unnecessary pleasures (ie, a costly diet) is a better condition because of two reasons. 1) It allows us to take pleasure in unnecessary desires at intervals, because if we no longer desire them then their deprivation will not cause pain. 2) It protects us from fortune, which is fickle.

The idea is that we will eventually grow acclimated to these unnecessary pleasures, at which point they become our baseline and no longer are as pleasing as they once were. Then the pain we invest into them is not going into a pleasure at all, but it is being invested only to free us from the pain of not having these pleasures. Which brings me to the next argument:

Your claim is that freedom from pain = pleasure. I agree that being free from pain is A pleasure. But I 100% disagree that in increasing pleasure we are becoming increasingly free from pain. Pain is a positive experience. If we break our leg, we feel pain. It is not like air in a jar, where if you remove some pleasurable experience, more pain manifests itself. That is why I disagree with the jar analogy. If I remove jelly beans (pleasurable experiences) from the jar, I create more air in the jar (pain). That is false on the face of it the way I see it. If I’m eating ice cream and I finish the ice-cream, thereby ending that pleasurable experience, am I creating pain? The jelly bean was removed, and air filled its place, so according to your model I would be creating pain by finishing my ice cream.

Forgive me also if I have argued different things in different posts - I am working these issues out and growing as I talk about them, and I wouldn't want to limit myself to something I said if I believe it to be wrong later.

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I focus on pain because of Epicurus' idea that maximum pleasure is freedom from pain. He has stated "For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid[...]" I would agree with you that pleasures are very subjective, so a universal ranking would be inappropriate. You bring up an interesting point in the man toiling five years for five minutes on the mountaintop.

The five minutes is likely in the "natural but unnecessary for happiness" category. Didn't Epicurus also believe that we should not seek that which is unnecessary for happiness, but we should enjoy them if they were to come to us? I would differentiate this from toiling for family, friends, or a fulfilling career, because these things may very well be necessary for happiness for some. There is also an interpretation of the "natural/unnatural and necessary/unnecessary" categories, which bases them on survival instead of on happiness, but both are valid (which Epicurus recognizes in his letter to Menoeceus). The man toiling for five years for this brief pleasure of the mountaintop is lacking a tranquility of mind for these five years in doing so. A desire which would result in five years of the lack of ἀταραξια seems to be one that Epicurus would second-guess.

If the goal for Epicurus is pleasure, and if "pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain," is the goal not then complete freedom from pain?

To remove all sources of pain means to be left only with pleasure if our lives have any substance whatsoever. I think even the most unfortunate of lives do not consist of solely pain. So the removal of all sources of pain would result in the baseline of pleasure, which death would not fulfill. There is also intrinsic pleasure in being free from pain. If I may quote Lucretius:

"Sweet it is, when the wind whips the water on the great sea,

to gaze from the land upon the great struggles of another,

not because it is a delightful pleasure for anyone to be distressed,

but because it is sweet to observe those evils which you lack yourself."

This is the sort of pleasure which death or sleep could not provide.

I erred if I tried to argue that freedom from pain in the absence of any pleasure whatsoever is desirable. But I do think freedom from pain always results in pleasure in any practical sense.

Let me know what you think about this, I always appreciate the different perspective.

Very interesting thoughts Cassius. I will do my best to try to understand them and offer an interpretation.

I understand what you are saying with the jelly bean analogy. It is a mistake to rank pleasures based on their capacity to achieve freedom from pain, because the definition of pain is suffering, and water and wine are both equally capable of removing thirst. However, conceding this another problem comes up:

That "pleasure reaches its maximum limit at freedom from pain." If this is the case, pleasures must be ranked based on their capacity to achieve freedom from pain. But as you have illustrated with the water-wine example, two pleasures which are equally capable of removing the pain of thirst differ in their ability to please. And still, other drinks may be more pleasurable than wine which are equally capable of removing pain, and so forth. So why is it that pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of pain, unless one can claim that any increase in pleasure is simply an increase in freedom from pain (which seems untrue)?

A nuance I have found in our discussion is the difference between "perfect pleasure" and "perfect freedom from pain." It seems to me they are the same according to PD3; however, what of the man whose IV is injected with morphine, versus the man who is satisfied minimally in that all of his sources of pain are eliminated? One man is experiencing greater pleasure than the other.

Perhaps it is that, practically in one's life, it is a mistake to pursue pleasure beyond freedom from pain, because both the toil to achieve such pleasures and the anxieties accompanying them will render them, in the end, "un-free" from pain. Therefore we should let them come to us, but we should not seek them.

I would contest then the idea that the vessel of human life cannot be expanded. Or if it cannot, that perfect pleasure exists when it is full. If pleasure is simply dopamine, then the amount we experience can range anywhere from a drink of water to methamphetamine. If freedom from pain is when the vessel is full - and absent of pain - then the pleasure of methamphetamine would somehow overflow the vessel, which is not possible. Thus it must either need to be able to expand, or the vessel must be large enough to allow for the pleasures of even the most intense sort.

It seems to me the vessel is extremely large, and freedom from pain is when the only items in the vessel are pleasurable ones, and no painful ones remain. Although the vessel is not full, attempting to fill the vessel with excess pleasures would only result in pain in the long run, as the drug mentioned would. So it is not a problem that the vessel is not full, it is enough that it consists of no pain.

PD3 states "Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together."

So therefore, to say that some pleasures are more pleasurable than others is to say that some pleasures are better capable of removing sources of pain than others.

To make this claim would mean that complete freedom from pain is unattainable, because surely the only pleasure capable of the utter annihilation of any pain would be that perfect pleasure which does not exist. Is this the correct implication?