It looks like the digitized manuscript of the Oblongus is not available remotely:
https://catalogue.leidenuniv.nl/permalink/31UKB_LEU/18s393l/alma990037160190302711
It looks like the digitized manuscript of the Oblongus is not available remotely:
https://catalogue.leidenuniv.nl/permalink/31UKB_LEU/18s393l/alma990037160190302711
I'm intrigued. For ease of reference:
Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10.5858] "We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense (Τό τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει) as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended,89 nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space ; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes : there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater ; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.
[59] "We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom (ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον); it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude ; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest (τε τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ)# things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.
#Note in Hicks' English translation:
i.e. "uncompounded." But von Arnim's ἀμερῆ, "void of parts," is more suitable.
n p.59 he talks specifically about minimum magnitudes devoid of parts (ta elachista kai amere).
Hicks has:
τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ (ta elachista kai amigē)
This might be one to check the papyri later.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀμι^γής
I *really* like that one.
Thank you, TauPhi!!
This part intrigued me:
the most important of them were previously quoted by H. Diels.
This is no doubt Hermann Diels who co-wrote some papers with Usener and some of his own work. If Powarkow provided any specific citations to Diels, I'd be curious to dig those up on Internet Archive. Unfortunately, Powarkow's book isn't digitized on Internet Archive.
instead of wasting resources teaching kids lots of material they are either unwilling or unable to absorb, it would be better to pick those that have real talent and focus on educating them so that they can assume upon maturity those jobs and responsibilities that require specialization and education.
I would offer a rephrasing of that to:
Find out what talent (and interests) the children have and what excites them about learning and focus on educating that with an emphasis on the individual student.
This would be an overhaul of the entire educational system, but it could potentially have far reaching effects. From cookie cutter to artisanal pastries, so to speak.
Education can't be just about jobs and responsibilities. Yes, life skills and practical skills should be taught (and often aren't now). But education should provide a platform for exploration, experimentation, critical thinking, and finding out answers in a supportive environment.
One thing I'm not clear on with katastematic pleasure being "a permanent condition as produced by practice" is whether this implies that the practice must be ongoing for the permanence to remain.
Is Don or anyone saying that Epicurus classified katastematic pleasure as "permanent?" Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?
I suppose yes, for my part... Without all the Christian baggage. And it's not just saying "I believe"!!
If you root out false beliefs, superstitions, fears of divine retribution, anxiety about death, etc., yes, those are gone and permanent, IF you've really put the work in to pull them out, root and branch (to stick with the agricultural metaphors). It's the work of really studying, thinking on it, and internalizing that's the hard part.
This podcast episode hits on a number of topics that have been being discussed on the forum recently. Definitely worth a listen!
I had further thoughts this morning on the importance of what's going on under the surface of DL 10.136. I think I've stumbled on this idea before but never explicitly formulated it.
In that citation from Epicurus's On Choices and Rejections (sorry, I really dislike "Avoidances"), he posits two kinds of pleasure:
A. "katastematic" pleasures which I think we agree has something to do with "stability," however we're defining that for the moment.
B. pleasures derived from motion by means of activity.
Here's my morning thought:
Pleasures of the B variety are initiated or are derived through motion by means of activity. I get the impression that κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ refers to motion initiated both by voluntary action of oneself and activity acting upon a person.
LSJ has ενέργεια defined, in part, as the opposite of εξις (exis): "a being in a certain state, a permanent condition as produced by practice (πρᾶξις)."
That εξις "a permanent condition as produced by practice" sounds a lot like what I and others have been trying to say about "katastematic" pleasures. Epicurus himself wrote that he produced the permanent condition of his calm life through his practice of studying natural science. And I interpret that "calm" as referring to his mind being calmed from fears, anxieties, etc. of gods, death, etc. by internalizing - by *knowing* - the natural explanation of phenomena.
So, my offering is that katastematic pleasure is the pleasure derived from slowing down and experiencing the "permanent condition as produced by practice." If we want to describe it as "background" that could work, but that seems now to me to shortchange the experience. Katastematic pleasure derives from practice, study, work, activity, ἐνεργείᾳ, but once you have that stable foundation, no one can take it away.
I need to think about this more, but this is off the top of my head on a Friday morning.
C. reap: A leads to B
The actual word used is:
ἐποίησα (epoiēsa)
1st person singular aorist indicative active
from ποιέω (poieō, from which we actually get the word poet)
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ποιέω
In this case:
I created
I brought into existence
I produced
I made
So, "reap" is a more poetic but entirely acceptable way of saying "From the pleasure of my study of natural science, I produced my calm life."
I think you're on to something, burninglights , especially in light of what Epicurus says in the letter to Herodotus (to paraphrase):
[37] "I devote my continuous energy to the study of natural science and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this."
A. "my continuous energy to the study of natural science" (pleasure through motion)
B. "the calm enjoyment of a life like this." (katatematic pleasure)
C. reap: A leads to B
You just to put the work in on A to live the calm life of B.
I'm so conditioned to just say "kinetic pleasure" that I wanted to once again, for my own peace of mind (pun intended), to look again at what Epicurus is quoted as saying in DL 10.136:
ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."
That last line:
ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται
has some interesting constructions.
κατὰ κίνησιν (accusative)
along/through/in motion, as opposed to "rest" (στάσις; related to katastematic)
ἐνεργείᾳ (dative) by means of activity/action (opposite of dynamie)
There's a lot of to-do in philosophical discourse of the time about enargeia vs dynamei that is beyond me for now. It seems to do with actual action vs potential power/strength?
In any case, just saying "kinetic vs katastematic" masks a whole lot of stuff going on under the surface.
To bring this back to burninglights ' original question:
The Greek word for gratitude is χαρις (kharis) which is directly related to χαρα (khara), the specific kinetic/energetic pleasure in DL10.136. And both words are related to χαίρω (khairō), rejoice, take pleasure in a thing, etc.:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χαίρω
So, to provide a response to the original question, in light of the etymology of the words, "gratitude" is a kinetic/energetic pleasure.
Searching the texts for mention of the pleasures Epicurus cites in On Choices and Avoidances is a good idea.
However, I would offer that it's important to search the Greek words and not the English translations. That said, I'm curious to look at your citations to see what words are used in the Greek text!
The words Epicurus uses are in DL 10.136 are:
καταστηματικαί ἡδοναί (katastematikai hedonai) "katastematic pleasures"
κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται (kata kinesin energeia blepontai) "(pleasures) consisting in motion and activity"
Sometimes the English translation use "joy" or "delight" or similar words to translate hedone "pleasure" which obscures what the word used is. So, I'm really not trying to be difficult, but translations can really obscure what the actual text actually says sometimes.
Here's where I replaced words conveying katastematic and "kinetic" pleasures:
εὐφροσύνη occurs in Diogenes Laertius, Book 10 in the 10.136, but also occurs in the
μᾶλλόν τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις.
"He will find more delight than other men in contemplation/consideration/speculation."
See my website on the characteristics of the sage:
The word is also used in another form as the title of the book that Timocrates wrote, Εὐφραντοῖς, to slander Epicurus, mentioned at DL 10.6.
A form is in VS48:
While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end.
πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑστέραν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιείν, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ ὦμεν· ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐπὶ πέρας ἔλθωμεν, ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι. (lit. to make merry, to cheer; so here "equally merry")
I've also found εὐφροσύνη in the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda:
Fragment 215, column 1
[5 lines missing]
[- ca.6 -]ἀ̣π̣ελέν[χ]ε-
τ̣αι. vac. 1 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν̣
αἱ μέν εἰσιν κεναί,
αἱ δὲ φυσικαί. vac. 1 αἱ μὲν
οὖν φυσικαὶ τὰ τοσαῦ-
τα ζητοῦσιν ὅσα εἰς
τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν
εὐφροσύνην ἐ[στίν]
[ἀνανκαῖα, αἱ δὲ κεναὶ]
[5 lines missing]
Of the desires some are vain, others natural. Now those that are natural seek after such things as [are necessary] for our nature’s enjoyment, [while those that are vain] .................................................................................
fragment 10, column 4
[τοσ]ό̣ν[δε προστίθημι].
[ἐπει]δ̣ὴ̣ [ὄναρ] τελο̣ῦ̣μεν
τ̣ὰ̣ ̣ἀ̣φροδείσια, ὡς κ̣αὶ ὕ-
παρ, οὐδέν ἐ̣σ̣τι τὸ μ̣ά-
την ἀπ' αὐτῶν εὐφρ̣ο-
σύνην λαμβάνε̣ι̣ν̣
ὅτι καθεύδομεν.
...we perform sexual acts (ἀ̣φροδείσια aphrodeisia), it is no good arguing that the pleasure we derive from them is unreal because we are asleep.
Those are the texts I had readily at hand this evening. I don't think I searched for euphrosyne before, and I'm curious if there are more. I think khara (the other "kinetic" pleasure) has more references.
Getting back to the discussion, I find it interesting that Diogenes of Oenoanda uses euphrosyne to describe the pleasures of sex. The famous fragment of Epicurus's includes sex:
67. I do not think I could conceive of the good without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀκροαμάτῶν, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατʼ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις.
The "sight of bodies and forms" is actually ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις, lit. "seeing pleasant movements" and that last word is kineseis, directly related to the word in DL 10.136: "(pleasures) consisting in motion and activity"
Could it be that pleasures, writ large, can be categorized as either katastematic and "those consisting of motion and activity" and within those, sub-categorized as either forms of ataraxia and aponia or khara and euphrosyne? The Oenoanda inscription seems to imply that the pleasures of sex are a form of euphrosyne. Diogenes Laertius seems to imply that contemplation (or festivals if you take the other tack) consist of euphrosyne. VS48 implies one should have euphrosyne on the road of life.
I'm just throwing this out as food for thought for now. For now, it's after midnight so...
***
Morning Postscript...
In looking at my other post referenced above, I noticed that I said Epicurus also uses the word ἐνεργείᾳ from DL10.136 in the Letter to Herodotus:
[37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous **energy** (τὸ συνεχὲς **ἐνέργημα** (energēma)) and **reap the calm enjoyment of a life** (ἐγγαληνίζων) like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole."
[37] "Ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ᾠκειωμένοις φυσιολογίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ, παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ ἐποίησά σοι καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐπιτομὴν καὶ στοιχείωσιν τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν.
The - let's call it - "kinetic/energetic" pleasure of *studying* natural science leads to ἐγγαληνίζων "the calm enjoyment" of life which to me sounds like a katastematic pleasure. ἐγγαληνίζων literally means "spend calmly." Which interestingly enough is related to γαληνός "calm, especially of the sea"! There's that ocean/sea metaphor again in relation to stable katastematic pleasure.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, γαληνός
I think we have to entertain the possibility that THE katastematic pleasures are simply ataraxia and aponia.
Ataraxia is the tranquility of mind that results from ridding one's mind of fears of death and the gods and obtaining a proper understanding of natural phenomena, and so on. I'm working on a good description of aponia. It's not just "freedom from pain" in a banal sense.
Ataraxia becomes the background of our experience. Once we really lock it in (*really* and truly lock it in!! I know I'm not there yet!), we approach our all our other experiences with that stability and tranquility of mind that can't be shaken or taken away.
The kinetic/katastematic distinction, from my perspective, was most helpful in distinguishing the Epicurus's school from the Cyrenaics. It established the Garden as embracing ALL pleasure as the good, not just the kinetic of the Cyrenaics.
The trouble is that *kinetic* does tend to imply "in motion" and *katastematic* implies ....
Stability.
PS. I should have read further down before replying You raise some interesting points.
It's all about context. Self-defense? To prevent them from killing others? Etc etc etc.
For the record, I have no doubt that Epicurus and all the classical Epicureans made this distinction. Primarily from DL 10.136:
The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."
plus other references in Metrodorus and other texts.
That said, off the top of my head, I agree with Cassius that feelings of gratitude would be a kinetic pleasure.
HA! Not ONLY of Plato:
Touché, mon ami! Well played!