Posts by Bryan

I agree Don, I think both blessedness (i.e., contentment) and indestructibility are necessary qualities of gods. These qualities serve as examples for us -- but our limits in both regards are fully acknowledged, per Philódēmos:

"…the intimacy arising from necessities, in regards to association, gives the emotions over to [that intimacy]: for maintaining intimacy, while existing [together], is not possible without any mixture [of emotions]. Indeed, certainly for us, who are weak and have further need for the necessary things of friendship…"

_{…χρειωδῶν ἡ συμφυλία π[ρὸς τὴν] συνανα[σ]τροφὴν αὐτῆι τὰ πάθη παρ[αδί]δωσιν. οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἔχειν τὴν συμφυλίαν ἄνε[υ] πάσης ἐπιμειξίας ὄντας. ἀμέλει δὲ κ(αὶ) ἐφ' ἡ̣μῶν τῶν ἀ̣σθενῶν κ(αὶ) πρ(οσ)δεγομένων πρ[ὸς τ]ὰ [χρ]ε̣ι̣ώδη τ[ῆς] φιλίας
Philodemus, On The Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 152, fr. 9 (87)}

Philódēmos directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship / intimacy (ἡ συμφυλία) he says that generosity is necessary.

I am enjoying the notebook!

Quote from DaveT

four cardinal principals

Quote from Don

Tetrapharmakos

Yes, here is Tsouna on that section:

"The expression τὰ τέτταρα refers to the Fourfold Remedy. We suggest that it should be distinguished from τὰ κυριώτατα (1. 8). τὰ τέτταρα are precisely four principles originally expressed by Epicurus and later constituting the Fourfold Remedy. On the other hand, the term κυριώτατα in its technical sense is intended to cover all the fundamental principles pertaining to a certain subject and enabling the Epicurean student to confront particular problems and to solve them on his own."

Hello Robert, the book can be purchased here:
On Choices and Avoidances – Bibliopolis – Edizioni di Filosofia e Scienze

Most of it is commentary and the translation only runs a few pages:

"It is fair that we speak against the rest of people who have a contrary opinion about what has been said, who state that we accomplish actions successfully without the help of philosophy. For we know that the very copies in which they are openly abusing us are easily available. But if we set side by side some ... And they claim that in truth no judgement takes precedence over any other, being persuaded that the great affection of the soul occurs as a result of pain and that thus we accomplish our choices and avoidances by observing both [bodily and mental pain]. For it is not possible that the joys arise in us in the same way and all together, in accordance with some expectation ... and some people denied that it is possible to know anything. And, further, they added that if nothing is present on account of which one should make an immediate choice, then one should not choose immediately. Some other people, having selected the affections of the soul as the moral ends and as not in need of additional judgement based on further criteria, granted to everybody unchallengeable authority to take pleasure in whatever they cared to name and to do whatever contributed to it. And yet others held the doctrine that what we call grief or joy are totally empty notions because of the manifest indeterminacy of things ...

(It is just as well that we know both that the good is not only limited in magnitude but also is easy to attain) and that the bad not only has limits in magnitude and time, but also is easy to bear; for otherwise it would be of no use that the good should be limited but impossible or difficult for us to attain, or that the bad should be limited but unbearable through its long duration. For what results from these points of knowledge is that one seeks after nothing which does not naturally remove pain—and such are most of the matters which people take a serious interest in—and that one does not avoid what does not prevent one from having pleasure—such as we should consider most matters of improvement to be. Again ... Having looked into those matters, one should also consider the differences among desires, both with regard to the pleasures and with regard to their causes. For it is also on account of the failure to distinguish between them that important errors occur through them with respect to choices and avoidances. For men suffer the worst evils for the sake of the most alien desires which they take to be the most necessary — I mean desires for sovereignty and brilliant reputation and great wealth and suchlike luxuries and other similar things. Again, they neglect the most necessary appetites as if they were the most alien to nature ... of natural pleasures some are necessary, others not necessary; and of the former ones themselves some are necessary for life, others for the health of the body, others for living happily, according to the different causes and not all taken together. And we called different causes those causes some of which, it seems, produce terrible storms while others do not, some occur prematurely due to certain defects, others happen because of the perceptions of joy, some are produced by habits whereas others are produced independently from them, some occur having originated from ourselves while others arise because of external factors, or because things which became desirable by our lack of them inflicted a sort of wound by the very thought of them. And some…

...because the most blessed beings are far from having supreme power over them for ever. It is easy, then, to see that such beliefs are the causes of innumerable failures. For these men place themselves in such a situation so as not to take advice from anybody about anything at all, in the belief that nothing depends on man, but everything is controlled by the god.

Then, at any rate they inevitably fall into the evils which the lack of forethought tends to inflict upon men ... It must be indicated that ... they meet with irreparable misfortunes, and sometimes they cast their own cities into evils as well. And if they are not compelled by the plausibility of things, or indeed if the omens do not agree by sheer chance with what ought to happen, as they are held back and they procrastinate because of their apprehension to do nothing against the will of the gods, they fail to act. And because of the troubles which cannot be surpassed, they neglect...

…by Zeus, many and great evils concerning many matters occur as a result of the worthless assumptions of mindless men and are avoided as a result of the right concepts; and, as it is also suggested in those discussions, they consider some matters instead of others as the most important. Besides, men think that what occurs through the agency of the gods and of the other powers will perpetually cause to the dead evils by far greater than the goods which it will bring to the living in their lifetime. And for this reason...

…by them to the gods. Therefore, they lament if they are afflicted by things which resemble evils, both the evils deriving from ingratitude towards men and the fatherland, and also the evils resulting from superstition, i.e. because they take god to be the cause of both death and life —though, by Zeus, the other evils are very great. And because of the sorrow that weighs upon them on account of their death, they become irascible and hard to please and ill-tempered ...

And therefore, it is also obvious that, aside from those misadventures, they are totally worthless people. This is said because of what has been stated about the four cardinal principles, for the thesis that the understanding and the memorisation of the cardinal tenets contribute greatly to actual choices and avoidances is not equal to claiming that some choices and avoidances are traced back to the states of tranquillity concerning them [sc. the cardinal tenets] —as some have clumsily interpreted it—but to claiming that they [sc. the choices and avoidances] are accomplished successfully when we measure them by the ends laid down by nature...

…clearly, since they do not hold the assumptions which we value. The many are rather led to right conduct by the laws which threaten with death, and with punishments coming from the gods, and with pains which are considered intolerable, and with the privation of some things which are supposedly hard to procure. This is the case partly on account of what was said at the beginning, partly because these things threaten men who are foolish and who cannot be persuaded by the true precepts; and the only thing that is achieved through them [sc. the laws] is deterrence for a short period of time. Besides, it is evident that the assumptions...

…these things were shown to provide help in study. Above all, he establishes the principles of philosophy, by which alone it is possible to act rightly. And it is clear that he also establishes the congenital ends, which yield the most conspicuous evidence and by which the calculations concerning choices and avoidances are performed. Besides, one must unfailingly draw the moral arguments regarding both choices and avoidances from the study of nature in order that they should be complete — if nothing else, the principle that nothing is produced without a cause and that ... does not change...

…it is impossible for one to live pleasurably without living prudently and honourably and justly, and also without living courageously and temperately and magnanimously, and without making friends and without being philanthropic, and in general without having all the other virtues. For the greatest errors in choices and avoidances occur when some men perform each action while holding the opposite views, and thereby while being constrained by evils. On the other hand, one should not quibble when talking about the teaching of the elements on account of the mutual entailment and necessary sequence of some things to some others. For sometimes ... the desires…

…we advise ... further in actions ... It is necessary to bear in mind also that a further factor which contributes to success is a thorough understanding of individual sources of external goods and how they stand in relation to us —for example, luxury and beauty and wealth, generally speaking, and marriage and the like—, but its contribution is small in comparison with the cardinal tenets which we mentioned. For which reason these have been placed also at the head of the Principal Doctrines. Thus, it might even be said that...

…they say thoughtlessly: «It is impossible for anyone to learn beforehand on what day one might arrive (at the end of one's life), either in old age or dying before reaching old age; indeed, no one knows the exact truth. Whence, we do not reflect continuously on the fact that we will die in the same way as we do when death is clearly known to be coming soon. For there is some time left. And because the end of our life is hard to determine, sometimes we feel perhaps inclined to extend it as much as possible, while other times we tend to be able to quit life immediately afterwards [sc. immediately after we realise that death will be coming soon]». Thus, in an unseemly way, some people ...

... betray the only things which can provide pleasures and endure pains in vain. And they abandon philosophy entirely, each of them saying: «Shall I go now into endless toils and then pass away in the middle of them?» And they refuse to impart benefits of any kind on the grounds that this ought to be done by the immortals or by those who expect to receive gratitude in return. Again, they are ungrateful to everyone and they always exclaim with derision: «Don't give anything to the dead!» And indifferent towards all things…

…exclaiming: «Pray, do I not live decently and justly? Or do I not live in accordance with the laws applying to men? Then, when I shall die I shall be immortal». And they are cut off from everything by means of which they would have a better life, exactly like men who are sentenced to death. What is more, they neglect what contributes to health, adding: «How many evils shall I endure if I live luxuriously for three seasons?» And they are frightened to death by all diseases. And on account of projecting everlasting evils onto the time when they are dead, they are afflicted by immeasurable troubles ... Thus, carried away by this line of thought and struck against expectation by something sudden, they are entirely beside themselves. But before that, they deprive themselves of any enjoyment, so that the things necessary to life will last them. And they live putting everything off in the belief that it will be possible for them to partake of some goods later on. And thereafter, they are unbalanced throughout their lives. And they dedicate themselves to many labours...

…that they did contrive and will contrive new solutions, so as to ward off frightening things more speedily on every occasion which might turn out this way until they die. And for fear that, because of the length of time involved, they might ever lack the necessary things, they become reluctant to distribute any benefits and they withhold returning the benefits which they have received. And when they lose money, they suffer the pains of hell. Besides, they engage in wrath and hatred which do not befit humans, and they become arrogant in their announcements, commands or threats. Also, they lack pity and sympathy towards their kindred...

…nor does he desire to amass much money. And he does well in the present as is not illogical, but having closely examined the things which yield fruit in return for his labours, he works with more equanimity —unless he works for the sake of friends. And rather using all his time sparingly, he relies on his own capacities alone whenever there is need to do so. And from boyhood onwards, he never breaks off from the anchorages of philosophy. And feeling confidence during his own lifetime, even when this is very long, he also distributes all that remains [sc. his property], that only left remaining to him which is necessary for life itself...

…since he came to his death. And avoiding a careless death, he is industrious because of the consequent doctrine based on the concept of the preservation of one's goods. And since he does not cut short the long extent of his life, he always begins new activities and friendly attachments. And he attends to his own property as to how to administer it. Also, he reflects on former events in the belief that they may concern him in the future. And he treats with much care as many people as he can, and he is thankful to those who treated him kindly, in particular because he hopes that he will share in some goods with them or that he will receive some benefit by these same people again in the future...

…during the long duration of his life. And when he encounters whatever can lead to an improvement, he spares no effort in the hope of surviving for a while. Indeed, he takes the greatest care of his health. And feeling confidence against illness and death, he endures with strength the therapies that can remove them."

Quote from Don

Oh, this looks promising?

http://www.epicuros.gr/pages/en/Tempe…us_Porphyry.pdf

This was written by Elias Tempelis (Professor of Philosophy at the Hellenic Naval Academy) to accompany his presentation for the 9th Panhellenic Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy.

His interpretation also excludes the quote Elli rejects, but he argues that most of the letter contains quotes from our school (with Porphyry only parenthetically adding his objectionable content). So Tempelis represents the most "optimistic" interpretation. I am inclined to agree.

Thank you for sharing this, Don. I do not think we discussed it.

Great episode! Accepting the belief that evil exists as a disembodied force leaves one under the control of those who decide how to wield it.

Exploring alternate paths in Roman history -- and how they would have redefined who the “bad guys” were -- is a good way to illustrate the point. Thank you!

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 9.41:

Epíkouros says that "in my illness, my conversations were not about the feelings of my little body, nor was I chatting about such things to those who visited, but, while studying nature, I continued with the prior topics, even while in that very state, studying how the mind (although participating in such movements occurring within my little bit of flesh) remains untroubled, while preserving its own good. Nor did I surrender power to the doctors to act important as if they were accomplishing something – instead, my lifestyle was being led well and correctly."

Quote from Rolf

When I'm in a "neutral state" - not sick, injured, etc. - and I focus on my body's senses, I pretty much always notice some kind of ache, tenseness, stomach pain, itchiness, or some other uncomfortable feeling that I'm generally able to ignore when I'm not not fixating on it.

I think this is typically the case for most people. For me, "clearing the mind" is pleasant before sleep, but when I am awake and ready, then "mind-clearing meditation" feels like intellectual asceticism and it is at this point I will notice the extra sensations you mention.

Happily, Epikouros recommends an active and applied mind, he says:

"I recommend continuous activity in physics and pacify myself particularly with such a life."
(D.L. 10.37a)

----------

Epikouros fully acknowledged that all pleasures are based in active pleasures, but he identified the pleasure of being satisfied (i.e., "established pleasures") as the natural goal of living things.

Unlike ascetics, we do not deny the body -- and unlike the average man, we do not deny having reached full pleasure when we are satisfied.

"Eating" is pleasurable, but a life dedicated to "eating" is sad and unhealthy -- and so for the rest of the active pleasures. If we reach the point of satisfaction and wonder what else our body needs, we are missing the point. If we form a lifestyle focused on satisfying our physical pleasures, our intellectual abilities will suffer.

But bodily satisfaction is the beginning of the intellectual life -- and once this is achieved, then here it is healthy to settle in, and consume and consume (philosophy and science) as a lifestyle.

THANK YOU!

I have been reading through your letter to Herodotus a little every day. "Shining a new light" may seem trite, but it applies to your brilliant and beautiful work (I looked at that letter very closely last year, but you brought out many different and new ways of looking at it).

Just as a point of discussion: I was initially a bit surprised by your preservation of cases in the transliterations used in your translation -- certainly not something I have ever seen before -- but now I think it serves as a linguistic bridge to draw a potential student closer to the original!

Posting an update to coins and rings I have been making, They are still a bit rough, but if anybody wants any, let me know. The necklaces and the coins are the easiest to make, and the Lucretius Trio ring is "on hold" at the moment (but I should be able to make more, somewhat better versions, soon).

Quote from Don

Glossarium

Yes on page 677, Usener says "τρικαλίνδητος, τρικυλίνδητος. ac similiter τρικυμία dicta. Epicurus dicit 'paratus sum ad vos quocumque iubebitis me ut trochum praecipiti cursu volventem agere (trudere)'"

So he takes it as as a colloquialism, but based on the wheel imagery.

Quote from Joshua

'thrice-garlanded'

I fully agree with your line of thinking, Joshua.

The sentence ending with "ὠθεῖσθαι / to be pushed" has led most translators toward the "wheel" interpretation -- but it can just as easily mean "compelled."

With that problem out of the way, τρικύλιστος certainly has a basic meaning of "rolled three times" -- but with κυλιστός meaning "twined in a circle, an epithet of a kind of garland" (as LSJ states, and as you and Athenaîos have shown) -- "rolled" can certainly refer to a garland. (It seems most of the "garlands" Athenaîos is discussing are worn on the head, so I think we are talking about wreaths.)

So the only remaining mystery is the prefix "three" -- which could easily be a colloquialism for either entwining three different plants to make one wreath, or just placing one upon the other -- the effect would be similar.

*******

Regarding "Three," we do see our Philōnídēs of Laodíkeia honored with three distinct wreaths (στέφανοι) in the inscription Attica, IG II2 1236:

"...the people honored him: both [the elder] Philōnídēs himself and his sons Philōnídēs and Dicaearchus – with citizenship, and crowned them with (1) a wreath of laurel and again with (2) a golden wreath... ...to praise [the elder] Philōnídēs of Laodicea and his sons Philōnídēs and Dicaearchus, and to crown each of them with (3) a wreath of myrtle, which it is customary to use when crowning their own benefactors."

Significantly, these are specifically honors given to Philōnídēs by the Athenians.

*****

So it could mean, in the context of Epikouros' letter to Themísta, "with all the honors you have given me in your letter" (i.e., crowned with multiple compliments)"

It is not much of a connection, but Lucius Lucretius Trio was an older contemporary (and presumably relative) of our Lucretius, and the crescent moon shows up on some of his coins.

Oh, I was just pointing to the (1) specific meaning "hooked" vs. (2) merely meaning "bulk." I know he usually uses "bulk," but I am not sure if he uses "hooked."

Quote from Eikadistes

ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooks”),

Although that exists, Epíkouros mostly uses:

 "ὄγκος (B), ὁ, bulk, size, mass of a body"

ὁ ὄγκος is really his main word for "particle."

I fully agree with your point, even using this example I could see us being "oncologists" instead of "atomists" (but that word was taken for other uses).

For the threefold division, it seems that "empty" has a negative connotation in Epistemology and Ethics, but is neutral in Physics.

Quote from Don

VS423.

I think you want U423, and so for the rest.

Is that from a version that has the Greek and English already paired?

I read that part of 62 as "The addition of judgment concerning the unseen... ...is not true in such cases: since everything envisioned or comprehended through our attention to [mental] perception is true."

The addition of judgment, then, is the source of the error, not "attention to mental perception."

In the sentence we are looking at aliquam is an adjective, from aliquis and usually means "some."

Less common is the adverbial use of aliquam, and only there does it mean "somewhat, to some degree" which comes close to "largely."

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=aliquis&la=la#lexicon

"aliquis, indef. adj., some, any"

Plutarch, in his Reply (at 1116c) says this -- and then ends with a helpful quote from Colotes:

But I should like to ask the very man (Epicurus), who brings this indictment, if his school does not see this distinction in their own system, whereby some objects are enduring and unchanging in their being, just as atoms too in their doctrine are forever the same because they are too hard to be affected, while all aggregates of atoms are subject to flux and change and come into being and pass out of it, as innumerable films leave them in a constant stream, and innumerable good others, it is inferred, flow in from the surroundings and replenish the mass -- which is varied by this interchange and altered in its composition, since in fact even the atoms in the interior of the aggregate can never cease moving or vibrating against one another, as the Epicureans say themselves.

"It is true" you (Colotes) say "that this sort of difference in ways of being is found in the actual world. But Epicurus shows himself a better philosopher than Plato in applying 'being' to all alike -- to the intangible void and resistant body and to the elements and their aggregates, holding that a common and single way of being is found in both the eternal and the generated, both the indestructible and the destructible, both the unaffected and enduring and changeless realities that can never be expelled from their being and those whose being lies in the fact that they are acted upon and changed and which never for an instant remain as they were."

The "aliquam" from your list is the adverb "largely," --- which is not that common -- but in this sentence it is a version of aliquis and means "some."

"It is thought better to obtain some part rather than none [at all]."

Lists of the books from these two paragraphs: