"the academic world ... has labeled Epicurus as a philosophy for losers, misfits, loners, and recluses."
I would add "*mistakenly* labeled" in there just to be clear to people.
"the academic world ... has labeled Epicurus as a philosophy for losers, misfits, loners, and recluses."
I would add "*mistakenly* labeled" in there just to be clear to people.
Maybe structure it as an Epicurean book discussion using Dr. Austin's book?
We also have a two part podcast episode with her:
Welcome aboard.
Not in Toronto, unfortunately. Feel free to use the resources on the forum here for discussions etc at your Meetup. Keep us posted how it goes!
KD 17 Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.
One who is just, moral, and virtuous has peace of mind; but one who is unjust is overflowing with agitation, confusion, and uncertainty. (ταραχῆς, i.e., the opposite of αταραξία).
This Principal Doctrine just makes sense. If you are just in your dealings with other people, moral in your actions, and do your best to display fair behavior, you have no need to be troubled. You've done your best. Don't get me wrong. Bad things will happen to you, and some people still won't like you. But you don't control that. Your mind can be at peace. On the other hand, if you treat people poorly, display amoral behavior, and are basically an objectively poor excuse for a human being, you have reason to be troubled! People will be out to get you. If you're the latter, you need to have some frank speech with yourself and get on the right track. To paraphrase Wil Wheaton: Don't be a jerk! If you take his advice, you and all of us who interact with you will be the better for it.
fwiw - Here is my (on-going!) look at Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in light of Epicureanism:
For example, (an excerpt):
QuoteAt 1097b, Aristotle states “What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This description seems to apply to happiness above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything else.”
First, the word translated happiness here is εὐδαιμονία eudaimonia which I prefer to translate as “well-being.” LSJ provides various translations within its short entry: prosperity, good fortune; true, full happiness. The interesting issue is that Epicurus also made liberal use of the word eudaimonia as well. But did he identify it with The Good or the ultimate, final end? A quick search of writings brings up:
Vatican Saying 33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]
Fragment 548. Happiness and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature. τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον [happiness and blessedness, latter same word as in PD1] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.
....[and so on with several other Epicurean citations, commentary, etc.]
And on a later page in my admittedly snarky commentary...
QuoteDisplay MoreAristotle then gets to the heart of his definition of virtue, quoting Ostwald:
"Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean by reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency... virtue is a mean, but in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme. " (1106b-1107a)
LOL! There is SO much that is problematic here from my perspective. Allow me to break down my issues with Aristotle's exhortations.
He defines "virtue" (excellence, αρητη arete) as a characteristic/disposition (ἕξεις hexeis) which remember is a "trained habit, skill, state or habit of mind" determining the choice of actions. We choose actions all the time! Epicurus puts great importance on our responsibility to choose our actions and that which we reject. The "choice" Aristotle uses here is προαίρεσις (proairesis), ‘choice’ or ‘purpose’, which he discusses in Book 3.2. It is obviously connected with the the word Epicurus uses, hairesis, but we'll leave more discussion until Book 3. So, the fact that "virtue" is connected with choices, yeah, okay, that seems mildly non-controversial. Go on...
But the mean/middle is "defined" (and we're using that word loosely, Aristotle) by a "rational principle" such as a person using practical wisdom would use to determine it! LOL! So, virtue is something that we choose by using practical wisdom - phronesis? So, far, I don't think we've defined practical wisdom either. Epicurus also places great importance on practical wisdom: It's one of the three things without which we can't experience a pleasurable life. It helps us make prudent decisions on which actions to choose and which to avoid. But Aristotle is going MUCH further in defining "virtue" in relation to this without even giving as much description as Epicurus!
And I love the last part! Virtue is a mean between extremes BUT "in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme"! Aristotle is attempting once again of trying to have it both ways. It sounds circular, self-refuting, and ridiculous. I am not impressed.
The next part makes me laugh as well! He goes to great length here of trying to define virtue as that elusive mean (that is actually an extreme of goodness remember) between two extremes, but then says...
"Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean... Some actions and emotions "whose very names connote baseness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy; and among actions, adultery, theft, and murder."
Those are just actions to my understanding. He's trying to say you can't "virtuously" commit adultery, theft, and murder. Duh! Epicurus would say those things do harm to others and so aren't just. They disrupt society or harm relationships. However, is it just to steal bread to feed your starving children? Is it "murder" if you kill someone while defending yourself? Someone may still have to be punished for the good of society BUT maybe not? Context and social contracts are key to Epicurus's discussion of justice... I'm not as sure he's getting hung up on "virtue."
Aristotle goes on to list some of these extremes, means, and deficiencies (1107b), but - egads! - "many virtues and vices have no name" as in not all excesses or deficiencies actually have a name. So, he's going to make up things that have no name, are not referred to in regular speech, don't actually exist, but for the sake of his argument, we're supposed to pretend they exist. Methinks he's starting to use unicorns and centaurs.
Those lists of names of ancient Greek writers just drives home to me how much we've lost and that we'll never see to even be able to compare Choerilus to Anaximenes to Hipponax to...
Welcome aboard, sowhataustin
One aspect of the metaphor is that a lighthouse is clearly man-made, and the guidance we're looking to is something completely natural, more like a "north star" maybe.
I like the North Star idea. That could still work. I'll admit I like the sailing metaphor in our little boat.
Storms can also obscure the North Star, but it remains and becomes visible again once the storm of pain passes.
The lighthouse is always there. We steer our little boat towards the lighthouse. We steer away from the rocks and shoals by the beacon of the lighthouse. We choose to keep going through storms and rocks to get to safety. We don't sit out the storm, unless we're too far out to see when we have to heave to.
How does pain, pleasure, homeostatis, satisfaction in the feeling of being alive (Chrysippus' hand), doing what needs to be done for good longterm outcomes, etc. fit into this metaphor?
Pain is represented by the storms, hidden reefs, submerged rocks, pirates(!), and other hazards as we keep our eyes on the lighthouse.
Pleasure, that to which all else points, is represented by the lighthouse, the highest point around, symbolizing safety, satisfaction, security, refuge, harbor, etc.
For now, I'm not going to shoehorn the other aspects into this metaphor. A metaphor can on encompass so much before you need another metaphor. And this is all iterally off the top of my head. I am in no way attached to it. If others find it helpful or want to build on it or discard it,
An interesting take on Cicero's criticism a regards virtue
Consider a light house.
The lighthouse is always there. We steer our little boat towards the lighthouse. We steer away from the rocks and shoals by the beacon of the lighthouse. We choose to keep going through storms and rocks to get to safety. We don't sit out the storm, unless we're too far out to see when we have to heave to.
That's a draft metaphor. Thoughts welcomed.
Ancient fidget spinners?
I am motivated by the removal of pain.
Or you are motivated by the need to move toward pleasure.
PS. I'm thinking some of this is a matter of perspective and not just linguistic trickery.
I have thoughts on the word "goal" for τέλος ... But that'll have to wait until this evening.
Okay, so what was I alluding to?
ΤΕΛΟΣ (telos) is often - predominantly - translated into the English as "goal," sometimes "end." This implies what comes at the finish of a race or end of a game or "winning if you reach the goal." That's an unfortunate side effect of working with the English word "goal." Think of a football/soccer match and the announcer yelling "GOOOOOAAAAL!"
My thought is that ΤΕΛΟΣ (and I'm purposefully using the Greek spelling to remove it from contamination of English semantics) should NOT be taken as a "goal" to be achieved but rather as a fact to be acknowledged. Let me provide a link to the dictionary here to start:
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/%CF%84%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%82
While ΤΕΛΟΣ does have, within its dictionary definitions, English words like "achievement, attainment; winning-post, goal"; the connotation I want to focus on is "Philos., full realization, highest point. ideal; ... the end or purpose of action: hence, the final cause: hence simply = τὸ ἀγαθόν, the chief good."
When Epikouros writes to Menoikeus to say "καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν" I maintain it is NOT something like "pleasure is the start ἀρχὴν and finish τέλος of the blessed life." The blessed life is enveloped by pleasure, it is the foundation and the fulfillment of the blessed life but we need to acknowledge that and live our life that way. The blessed life - a life akin to the gods - is a life where all one's actions are pointing toward pleasure. When we ask the question "Why do I do that?" the answer is always "for pleasure". If I undergo a painful trial to have a better life on the other side, the reason I went through that pain is pleasure. Pleasure imbues EVERYTHING we do. If we try to substitute another answer to "Why do I do that?" we are fooling ourselves. Pleasure is not a "winning-post" to be reached, something we have to strive for or agonize about not having or something to swim against the tide to achieve. Pleasure is present - sometimes slightly, sometimes intensely - in every moment of the day in everything we do. If we see Pleasure as something "out there" that we have to achieve, we're missing out.
"Goal" is an insufficient way to express the omnipresence of Pleasure. "Pleasure is the goal" is a pale way of saying - as I consider it more - "Pleasure is the reason I do everything." Pleasure is the final cause for all my actions. That kind of "final goal" is what is meant by "Pleasure is the goal." It's NOT "Pleasure is the GOAL" it is rather "Pleasure IS the goal."
We ONLY experience two feelings: Pleasure or Pain. If Cicero wants to go all apoplectic on what he considers an idiosyncratic use of "voluptas" or ηδονη, boohoo Cicero. It seems to me to be Epicurus calling reality as he sees it.
Pleasure exists as the omnipresent end-point of all our actions. We don't have to run the race to achieve pleasure. It is here, now, in every decision, every action, IF we're willing to admit that that is - in every moment - the final cause of all our actions.
That's what I'm beginning to understand "Pleasure is the goal" to mean.
I have thoughts on the word "goal" for τέλος ... But that'll have to wait until this evening.
ΑΡΕΤΗ (my misspelling previously)
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀρετή
Virtus
Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, virtūs