Posts by Bryan

This is great in many ways! This is Lucian's longest surviving work, and having audio versions of relevant writings is very desirable. I think they will be more helpful for “getting the word out” in the long term than written text.

Different voices for the different people in the dialogue are necessary, and this does achieve that well -- and, of course, giving robot-Joshua the winning side of Lycinus is appropriate. We associate Joshua's voice with accuracy and coming from our view-point. Brilliant!

The voices do not catch the sarcastic tone very well (the robot may not even fully recognize when the text is sarcastic). This undercuts the comedy a little bit, but otherwise the voices are great. THANK YOU!!

"The beginning – and the greatest good – is prudence: therefore prudence exists as more valued than philosophy."
^{Lives 10.132b [Epicurus to Menoeceus]}

Quote from Cassius

Eventually move to Philodemus' "On Signs" / "On Methods of Inference

I'm not sure if it will be much help, but a few years ago I took the existing translation and tried to organize it, and also put all the opposing arguments in red. (link here).

My highest expectation, hope, and desire is for personal peace -- and a similar well-being of peace for my friends: what greater thing could be desired?

This is not a low expectation, but a very high one -- and one which our philosophy supports very well.

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However, from another angle, this may well entail "lowering your expectations" if they are insupportably high!

Not one of us can significantly change the mass flow -- of the ocean, of the air... etc.

Yes, you have made the most of what we have for this text! As we know, the context, in part, will certainly be Plato's view of triangular planes as the basis for the material world, which he explains in the Timaeus, and which our school rejected as having any any preeminence over any other shapes -- and, more significantly, our school denied that a 2-dimensional analysis of reality was fundamentally relevant -- given that the fundamental units have a 3-dimensional extension.

I recreated a bit of this here.

As Epicurus says "…....those triangles of his, from which he also entangles the remaining shapes. If he supposed that indivisible units [ἄτομα] exist, why did he not make any proof that bodies exist as indivisible? But if [his shapes are] not indivisible [and therefore can be divided further], what would one think the remaining [shapes that result from this further dividing] are composed of -- those which he puts together out of anything whatsoever? However, these [topics] will again, I suppose, be lengthened out; but for now, it is sufficient to say that it ridiculously occurred that this man [i.e., Plato] simultaneously called [his basic shapes] similar, while somehow fully depriving other [shapes as a basis]…"
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 5 (column 38)]}

Quote from Cassius

Sedley says flatly that "Katastematic pleasure is the absence of pain."

Both are correct, and it may be more helpful to highlight the similarities in the interpretations.

The "ste" in Katastematic is the same root that gives us "static" in the sense of "standing" or "still" -- and the "kata" is an intensifier! Etymologically the whole word means "characteristic of thoroughly standing"

As we have seen, Epicurus does literally say that "Katastematic pleasure is the absence of pain" at DL 10.136 where he says "Undisturbedness (ataraxía) and non-suffering (aponía) exist as established (katastēmatikái) pleasures, but joy and merriment are seen from movement through activity."

[Mental] painlessness/non-suffering (ἡ ἀπονία) is equated here with a katastematic (established) pleasure.

But this leaves plenty of room to also agree with Austin:

Quote from Cassius

katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning

It is helpful to see painlessness/non-suffering as referring more to the mind/spirit and less so the body... but, of course, the close connection between the mind and body was never denied by our school in any way.

Consider Plutarch [Non Posse, 1089D]:

'See then, first of all, what they are doing: transferring either this "non-suffering" or "painlessness" or "stability" back and forth from the body to the soul – then back again from the [soul] into the [body]!'

Quote

However, if we interpret Lucretius’ concept of corpora as ‘discrete particles’ or ‘atoms’ instead of flows, his whole conceptual edifice of folding [plex] (simplex, duplex, complex, amplex) completely unravels. Atoms simply cannot fold.

I do believe that Nail is alone in interpreting corpora as "flows." Corpora is a common and simple word that means "bodies." It is used by Lucretius, among many other terms, to refer to the primary particles ("atoms" in the literal sense of fundamental uncuttable units).

The idea of "flow" will not be found in any dictionary entry for Corpora (link for example). There is no place in Latin literature where Corpora means anything close to "flows."

Similarly, although the -plex ending in simplex, duplex, etc. does indeed etymologically come from “-fold”, nevertheless simplex, and duplex are the standard Latin words for "single and double" -- and forcing an actual and literal "fold" into the idea -- beyond "single-fold" meaning "single" and "two-fold" meaning "double" -- is another unique interpretation of Thomas Nail.

Quote from wbernys

he apparently disliked the study of Homer, seeing it as a waste of energy

Regarding critique of form, Epicurus disapproved of the study of Homer in terms of comparative literature and analysis of poetic meter (which were very popular pastimes among the elites in his day -- elites who were not inclined to take Homer literally, but still had a lot of respect for his work from a cultural perspective).

Regarding acceptance of content, Epicurus also disapproved of Homer being so highly respected among the middle class, who were more inclined to take Homer literally, and who viewed Homer's work as an ancient source of actual information about the gods.

However, regarding critique of content, Epicurus certainly did approve of studying Homer in order to criticize his content.

According to Plutarch (Non Posse, 2, 1086F), Metrodorus himself "rebuked (λελοιδόρηκεν)" Homer "in many of his writings."

In his criticisms of Homer, Metrodorus wrote about "the poetic rabble (ἡ ποιητικὴ τύρβη)" and "the foolish sayings of Homer (τὰ Ὁμήρου μωρολογήματα)."

So Metrodorus produced multiple books about Homer, digging deep into his specific claims, and highlighting their absurdity.

Quote from TauPhi

'The History of Materialism and Criticism of its Present Importance'

This looks like good "seeing the forest through the trees" material, but we need an audio version... Looking at the whole forest is too tedious -- but it is easier to listen to the whole forest.

Quote from Eikadistes

Karneískos' fragment to Philístas

Your productivity has made it difficult to keep up lately, but that is a great problem to have. This is wonderfully done! The translation and the presentation are both spectacular.

As you know, we need to do this to all the P.Hercs. The task is large. Thank you for your help!

On a side note, I have enjoyed many items from the Emporium, but I have to say the "Happy Eikas Sweater" is one of my new favorite pieces of clothing. Staying warm is natural and necessary, therefore, we all need one of these sweaters.

Quote from Cassius

As to Lucretius, I am finding zero reference to the natural and necessary categories.

Yes, of course we have this section, 2.20, but it does not expand on the idea very much.

I will throw in a few related quotes:

"Epicurus {as reported by Colotes} acts with the purest effrontery when he claims to lay down the same first principles, but nevertheless does not say that "color is by convention" and thus the qualities sweet, bitter, etc. "
^{[Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1111A]}

"Oh by the Gods! Through your disposition, you revealed to us that you were deserving -- not according to the conventions of civic freedom"
^{[Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 32]}

"for one ought not to study nature according to empty axioms and conventional rules ¬ but as apparent things call out"
^{[Epicurus, Lives, 10.86c]}

"…[to such an extent produces linguistic] conventions by [your] memory through [the use of] a term – oh, by gods! – that you see these [conventions] as an established thing… [with you] proceeding according to [your] judgements as [practical] situations arise in various ways: anyone could disturb [those practical situations] – for they are always empty…"
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 5]}

"…and You happened to be applying [your choice of words] at that time without the association of certain conventions [which have been developed] ¬ [thus] you would not have made clear: the [fact that] judging every expression applies to a certain [judgment* – but you were] still seeing [the public] indiscrimination of words vs. [practical] situations, [and] You were fully conceiving [this issue]" * i.e., most words naturally apply to an originally specific concept.
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 2 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 3 sup.)]}

"…indeed, to integrate [common terms into technical vocabulary] to a larger [extent] with what we ourselves want ¬ but if at that time, thinking the same thing, we were speaking according to the interpretation [then] set-forth: in which [we said] that every human Error exists having no different shape than what is produced due to the multifaceted conventions of terms upon the preapprehensions and [upon] the appearances [of objects] , and… …because of these things, We have split [them] into two… …[with the] anticipations… …every saying…"
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 3)]}

"...He [still] laughs at this [riddle] in regards to [its] sophistry since he had not completely comprehended together in that response what also would have been adapted out of some convention of a term in this way *– so as to fall into saying that it is possible for the same person to understand and also to not understand..."
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 9 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup. – part 1)]}

"We do not remove ourselves from the cause [of the generation of movement] – and [we do not remove ourselves from] what [movement] has been fully generated but by [even] doing one certain thing, We similarly clarify [the nature of]ourselves and [of our] composition. We do not instruct about it – indeed, We do not even rearrange many [words] in accordance with certain conventions without [taking any] mind of the terminology… …for what is removed from a cause [of movement] by necessity [is itself its own cause of movement]…
^{[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 104, 105]}

Quote from Cassius

between the Yonge and Loeb

Looks as though Loeb is correct. Older editors assumed the Latin was wrong. So they assumed a lost negating word. This was considered more plausible here because the word just before this phrase "they condemn" (contemnunt) has an apparent errant "non" (the Loeb edition does have a note about that issue).

For example, this edition (link) says at that spot (in Latin):

"Yet they seek abundance" (quaerunt tamen copiam) These statements are plainly contrary to what Cicero has just said, namely that the Epicureans feigned contempt for pleasures. Therefore Bentley’s conjectures are not to be rejected: ‘yet they do not seek’ or ‘yet they despise’. But perhaps Cicero wrote ‘yet they cling to something’. In any case, nothing certain can be established from the agreement of all the manuscripts.”

Quote from Kalosyni

Lucretius never used the word "atoms"

At every turn Lucretius is trying to translate, not transliterate, Epicurus. There are only a few exceptions (Such as homoeomeria, for which he apologizes for using only the transliteration.) To consider this translation a transformation is of course in part true, but Lucretius at every point, where we have Epicurus' words on the same topic, succeeded in producing very close translations of Epicurus' wording.

Quote from Eikadistes

H. A. J. Munro is the only author I've found who seems to consistently stick to Lucretius' neologisms

I agree it is good to follow Lucretius very closely. Otherwise it seems surprising to learn that Lucretius did not use the word "atom." For example, I use "primary-beginnings" for prīmṓrdia and "first-beginnings " for principia.... but they do both mean "atom."

Quote from Eikadistes

I made a list

This is very helpful! Thank you!

Wow, that really looks GREAT! On a side note, I love young Epicurus in a spacesuit -- and it really is a fully appropriate image. THANK YOU!!!

To get started, let me add some quotes that we are discussing.

From Philodemus:
"…having proposed that we pay attention to the writings of our own men – Epicurus reproached all the madness of those who abolish the divine from existing things – just as, in the 12^th [book]: he finds fault with Prodikos, Diagoras, Kritias, and others – saying that they are deranged and insane (παρακόπτειν καὶ μαίνεσθαι). He even likens them to those who go bacchating, commanding [them] to cause no trouble for us, and to not be irritating (ἐνοχλεῖν). Indeed, they rewrite the names of the gods – just as Antisthenes, insisting on the most general [conception of the gods], attributes the particular [conceptions] to an establishment [by human convention] – and prior to that [an establishment] through some deception."
_{^{[Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.18.514 – 1.19.541]}}

Prodikos, Diagoras, and Kritias were well-known atheists. Antisthenes (fl. 406 BCE) "began the Cynic way of life." He was known for "often" saying "I would rather be insane than feel pleasure" _{[Laertius 6.3]}

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And from Epicurus, where he does not say that the Gods are detectible/manifest -- but only that our knowledge of them is:

"Gods, indeed, exist: for our knowledge (ἡ Γνῶσις) of them is detectible (ἐναργὴς)." _[123c]

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And it is good to remember that Epicurus does not call the ideas people develop about gods "false anticipations" -- but instead he says:

"the assertions of the many about the gods are not anticipations (prolḗpseis) but false suppositions (hypolḗpseis)." _{[D.L. 124a]}

Quote

^{Lucretius 1.122:
"...in which neither our souls nor bodies endure -- but certain images, faded in strange ways·"}

For the general cultural idea of the existence of one's image (eidōlon) separate from the decayed body as well as the transferred soul, consider the Nekyia (Νεκυΐα, "rite of the dead," i.e., Odyssey, Book 11), where Odysseus – recounting his Underworld visit to Alcinous, king of the Phaeacians – sees Heracles' image in Hades, while "Heracles himself" is with the gods:

"···I became aware of the mighty Heracles – his phantom: for he himself among the immortal gods takes his joy in the feast, and has for a wife Hebe of the beautiful ankles, daughter of great Zeus and of Hera of the golden sandals – about [his phantom] rose a clamor from the dead, as of birds flying everywhere in terror, and he like dark night, with his bow uncased and with arrow on the strong, glared about him terribly, like one about to shoot···" _{(Homer, Odyssey, 11·601)}

Consider Aristotle:
"…when something has caused motion in water or air, and such motion propagates itself to a certain point – even though the initial cause of movement is not present: in the same way, it may well be that a movement and a consequent sense-perception should reach sleeping souls from the objects from which Democritus represents as 'films/images' (εἴδωλα) and 'emanations' (ἀπορροαί). Such movements, in whatever way they arrive, should be more perceptible at night [than by day], because when proceeding in the daytime they are more liable to dissolution (since at night the air is less disturbed, because there is less wind at that time). These films would be perceived within the body while sleeping – since people are more sensitive even to slight sensory movements when asleep than when awake: it is these movements then that cause mental-impressions (φαντάσματα)."
^{(On Prophesying by Dreams, 464a)}

And also Epicurus:
"…[these thoughts] are said [to be] motion-inducing, nor would we assert these few [thoughts alone are motion-inducing]: if indeed ^[1] the greatest part [of our thoughts come in] by penetration [of films] from the surrounding [environment] – ^[2] the rest [of our thoughts] follow along with the whole appearance-based [way of thinking]…"

^{…ῥηθέναι κινητικά· οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα φήσομε̣ν̣ εἰ αἰ, τ̣ὰ̣ πλεῖστ̣α̣ κατ' ἐπείσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περ[ι]έχον[το]ς, ἄλλα παν̣τὶ τῶ[ι φα]νταστικῶι παρακ[ο]λουθοῦντ̣α…}
[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 19 (12)]

Although the section is now lost, Ennius seems to have begun the Annals with a recollection of one of his dreams:

"···So Ennius asserts at the beginning of his Annals, where he says that he had seen Homer in a dream saying that he had once been a peacock and from that his soul was transferred into him, according to the dictates of the philosopher Pythagoras···"
^{(Cornutus, Commentary on Persius, 6·10·2)}

"···[Ennius] wrote at the beginning of his Annals that he was advised in a dream that, according to the doctrine of Pythagoras, Homer's soul had come into his body···"
^{(Porphyry, Commentary on Horace, 2·1·51)}

And, as we have seen, Epicurus wrote a popular, but now lost, letter against the philosopher Stilpo -- and one of the things Stilpo was most known for was the position that only what is in the mind really matters to the wise man.

Seneca (_fl. 35 ^CE), Letters to Lucilius, 9.18:
"[the wise man] will confine all good within himself and say what that Stilpo said – Stilpo whom a letter of Epicurus attacks -- for this man, with his country captured, his children lost, and his wife gone, yet he came out from the general destruction, alone, and yet happy: to Demetrius who was asking – who had the surname Poliorcetes from the destruction of cities – whether he had lost anything, [Stilpo] said 'all my goods are with me!' Behold a brave and vigorous man! He conquered the very victory of his enemy. 'I have lost nothing' [Stilpo] said. he made that man [i.e., Demetrius] doubt whether he had truly won, 'everything that is mine is with me – Justice, Virtue, Wisdom, and this very thing: to consider nothing good that can be taken away.'"

Yes, Epicurus talks about “Speculative Judgement,” (hē theōrētikē doxa), i.e. judgement about conceivable universal characteristics; and the truth-value of this kind of judgement is tested by attestation and contestation via indirect practical consequences. He treats this as belonging to analogical consideration (ho analogismos).

So, as we know, the issue isn’t abstraction as such, but whether the abstraction is (and remains) attested (or not contested) by sensation. The error, if there is one, lies in our “addition of judgement” (to prosdoxazomenon).

Quote from Kalosyni

at times incorporate elements and ideas from external sources

Certainly so,

Quote from Patrikios

Second, and equally important, this practice culminates in zuowang—sitting and forgetting.

Quote from Hiram

"Taoists have a technology of the self for discarding memories: zuowang (sitting and forgetting). Although some descriptions of this practice sound mystifying..."

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Hiram does a lot of great work, but, as he says in the article, "zuowang" is Taoist.

Pulling these definitions of Zuowang from the wikipedia article:

• "oblivious of oneself and one's surroundings; free from worldly concerns" - Liang Shih-chiu & Chang Fang-chieh
• "oblivious of one's surroundings, free from worldly concerns" - Lin Yutang
• "to be oblivious of oneself and one's surroundings, to be free from worldly concerns" - John DeFrancis