What a great find, Bryan !
And check out all the usages of that verb:
Eikadistes : I like your characterization of that, too:
This sort of suggests to me that the "space between worlds" would have been perceived as a creative continuum in which re-arrangements of particles occurs.
all around!!
Yes, β as v instead of b may have started for some dialects of Greek in the Koine period. Classical Greek and Homeric definitely had "b". Βάρβαρος was definitely barbaros, for example.
I typically used Υ/υ for U, V, and Y in my "code." Unless it came at the beginning, then ι: ιελλο συβμαριν or ΙΕΛΛΟ ΣΥΒΜΑΡΙΝ.
See also
I have found there's no better way to get to know the alphabet - speaking as middle schooler me - than to try and write English in Greek letters. I literally took notes in junior high in Greek letters.. and that's what eventually put me on the path to try and learn Greek ("Well, if I'm writing in these letters, I should really know some of the language.") It's slow going at first. Write your name, write family members names, write pet names, write short sentences. Try to get "fluent" enough to write your shopping list in Greek letters. Write notes to yourself. Do you "to do" list. The next time you go to the grocery store, try something like:
See if you can "decipher" those. 
You need to be a little creative. Ancient Greek didn't have c, f (use φ), h, j, q, v, or w, and we don't typically use ps, kh, and other such letters, unless you want to try a sentence like "ἑρ λιψ υερε κρακκεδ φρομ θε κολδ." Try deciphering that, too.
It becomes a kind of code for awhile, fun to play around with.
If you try this, the letters will become second nature, THEN you can start transliterating actual Greek words much easier... and then on to translation!
NOTE: The video uses "Erasmian" pronunciation. I would recommend looking at Luke Ranieri's stuff on Polymathy, etc. including https://lukeranieri.com/wp-content/upl…-2021-11-21.pdf
Chiming in...
While the "then's" could be taken as hierarchical, they could also just be identifying three co-equal kinds of desires: for eudaimonia, for freedom of disturbance for the body, and for life.
The life one is interesting, because I could also take the "natural" desires as a desire for things like food, shelter, etc.
For those who don't want to go to the trouble of downloading my paper, here is the pertinent section. And all of this is open to further discussion:
127g. καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον·
"And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessities; on the other hand, the natural ones only."
ἀναγκαῖαι "necessary, essential; (if a plural noun as here) necessities"
127h. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι,
"then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, there are those necessary for eudaimonia;
Those necessary for eudaimonia are open to interpretation but must be based on Epicurus's philosophy.
127i. αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
ἀοχλησία "freedom from disturbance"
σώματος genitive singular of σῶμᾰ
σῶμᾰ "the body; one's material body or existence"
“then, those [necessary] for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those [necessary] for life itself.”
There are some translations that interpret αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν to mean only things like clothing and shelter - those things that provide "freedom from disturbance" for the body, that is for one's physical existence. That isn't literally what is written so that is simply one interpretation. Those kinds of things - clothing and shelter - would seem to fall under the final category of those necessary for life. So, this category should catch those between eudaimonia and those necessary for life. This is an interesting category.
I would contend that those "necessary for life itself" are those essentials at the base of Maslow's hierarchy of needs: food, water, shelter, sleep, air, etc. Again, clothing and shelter would seem to fall into this category.
Have not read but skimmed: talks about Epicureans and Euclid regarding mathematics:
DeWitt is not the only commentator to take the position that there were twelve fundamentals and attempt to enumerate them - so does Diskin Clay, someone who is well recognized among mainstreatm commentators. His list is much the same, though not identical, to DeWitt's. See Clay's "Epicurus Last Will and Testament."
I feel I would me slacking if I didn't play the gadfly here and point to this thread from June of this year when it comes to the "Twelve Fundamentals." I have nothing else to add to what I said in that thread, but it feels pertinent to this current conversation:
130, right?
. [130] τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.
Where was I getting my take then?! Oh, I left it out of my full translation but not the commentary. That's what I get for looking at a translation (even mine!) and not returning to the books.
Here's the line in question ..
130b. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.
Let's start at the beginning:
χρώμεθα
This one takes some explaining, and it seems to be often passed over in translation. This verb is in the middle voice which means the subject of the verb is both the agent and experiencer. So, χρώμεθα generally means something like "we consult a god or oracle for ourselves" or "the declaration of an oracle or god." I think this is significant, because, in the context of Epicurean philosophy, there are no gods who are going to provide advice through a supernatural means via an oracle. So, what is going on here? The Epicurean consults their own faculty of weighing the consequences of their own choices.
The word is also used in several more places within this verse.
This is especially important because the next word γὰρ "because" sets up the answer to the question "Why do we 'consult the oracle' of the consequences of our actions?"
Next, we have our old friends μὲν...δὲ…. Let's look at the similarities in those two phrases:
[μὲν] τῷ ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ,
[δὲ] τῷ κακῷ τἄμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.
So, Epicurus is contrasting τῷ ἀγαθῷ "the good (pleasure) with τῷ κακῷ "the bad" (pain). Let's look at the embedded phrases that modify the meaning here.
κατά τινας χρόνους "over time"
τἄμπαλιν "on the other hand, on the contrary"
So, "we consult the consequences of our actions because, on the one hand, good/pleasure over time can lead to bad/pain; on the other hand, bad/pain can lead to good/pleasure."
PS .. with κακῷ and ἀγαθῷ being in the dative, that's where I'm getting "leads to." In the sense of the means with which something is done or the cause of something. So, I don't think there's a simple A is B and B is A construction here. That said, I am more than happy for someone with more experience with ancient Greek to comment on that.
[130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.
We have to be very careful with phrases like "pain as good". I don't know which translation you're using there, but that's not what the letter says. My own more literal translation is:
So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.
Pain is entirely evil, but we have to endure it sometimes for the pleasure that results. But pain is not "good." Pain can be instrumental to gain pleasure, but it is not "good."
I note you're calling it criticism but you're also including the positive parts?
For sure, I'm including everything I can find. Most of it is complimentary.
I just took that in the sense of "literary criticism". That site is an impressive anthology of resources!
See also
Related to Chapter 10?
Welcome aboard, jason !
The more I learned, the more I realized that many Epicurean ideas resonate with beliefs I’ve developed over the years through my own intellectual explorations.
You'll find that sentiment echoed by a number of forum members
FYI...
DCLP/Trismegistos 62661 = LDAB 3847
Fwiw, here's a review of a critical edition of Polystratus' work (again, Google translate from the French)
This work by Giovanni Indelli, which appears in a new collection of texts from the School of Epicurus contained in the Herculaneum papyri, is worthy of attention and interest for several reasons.
First of all, it gives us a global and nuanced overview of the identity, work and role of Polystratus within the School of Epicurus, most of whose texts have been lost, at least as far as the earliest period is concerned.
Then we have here a very careful critical edition, carried out using the most reliable techniques, and accompanied by a clear and faithful Italian translation, a documented introduction and a commentary written in an authentically philological and philosophical spirit.
Finally, the very content of Polystrate's text has an undeniable historical interest, and shows well, as Mr. Indelli emphasizes, the state of the discussions between the different post-Aristotelian schools. The Περί ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως "is addressed to those who, while they despise popular opinions, nevertheless defend opinions even less acceptable, because they are not based on λόγος" (p. 28). The disciple of Epicurus, for his part, has no weakness for the ideas of the masses, but his criticism of their errors and superstitions is based on a knowledge of nature finalized by practical life. Indeed, to free oneself from the unhappiness that ignorance and prejudice cause and to lead a happy life, one must refer to the φρόνησις and the ὀρθὴ φυσιολογία which are taught to us by the doctrine of Epicurus and which allow us to attain perfect pleasure.
In this context Polystratus develops an articulate critique of a skeptical objection to the fundamental principles of the Garden: his opponents are suspicious of the effective existence of ethical concepts, whose validity is clearly changeable among individuals and peoples. Polystratus' solution to this problem, which Epicurus had not dealt with explicitly, is based on the difference between "relative" and "absolute" concepts. Even "relative" concepts, such as those of δυνάμεις and πράξεις, nevertheless have an effective validity and existence. On the other hand, a critique of popular opinions based on obscure principles and obvious falsehoods, such as that developed by his opponents, has no value, becomes dangerous and dishonest and, ultimately, is irrational.
Fabio CIARAMELLI.
We all end at the same point - I think - that whatever is the truth, the universe is "natural" and doesn't have a supernatural overlay above it. So frequently the details are not necessarily important to reconcile, UNLESS they point to a major conclusion about the supernatural or life after death or something that would call into question whether the truth is natural or supernatural, or would call into question key issues about the "knowability" of any truth at all. Definitely when anything like that arises it does need to be made to synchronize at least at the conclusion level.
We basically agree. I would reword your initial sentence as: The truth is that the universe is "natural" and doesn't have a supernatural overlay above it.
Anything that contradicts that, much like seeing Alexander the Oracle Monger's snake, we should be one "whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by scepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility."
I'll likely never accept that in philosophical discussion there is a necessity of mapping into modern paradigms that are regularly changing and within which the experts don't even agree among themselves. I'll let those who want to try do to that pursue that, and I do understand that some want to do that.
Cosmos connects well with a galaxy, To Pan with the universe. If we want other cosmoi, I'd think we only have to accept multiple galaxies. As we know, Epíkouros uses Cosmos in the plural, but not To Pan.
To be clear about my perspective: when Epicurus says κόσμος cosmos "world" I think the evidence is that he means a planet (Earth) and all its accompanying sky and stars. Another "world" or κόσμος is this same system elsewhere. The universe, Το Παν (To Pan) "The All" is the entirety of existence that contains ALL these cosmoi.
Honestly, I think that trying to map ΚΟΣΜΟΣ "kosmos", ΚΟΣΜΟΙ "kosmoi", and ΤΟ ΠΑΝ "The All" onto modern concepts, especially concepts and theories that are evolving, is a fool's errand. Epicurus' conceptions of kosmoi and The All were fundamentally different than our own. My understanding is that kosmoi were islands of order in The All. Kosmos literally means "order" (actually related to English cosmetic, bringing order to one's face or appearance). Our word "planet" to the Greeks was simply a wandering star, πλανήτης, against the fixed stars in the sky. Epicurus didn't speak of beings on another πλανήτης but beings in/on/inhabiting other κόσμοι. Earth, to him as best I can ascertain, was where we lived in our κόσμος.
That's why discussions like this about theology or cosmology are often talking past each other. When the ancients were talking about an intermundia "between worlds" or ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΟΣ they didn't imagine planets or worlds or galaxies or multiverses. They had their ideas, . We have our ideas, informed by science and observation. I need to accept that Epicurus and the ancient Greek cosmological concepts have no necessity to equate with my modern ideas. They may overlap slightly, but they cannot be made to synchronize.
Look forward to reading your efforts and seeing your translation decisions.
... And that's exactly what I mean too when I say "the universe is all that exists." Any kind of terminology such as world systems or multiverses or anything else falls within "the universe is all that exists. " If it exists anywhere using any adjective, it's part of the "universe."
Oh, I completely agree that "the universe is all that exists" just to be clear. The only complication on that is possibly a differing view on what we mean by "world" and "universe." To be clear about my perspective: when Epicurus says κόσμος cosmos "world" I think the evidence is that he means a planet (Earth) and all its accompanying sky and stars. Another "world" or κόσμος is this same system elsewhere. The universe, Το Παν (To Pan) "The All" is the entirety of existence that contains ALL these cosmoi. The planets were find orbiting other stars are part of our cosmos. If we want other cosmoi, we have to accept the multiverse, ie, other universes. All the universes together in modern cosmology make up The Universe, THE All. If one is trying to map Epicurean cosmology onto a modern paradigm, I contend that that's the only way to do it.
That doesn't in any way go against Epicurus' primary tenet that we live in a natural, material universe.
I'd say your suggestions there are possibilities, but not really compelled at all by the texts. I would expect Epicurus thought of the universe as "all that exists."
Epicurus posited many world-systems in an infinite All (universe). That's exactly what the texts provide.
I'd wager we are me no more than a couple of hundred years from that ability ourselves, at the outside.
By what means? Not being argumentative, just curious.
If I temporarily take the physical gods perspective...
If you want to go down the physics route translated into a modern paradigm, I'm going to posit that the intermundia refers to another dimension or another universe in the multiplicity of universes out in The All. Gods are material and natural, but reside outside our universe under a different physics than our own. We cannot see them with our eyes, because our universe doesn't overlap with theirs. They are not aliens living on planets in our universe. That's just an assertion on my part, granted. But that's the only way I could right now "accept" a corporeal divinity in an Epicurean theological context.
I find it much easier to think of the gods as what an ideal life would be like without the limits on mortal, corruptible bodies. The best I can do is to live "like a god". That doesn't mean identical to a god or equivalent to a god. It's a metaphorical divine existence.
