Posts by Bryan

Quote from Cassius

which is the place I've heard a variation of that view before:

And is ultimately the primary source and confirming bias for Joshua Rothman's New Yorker article and why David Benatar is presented to the public. Once again, just like with physics, much of "modern morality" is just their religious ideas, but packaged to look modern and secular. (Something new was needed once the Christianity scam failed in certain sectors!)

Quote from Rolf

What is it that allows you to have faith in the physics of Epicurus but not the physics of certain modern scientists?

I would say it is about the fundamental assumptions. There will always be thinkers looking for the real fundamental truth in something other than the realm of the senses -- be it in Platonic forms, or in omnipresence of Yahweh, or in mathematics.

If someone says they have a particular knowledge that you cannot access -- but from their knowledge they then teach you something that contradicts your experience, then they have all the intellectual power. They may as well have hypnotized you!

They can then say absurd things such as "matter has no fundamental form" or that "matter can generate from no matter" -- which comes from religious assumptions and is supported by self-referencing mathematics not scientific real-life observations.

In this way they cover your eyes and remove all your footing.

For ὁ μακαρισμός, beyond the difficulty with the main stem " μακαρ" (discussed above), there really is another puzzle with the "ισ."

This is the same difference that changes "wise man" to "sophist," so it is a significant addition.

It is due to this addition of "ισ" that LSJ adds "pronouncing" to the definition of ὁ μακαρισμός, i.e., "pronouncing happy" which makes sense. It almost seems to mean "the hailing toward blessing" or "the pronouncement of blessedness."

Quote from DaveT

none of us, (except perhaps Martin ) have any capacity to judge the credibility of those giants of modern physics you refer to above.

That position resembles accepting a priestly class -- yielding intellectual authority to those established by state, custom, and finance to declare that something contrary to our own experience is the real truth.

Quote from Cassius

Mysticism was argued against by Albert Einstein

This is of course referring to Eastern mysticism, as Einstein did fully integrate Jewish mysticism -- from the spontaneous creation of matter to the formlessness of matter -- all of which fully accords with the fundamental "physical" teachings of the Talmud. This confirmation bias is still a powerful force.

To add a bit more:

The issue is not using mathematics or updating the physics. The issue is what you accept as your fundamental basis.

Newton used mathematics and "updated" physics in a way that is fully consistent with Epicurean philosophy, because he endeavored to explain what is observable -- his fundamental basis is what is observable.

All new inventions can be explained using a fully physical model. Taking credit for new technology is the prerogative those currently in charge.

Any "science" that uses math to try to explain away the observable is doing something fundamentally different -- and this path can lead to any conclusion. Even such things as the universe just popping into existence, or that matter is not fundamentally physical.

I shared a section of this in relation to the size of the sun, but it is all rather critical material, Sextus Empiricus (_fl.c. 200 ^CE), Against the Professions 7 (Against the Logicians/Dogmatists 1) 203 - 216:

Epicurus says that of the two things which are linked with one another – appearance and judgment– of these, the appearance, which he also calls "detectible reality," always exists as true. For just as the primary Experiences (that is, Pleasure and Suffering) are composed from certain productive things and in accordance with the very productive things themselves (such as Pleasure from what is pleasant – and Pain from what is painful) ¬ and is it not possible that what produces pleasure is not pleasant, nor what results in pain does not exist as painful.

But [it is] necessary that both what causes pleasure is pleasant and what causes pain is underlyingly painful by nature: so also in the case of the appearances – given that they exist around us as experiences. What produces each of the [appearances] is in every way and altogether capable of appearing – which cannot, being capable of appearing, not exist in truth such as it appears… …to establish what produces an appearance.

It is also necessary to reason analogously in regards to the [sensations] according to [the details of] each – for what is visible not only appears visible ¬ but is also such a thing as the kind of thing it appears [to be].

And what is audible does not only appear audible ¬ but actually in truth exists as such: and likewise for the other [senses]: all appearances, therefore, turn out to be true.

And according to reason: for, if an appearance is called true, say the Epicureans, whenever it is produced from something existing and in accordance with the very thing that exists – and [given that] every appearance is composed from something existing that is capable of appearing and in accordance with what is capable of appearing itself – [then] by natural necessity, every appearance is true.

But the difference regarding the appearances that seem to fall upon [us] from the same sensible thing (such as from a visible one) deceives some people – according to which the original source is apparent as either differently colored, or differently shaped, or otherwise completely changed.

[Epicureans] conjectured that, of appearances differing and conflicting in this way, it is necessary that a certain [appearance] is true ¬ but the other [appearance], from opposing things, happens to be false (which is naïve and [a sign] of men not fully perceiving the nature in the things that exist).

(let us make the reasoning based on visible things in this way) the hard object is not seen as a whole ¬ but [only] the color of the hard object.

Of the color, one [part] is on the hard object itself (just as in things seen from nearby and from a moderate separation) – the other [part is] outside the hard object and underlying in the adjacent locations (just as with things envisioned from a distant separation).

But this, being completely changed in the intervening [space] and taking on a particular shape, delivers such an appearance as the kind of thing which it also itself underlies in truth.

In just the same way, therefore, neither is the sound thoroughly heard in a bronze instrument that is being struck, nor the [sound] in the mouth of the man who shouted ¬ but rather the [sound] that is falling upon our sensation.

And just as no one says that a person hearing a sound from a small distance hears falsely – just because after he has come nearby he instead receives it as louder: in this way I would not say that vision gives a false report because from a far separation it sees the tower as small and round ¬ but from nearby as larger and tetragonal.

But rather [vision] truly reports – because even when the sensible object is apparent to [vision] as small and of a certain shape: it really is small and of a certain shape – due to the transmission through the air, as the edges of the films are being broken off.

And when [it appears] again large and differently shaped, [it is] again similarly large and differently shaped ¬ since by now both [appearances] are not established as the same thing.

For this is what remains of distorted judgment: to believe that the appearance envisioned from nearby and from far off was the same.

But it exists as the particularly of sensation instead to receive only what is present and moving it – such as color – and not to thoroughly separate that what is here is one thing ¬ but what is underlying there is another thing.

Therefore, the appearances, for these reasons, are all true ¬ the judgments, however, are not all true – but, they have some difference.

For, of these [judgments], some were true, but others false: since our distinctions [between true and false] are established upon appearances – and we distinguish some things correctly, others wretchedly (either by adding and attributing something to the appearances ¬ or by removing something from them – and generally give a false report against unreasoning sensation).

So then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by detectible reality ¬ false are those contested and not attested by detectible reality.

Attestation is the comprehension through detectible reality of what is judged [actually] being the kind of thing it was once judged [to be]: such as, when Plato is approaching from afar, I imagine and judge, due to the separation, that it is Plato ¬ but when he has approached, it was confirmed that it is Plato, with the separation between having been removed – and it was attested through detectible reality itself.

Non-contestation is conformity of what is unclear – but has been postulated and judged – with what appears: such as Epicurus saying that void exists, which is the very thing that is unclear ¬ this is confirmed through a detectible situation – movement.

For if the void does not exist, movement should not exist – with the moving body not having a location into which it will be transferred, because of everything being full and solid: so that what is apparent (that movement does exist) does not contest the unclear thing that has been judged.

But contestation is something opposed to non-contestation – for there was a joint-refutation of the visible thing with the unclear thing that was postulated. As for example the Stoic says that the void does not exist – asserting something unclear – and with this having been so postulated, what is apparent (movement, I mean) should be jointly refuted. For if the void does not exist, then, by natural necessity, movement is not produced – according to the way [of thinking] already previously made clear by us.

And so likewise, non-attestation is opposed to attestation: for it is as an underlying occurrence through the detectible reality of what is being judged not existing as such a thing as the exact kind of thing it was judged [to be].

Just as, when someone is approaching from far off, because of the separation we imagine it to be Plato ¬ but when the separation has been reduced: we know by detectible reality that it is not Plato. Thus something like this comes to be non-attestation: for what is judged was not attested by what is apparent.

Therefore, attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something being true ¬ but non-attestation and contestation of being false: while the basis and foundation of all things is detectible reality.

I think it is all in the "toil" over a joy that is only "now and again."

If I enjoy playing an instrument, and it is "low toil" and "frequent joy," then I am not his target.

I enjoy playing my banjo (looking into getting a bouzouki) -- but really only at the very end of the day when I have given my greater mental energy to greater things. I do not learn songs, only improvise, every second that I play is the song.

Quote from Don

It seems to me, the epicureans could take pleasure in the performance and not need to listen to critical analysis or music theory.

Yes, and not only not take part in music theory -- but also not learn to play an instrument.

P.Herc. 1578 fr. 20, Philodemus (Translated, I think, by D. Blank):

"It is typical of small-minded people with nothing worthwhile to which they can dedicate themselves, let alone which would make them happy, to toil over learning (to play music) in order to amuse themselves now and again, people who do not see the abundance of public performances or the possibility of partaking in them all the time around the city, if they want to do so, and who do not consider that our nature refuses (to listen to music) for too long and quickly tires of it."

Which version did you choose Charles? Which color and base?

Thanks Eikadistes!

On a slightly related note, it seems that many authors were in the habit of using the plural.

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Heraclitus (_{fl. f.} 50 ^CE), Allegories of Homer, 4

ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ φιλόσοφος Ἐπίκουρος "ὁτῆς ἡδονῆς ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις κήποις γεωργὸς"

Phaiāx calls the philosopher Epicurus "the cultivator of pleasure in his own gardens"

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Seneca (_fl. 35 ^CE), Letters to Lucilius, 4.10

Accipe quod mihi hodiērnō diē placuit – et hoc quoque ex aliēnīs hortulīs sumptum est:

Receive what has pleased me on this very day – and this too has been taken from little foreign gardens

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Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.10

"ecquid bene acceptus es? nōn irritant" inquit "hī Hortulī famem, sed exstinguunt

"were you well received?" he says "these little gardens do not provoke hunger, but they quench it"

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Cicero, On the Laws, 1.13.39

in hortulis suis iubeamus dicere...

In their small gardens let us allow them to speak...

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There are more from Athenaeus and Plutarch.

I ordered another one of these, but they refunded the order and now seem to have shut down the whole shop.

Carpe diem quam minimum credula postero!

This was great all around! The quote from DeWitt on "Epicurus' innovation" is excellent -- as was your treatment of the sorites topic! Thank you.

I always have in mind this quote of Metrodorus (from Plutarch in Non Posse 1091 A):

"This very thing is the good: escaping the bad – because it is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere, when nothing painful or distressing is further withdrawing."

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Full physical contentment is consistently and naturally achieved through our body's internal processes when we have the necessary provisions of food and shelter.

Similarly, full mental contentment can be maintained by recognizing the ease with which physical contentment can be obtained and by cultivating gratitude for this success.

I added a bit of paint, but sticking to gold/bronze/silver turned him into a bit of a ghost, so I'll try again with more realistic colors.

Adding this as well, which shows Epicurus fighting against eliminative materialism.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 6 (fr. B 28) & col. 10 (fr. B 32):

Insofar as we would refer to this aggregate as something: but also insofar as [we would refer to an aggregate only as] "atoms" and insofar as [we would refer to an aggregate as] "an aggregate" [per se]...

…for itself, according to what is similar and undifferentiated, [your reasoning] will be said to mentally perceive itself ^[1] as if it were one particular thing in what is conceived to exist [i.e., "this is my ability to reason"], but also ^[2] in reference to itself, of itself, within [the context] of other things [i.e., "my ability to reason is based in atomic movement"] – and in as much as [your reasoning] is said to perceive itself in some experience…

^{ᾗἄθροισμα τόδε τι ἂν Προσαγορεύσαιμεν: ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾗ "ἀτόμους" καὶ ᾗ "ἄθροισμα."}

^{…[ἑ]αυτῶι κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον κ̣αὶ ἀδιάφορον ἑαυτὸν ῥ̣ηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι οἷον ἑνός τινος ταύτηι τοῦ νοο̣υμένο⟦ν⟧υ ὄντος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτ[ὸ]ν ἑαυτοῦ ἐ̣ν̣[τὸς] ἄλλων. καθότι δ' ἐν [πά]θ̣ει τινι ἑαυτὸν λέ̣[γεται διαν]οε̣[ῖσθ]α̣ι…}

Regarding the main topic, I wanted to share Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43):

^[Sedley] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and depend upon beliefs of our own making.

Also book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 16 (fr. B 38):

^[Sedley] ...many naturally capable of achieving these and those results fail to achieve them because of themselves, not because of one and the same responsibility of the atoms and of themselves.

Really most of book 25 is relevant to this topic.

Quote from Don

You could quit. But are you ready to face the consequences of quitting your job?

On this topic, I wanted to share Seneca (_fl. 35 ^CE), Letters to Lucilius, Letter 22, sections 1-5:

"You now understand that you must be led out of those flashy and harmful occupations, but you ask how you might achieve that. Some things can only be shown by someone present… What generally happens, and what ought to be done, can be passed on and written down in universal terms: such counsel can be given not only to those who are absent, but even to future generations. but that other kind – when something ought to happen, or in what way – no one will advise from afar, since it must be deliberated with the circumstances themselves.

It is necessary not only for someone who is present, but for one who is alert, to notice the opportunity as it rushes by. So look around for this – if you see this, grab it with full force and all your strength: strive to strip yourself from those duties. And now, pay attention to the opinion I am about to give: I believe it is necessary for you to either depart from that life, or from life [itself]. but I think this as well: it is necessary to go by the gentle path – so that what you’ve badly entangled, you may untie rather than tear apart – however, if there is no other method of untying it: then do tear it apart. No one is so timid that he prefers hanging forever to falling once!

In the meantime – and this is the first thing – do not entangle yourself further: Be content with the business in which you have entered (or, as you’d rather have it seem, '[in which] you stumbled').

There is no reason for you to strive for greater things – otherwise, you will lose the excuse ¬ and it will become apparent that you did not just stumble into it. Yes, those things that are usually said are false: 'I couldn’t do otherwise' 'what if I hadn’t wanted to?' 'It was necessary'

For no one is it is necessary to chase after happiness at a run: there is something of value – even if not in resisting – in stopping, and not pressing forward with fortune as she drives. Surely you would not be offended, if I not only join in counsel, but also call in men indeed wiser than I am– to whom I usually refer, when I am deciding something:

Read the letter of Epicurus that pertains to this very issue, the one addressed to Idomeneus, whom [Epicurus] urges to flee as much as he can and to hurry – before some greater force intervenes ¬ and takes away the freedom to withdraw.

He nevertheless adds that nothing should be attempted unless it can be done suitably and at the right time. But when that long-awaited time finally comes: he says one must leap out.

He forbids the one thinking about this flight to fall asleep – and he hopes for a saving exit even from the most difficult things: if only we do not rush before the right time ¬ nor delay in the right time."

ADMIN EDIT: WIKISOURCE LINK: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_let…ilius/Letter_22

To further support Joshua's argument that starts at 16:00, I wanted to share these two quotes:

Plutarch, Non Posse, 28, p. 1105D: "If then 'The memory of a friend that has died is pleasant from every standpoint' as Epicurus said, indeed already it is possible to understand how much they deprive themselves of joy: believing they [passively] receive and [actively] pursue appearances and films of dead companions – in which neither mind exists, nor sensation – while they are not expecting to be truly united again with them (and to see their beloved father, and beloved mother, and even their helpful wife)."

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 63.7 (apparently quoting Epicurus): "For me, the thought of departed friends is sweet and pleasant: for I had them as though I would lose them – and I have lost them as though I still have them."

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Brilliant juxtaposition about prudence at 37:00! That needed to happen and you did a great job!

I noticed that most of the other statues offered from the same shop have pupils. I have struggled to paint them on other busts, so I asked the shop if they could add pupils to this bust. They said they could and gave this from their program as a sample; so be aware of this option. We'll see how it turns out.