Posts by Don

One issue I see in this discussion is "What do you* mean by 'know'?"

* btw "You" in the general sense, not you specifically.

Quote from Cassius

The problem is that of coming to grips with whether it is ever possible to "know" anything

There are various senses of that word "know" so I would be curious to know (LOL) what word Plato used specifically. For example:

I know I'm alive

I know where I am

I know 2+2=4

I know the capital of the US is Washington DC

I know the universe was in a hot dense state at one point

And so on

I freely confess I haven't read Plato's Meno, but glancing at the ol' Wikipedia article, this made me LOL:

Quote from Meno article on WP

Meno's theme is also dealt with in the dialogue Protagoras, where Plato ultimately has Socrates arrive at the opposite conclusion: virtue can be taught. Likewise, while in Protagoras knowledge is uncompromisingly this-worldly, in Meno the theory of recollection points to a link between knowledge and eternal truths.

So can Plato be taken seriously if he comes to opposite opinions? I'm all for reconsidering opinions and beliefs in light of new evidence, but how can there be a "Meno problem" if even its author provides multiple answers?

Quote

Socrates rephrases the question, which has come to be the canonical statement of the paradox:

[A] man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.

— translated by Benjamin Jowett, 1871

There's the old, I believe, Weinberger quote about:

• Known knowns
• Known unknowns
• Unknown unknowns

We can investigate "known unknowns" through prior experience. Unknown unknowns can eventually come to light as we experience more. We can investigate unfamiliar phenomena, test, observe, etc. via knowledge we have. "Meno" isn't really a problem unless one defines terms in such a way as to create a problem. Or so it seems to me.

PS. And when we "learn" something, we're not recollecting from a past life. We build on experience and knowledge that we've acquired or that we have a genetic predisposition for. Take language. Babies have an innate ability to make sounds, them to imitate sounds or communicative gestures (I always remember video of the baby with deaf parents inserting their hand, open close open close, "babbling" in sign language), then we learn how to formally put sounds and words and sentences together. That's just one example, but I believe at least an illustrative one.

Quote from Pacatus

Don

I admit I was not responding to Chalmers per se. Just to the notion that there are no such “hard questions” (or that they are readily answerable by our current understandings of neurobiology). For the rest, my post – and the example of intentionality – stands. (Do I need to reaffirm that I don't ascribe to any "supernaturalism"?)

Fully, completely, and totally agree there are some really difficult, hard questions to answer about how the world works! Zero argument there. Including, of course, in neuroscience. But like Alexander the Oraclemonger's snake god, I'm sure, in the end, there's a rational physical explanation for them... It just might take awhile longer to find the explanation to topics like intentionality, for example.

And you're officially on record for anti-supernaturalism Of that, I never doubted. and, mea culpa, if my post came off as combative. Certainly not my intention

Quote from Cassius

Along the lines of the Asimov quote that Pacatus listed, I would not admit that Epicurus was "wrong" at all. Incomplete as to details, yes, but that does not make the overall theory "wrong." We don't need the details nearly as often as we need the overall outline.

Hmmm... I don't know about this: "not 'wrong' at all"? Maybe in broad outline, as in physical processes were at work in the eidola theory, it was not wrong. I don't think calling eidola theory "incomplete" is even the way to express it. It's not like we've added to more details about the eidola and how they're produced. I would contend that we ignore details at our peril. The sound waves and chemical compounds and photons and particles and so on that lead to sensation are not eidola. Our minds are not impacted by subtle eidola, engraving channels in the subtle atoms of our psykhē.

I give credit to Epicurus for positing a step on the way to our incomplete but fuller understanding.

I give credit to Epicurus for staying firm on physical material processes of sensation.

I agree on all that and its importance in the evolution of understanding how things work.

So, if you're saying that the "high-level summary of the details" is that "sensation and consciousness is the result of knowable physical processes" then, okay, that's not wrong. But as to whether I'm going think of my thoughts as the result of eidola impacting my psykhē or whether they're electrical neural activity with input from other internal and external stimuli, I'm taking the latter.

Quote from Cassius

The conceptual framework of particles striking our senses, and then the body processing them in natural logical ways toward conclusions we can be confident about, is the key.

I see that as so broad though that I ask "Could that just as easily correspond to Plato's flashlight/emission model of vision?"

Quote from Cassius

my reasoning her is based on the premise that we are looking to build Epicureans who can live happily

Agreed, but Epicurus also said "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole." So, it seems to me he felt the broad outline was important to keep in mind at all times, but investigating how the world worked with "continuous energy" gives one the confidence to have "calm enjoyment of life."

Quote from Pacatus

I don’t think that one has to go to some supernatural/mystical “woo” to recognize that there are hard questions of consciousness – which is probably worth a thread of its own. For example: intentionality.

Just to be clear: I don't think answering the "how" consciousness is easy. It's a "hard problem." But I understand Chalmers as saying there's something"more" in addition to neurons and the brain and body to account for it. That's what I meant by woo. I come down on the late Daniel Dennett side (mostly) when it comes to looking for nonphysical mechanisms (ie, there's not any/it's all physical/material stuff). I fully admit I could be wrong about Chalmers, but that's the direction I saw him heading in in what I've seen or read.

Quote from Cassius

As I see it, the important issue is whether the mind and the sense work through material / bodily means or through some other means. We aren't a biochemistry group, and it would be as unproductive for us to get into the details of biochemistry as it would be to get into the latest discussions of particle physics.

Oh, I wouldn't suggest we become a biochemistry or particle physics forum; however, we've had any number of threads on neuroscience and physics. I don't advocate getting into the weeds of any specific science, but I think we have to keep distinct the ancient theories and the current theories (as in "a formal statement of the rules on which a subject of study is based or of ideas that are suggested to explain a fact or event or, more generally, an opinion or explanation; as in evolutionary theory" and NOT "it's just a theory").

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus' general approach remains perfectly valid...

Absolutely. I will be the first to contend that there is a through-line from Epicurus to modern scientific theories in that ALL are based on the truth of there being a material, physical universe *and* the laws governing said physical universe are knowable *and* there's no mystical, supernatural woo underlying the universe.

Quote from Cassius

But simply saying that it is sophistry doesn't persuade the legions of normal people outside this group who need to be provided both an explanation as to why it is sophistry and an alternative that makes sense from an Epicurean point of view.

So what's your solution to this problem other than to point out the natural, material basis for sensations? I fully realize there's Chalmer's supposed "hard problem" of consciousness where he seems to want to smuggle in supernatural or mystical bases for consciousness. I still think consciousness is just the sum total of our physical sensations, neurons, gut bacteria, and what not working in concert. Sure, it's complex!! But, in the end, we're still just physical beings sensing a physical world just trying to get through the day.

And I agree with Asimov's spectrum of "wrongness." BUT while eidola were less wrong than Plato's flashlight idea of sensation, it still was more wrong than our current understanding. There's nothing "wrong" with that, and I find it interesting to delve into how Epicurus came up with that approach. BUT we also need to understand why it was wrong, how it was wrong, and be humble enough to know how far we STILL have to go to understand how the universe works on all levels.

I'm going to start my response/rebuttal/reaction by saying that we do not sense things through the impact of eidola on our sense organs. Our bodies - all bodies - are not casting off "films of atoms" that travel through space. Yes, our eyes interact with photons. Our noses interact with molecules in the air. Our tongues interact with chemicals. And so on. Is it interesting to understand how Epicurus was reacting to his contemporaries' philosophical ideas? Sure. No argument there. However, Epicurus called his students to study nature and "how things work" in the material world. On that track, I think it behooves Epicureans living in the 21st century to understand how sensations and the brain work to their best of our ability in the here and now as well.

Quote from Cassius

Also, I think we can consider that concepts like "good," or "the good" or "the highest good" or "pleasure" (when viewed as a concept) or " the highest pleasure," or "gods" are, like virtue, good examples of the issue.

Determining what these things at the start of our quest is not an easy thing.

Those are different concepts from my understanding:

"good" is used by Epicurus to simply mean "that which brings pleasure." There is no other meter by which to determine "good" or "bad" other than the feelings of pleasure and pain.

"the good" or "the highest good" is simply "that to which all other actions/things point." Why do we do anything? We do it for our pleasure. Whether one agrees with this statement or not is irrelevant, because I have come to believe that it is simply a statement of fact. At the end of all questions of "Why?" the final answer is going to be "because it makes me feel pleasure." Substitute "satisfaction, well-being, etc." as the penultimate answer before saying "pleasure" but I believe that's the final answer you're going to have to give if one truthfully and honestly answers the question.

The "zarkoflex" example in the first video does nothing to alleviate my contention that this is all sophistry. If I tell you to go out into the world and find a lehmä, you won't know what that is. Where do I look? As the speaker said, maybe you google it. Maybe it doesn't come up. You keep looking. Eventually, you find out its the Finnish word for "cow." So you go to the farmer's field and point to the lehmä. You had heard about cows and seen cows and pictures of cows, you just didn't know the word lehmä. Same with a zarkoflex. If it exists in the world, it can still exist without your knowing the word for it.

This seems to be one reason Epicurus was teaching that we need to look at the most basic definition of things and why he didn't like Socrates'/Plato's obfuscation and redefining terms willy-nilly.

More later....

I still see the most cogent explanation of prolepsis as being the pattern recognition faculty that gives order to the cacophony of sense perception, including eidola falling on the mental sense perception faculty.

1. Eidola bombard our senses from the external world.
2. Perceiving those sensations are our confirmation there is a material, existing world.
3. So it is true there is a material universe existing.
4. Patterns of sensations that indicate individual objects and concepts are given shape by the prolepses.
5. That there are individual discernible objects and concepts is true through the prolepses of them.
6. Prolepses are reinforced and refined by repeated sensations.
7. Sensations and prolepses automatically evoke feelings of pleasure or pain prior to any reasoning.
8. Pleasure and pain are criteria of truth because they arise before reason kicks in, and the those external phenomena evoke feelings within us, again reconfirming the existence of a world outside ourselves.

That's how I make sense of prolepses and how they fit into being criteria of truth.

Quote from Cassius

If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary.
If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible.
Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.
An implicit premise: Either you know what you’re looking for or you don’t know what you’re looking for.

I'll admit I haven't watched the video yet, but this seems to me just pure sophistry and rhetorical doublespeak.

We interact with the world as it is. We have a finite number of experiences. With those experiences, we confront new experiences. We use the experiences we have to understand novel experiences. Lather, rinse, repeat.

Quote from briefvacation

about what the Jewish and Christian reactions were to Epicureanism.

You might be interested in this thread:

Thread

On Use Of The Term Apikoros / Apiqoros / Bikouros Against Epicureans

Admin Edit

This thread came back to life in 2024. Unfortunately I can't remember the context in which it was first written. it starts with a paste of a comment from someone else, and I believe that comment itself was in response to the "What if Life Were All About Pleasure?" article. As a result the original thread was a little disjointed, although the intent is clear - to focus on the friction between Epicurean philosophy and certain of its opponents. I am therefore cleaning up the original

…

Cassius

December 17, 2018 at 9:14 AM

Note, Acts is a literary invention. Paul went to Athens, but what he actually said is unknown. He had no secretary following him around. Is there a tradition of what he generally said? Probably. I'd it known how he was generally received? Probably. Traditionally , he made some converts, including Dionysius, Damaris, and some others.

So, my point is, we are more than allowed to imagine what the Stoics and Epicureans said, just as much a the author of Acts put words in the mouths of the Athenians and Paul.

Since the Epicureans and Stoics are mentioned by name in the Christian New Testament, I'd like to offer a "game" of sorts. Of the quotes and actions of the two ancient schools, who said what? Epicureans or Stoics? Here are the lines, then the full section in context:

• Some said, “What does this pretentious babbler (σπερμολόγος) want to say?”
• Others said, “He seems to be a proclaimer of foreign divinities. (ξένων δαιμονίων)”
• (They) asked him, “May we know what this new teaching is that you are presenting? 20 It sounds rather strange to us, so we would like to know what it means.”
• When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some scoffed
• others said, “We will hear you again about this.”
• But some of them joined him and became believers

Who said/did each one: Epicureans, Stoics, or other pagan Athenians in the crowd? Of course, there's absolutely no way to know for sure. Think of it as a thought experiment.

Quote from Acts 17: 16-34

16 While Paul was waiting for them in Athens, he was deeply distressed to see that the city was full of idols. 17 So he argued in the synagogue with the Jews and the devout persons and also in the marketplace[d] every day with those who happened to be there. 18 Also some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers debated with him. Some said, “What does this pretentious babbler want to say?” Others said, “He seems to be a proclaimer of foreign divinities.” (This was because he was telling the good news about Jesus and the resurrection.) 19 So they took him and brought him to the Areopagus and asked him, “May we know what this new teaching is that you are presenting? 20 It sounds rather strange to us, so we would like to know what it means.” 21 Now all the Athenians and the foreigners living there would spend their time in nothing but telling or hearing something new.

22 Then Paul stood in front of the Areopagus and said, “Athenians, I see how extremely spiritual you are in every way. 23 For as I went through the city and looked carefully at the objects of your worship, I found among them an altar with the inscription, ‘To an unknown god.’ What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you. 24 The God who made the world and everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by human hands, 25 nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mortals life and breath and all things. 26 From one ancestor[e] he made all peoples to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would live, 27 so that they would search for God[f] and perhaps fumble about for him and find him—though indeed he is not far from each one of us. 28 For ‘In him we live and move and have our being’; as even some of your own poets have said,

‘For we, too, are his offspring.’

29 “Since we are God’s offspring, we ought not to think that the deity is like gold or silver or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of mortals. 30 While God has overlooked the times of human ignorance, now he commands all people everywhere to repent, 31 because he has fixed a day on which he will have the world judged in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed, and of this he has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead.”

32 When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some scoffed, but others said, “We will hear you again about this.” 33 At that point Paul left them. 34 But some of them joined him and became believers, including Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman named Damaris and others with them.

I was a bit confused with the ascender in your 4734, but that does appear to be a variant ēta form.

DigiVatLib

284v - cod. Vaticanus Palatinus Graecus 261 (=S)

That said, I'll need to check the other manuscripts. Some may have μηδέ after that first και.

Pertinent section from Paris codex MSS (Gr. 1759), known as P (Publication date : 1075-1150 ). That second line here (which starts "119") looks to me certainly like:

και μην και γαμησειν και τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν...

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, μήν

verily, truly? for μην?

There is a δε once you get to δε ποτε βιου γαμησειν...

Quote from Eikadistes

Don do you have a copy of the original manuscript?

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/user/311-don/#wall/comment484

This post on my wall has links to the available online digitized DL manuscripts.

As far as "original," that's open to definition/interpretation. We certainly don't have DL's autographs or his sources in many cases. The ones we do have are centuries removed from him; however, they're the best we have!

FYI the author...

Professor James Warren | Faculty of Classics

Thanks for posting! Some of these chapter titles look very interesting!

The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists

Cambridge Core - Classical Philosophy - The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists

www.cambridge.org

Quote from Don

https://intellectinterviews.com/2020/05/cosmic…ral-philosophy/

An interview with O'Connor from 2020.