Posts by Bryan

I think this is the most instructive clue I have found, (Laertius 4.44):

"[Arcesilaus] died in a fit of madness, as Hermippus says, after drinking a good deal of unmixed wine, he had by then reached the age of seventy-five, and no man was more highly regarded by the Athenians."

That alone is only suggestive (just like the example with Epicurus), however the very next line, Diogenes says:

"My own verses about him run as follows: Why, Arcesilaus, did you draw unmixed wine so unsparingly as to take leave of your sense? I pity you not so much for your death..."

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As a side note about Arcesilaus being "highly regarded," Plutarch says "The reputation of Arcesilaus seems to immoderately distress Epicurus -- given that [Arcesilaus] was especially admired among the philosophers in those times" _{Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 26, 1121 E fin.}

Arcesilaus was a pupil of both Theophrastus and Pyrrho, yet he ended up leading the Academy a few years after Epicurus died.

I wanted to share this incomplete rough draft of the mocking epithets applied to other schools. I'm looking for any critiques, large and small. Most of the pairings of epithet to the particular philosopher are clear, but not all, given the higgledy-piggledy presentation given in Plutarch, Non Posse, 1086 D.

He was fundamentally a skeptic, saying "let us not hazard guesses about the most important matters." (Laertius 9.73)

Quote from Cassius

What we seem to be revolving around is seeing proplepsis as a form of automatic selectivity among the inputs provided by the sensations and feelings, by which the brain then in a separate step takes that selected raw data

Yes, if someone shows you a diseased rat in a cage and says, "This is a god!" -- the immediate, automatic rejection you feel comes from the fact that it does not match your prolēpsis (i.e., mental sense / anticipation) of what a god is.

Only after that initial sensation can you begin reasoning out why you automatically think a sick rat in a cage is not a god.

Plátō mocked the Heracliteans and their theory of flux by calling them "the fluxing ones" (Theaetetus 180c).

The mocking epithet Epíkouros used for Hērákleitos was "Kykētḗs" which means "the Agitator."

Epíkouros' term alludes to Hērákleitos' own metaphor of the kykeōn (a mixed barley drink) which must be stirred to stay combined (DK B125)

A quote of Sedley From this article. 

"According to Timocrates, Epicurus insulted the Cyzicenes... ...Eudoxus of Cnidos, the great mathematical astronomer and associate of Plato, taught for a period at Cyzicus, and produced there several distinguished pupils. One of these, Polemarchus, in turn became the teacher of Callippus of Cyzicus, who was later to move to Athens and exert a profound influence on Aristotle’s astronomical thinking. All this points to an established Eudoxan school at Cyzicus, which our fragment suggests was still going strong in Epicurus’ day."

It seems our Apollodorus "the Epicurean" and the more famous Apollodorus "of Athens" are now considered two different people, but I need help figuring out why.

They have the same dates:
Apollodorus "of Athens" first came to Athens in 146 BC (in his early thirties) -- and Apollodorus "the Epicurean" died around 100 BC (as an old man).

Apollodorus "of Athens" was associated with Epicureans:
He was originally educated by the Stoic Scholarch Diogenes of Babylon -- but this Diogenes, as we know, was on friendly terms with Philōnídēs of Laodíkeia. (This puts our Philōnídēs, who did visit Athens while representing the Seleucids, in the same friend group as Apollodorus "of Athens")

They both wrote the same book:
Diogénēs Laë́rtios says "Apollodorus [the Epicurean] in his Chronology tells us that [Epíkouros] was a student of Nausiphánēs and Praxiphanes" -- but one of the main works of Apollodorus "of Athens" was his "Chronology"

Thank you, moving Apollodorus just one down -- under Dionysus of Lamptrai -- should work for now.

Also Leontion, an original member, should be closer to the top of the list, around Polyaenus, and just after her should be Colotes.

Quote from Kalosyni

Notable Epicureans, including Epicurus, Metrodorus,

Can we add Apollodorus to this list? I cannot figure out how.

I would say that the prolepseis are our 'mental sense.'

I agree we are talking about a faculty. But what is any sense or faculty without an object? Sight means little without reference to what one sees.

A pre-thought visual sense occurs when we visually focus on an external impression, and a pre-thought mental sense (a prolepsis) occurs when we mentally focus on an internal impression.

Quote from Cassius

A conclusion can be based in part on a prolepsis and still be wrong, Faculties are never true or false, but the conclusions we draw based on them can be.

Well said, and very important to keep in mind.

I think of a prolepsis as a ‘mental sense’ -- what comes to mind when you think of something.

Just as you use your eyes to look at a tree, you use this mental sense to begin thinking about a tree.

You can use your eyes to look at a statue of a unicorn -- and you have an anticipation in your mind of what a unicorn should look like.

To contrast Cicero's use of "belief" above (in Latin, "opinio"), we have:

"[Epíkouros] himself called belief 'the sacred illness.'"

^{(ὁ αὐτὸς [ Ἐπίκουρος] τὴν οἴησιν "ἱερὰν νόσον" ἔλεγεν, Fragment 195 from the Florilegium Monacense)}

Which seems to mean that holding to opinions without evidence is harmful -- even though those opinions are widely respected.

Here is a list of words used by Epikouros that are all based on the same verb which prolepsis is built upon (λαμβάνω).

Prolepsis List 1.pdf

Oxford does seem to say it was "published," at least internally at Oxford, but apparently it was not issued to the public. Obbink is out of academia for the foreseeable future, and Oxford is unlikely to publish any more of his work.

I am not sure if we have shared this quote as well, but wanted to throw it in to make sure. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7.13.2-4 (Rackham trans):

"This is why everybody thinks that the happy life must be a pleasant life, and regards pleasure as a necessary ingredient of happiness; and with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them. Consequently those who say that, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense. But because Happiness requires the gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune; but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is an impediment to activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness."

Yes, thank you. That makes sense. At the very least, the farther north he is in Melítē, the closer he is to the Garden.

Thank you for the illuminating footnote: "While “Mýs” is typically translated as “Mouse” (assumed to be a diminutive) it could equally refer to his region of origin, perhaps Mysia. Most slaves in ancient Greece were foreigners who had been captured, sold, or imprisoned."

It seems Mysia was in the area of Lampsacus and Cyzicus (we know Epikouros sent letters to friends in Cyzicus, at least, P.Herc. 1418, col. 7).

According to Strabo (Geography, 13.1.19), Epikouros associated with "the most distinguished of those in this city [Lampsacus]" so maybe he did pick up Mýs around that time and location.

I wanted to get your impression of this little map, Don, where I added "garden" and "house." It is oversimplified, (and his house was just in that area, certainly not that large) but I would be grateful for any comments you have.

I agree with your line of thinking TauPhi, but Cicero does seem supported by others in his representation:

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1099D:

"Not even one of us would believe Epíkouros that – while dying amid the greatest pains and illnesses – he was counterbalancing with the memory of pleasures formerly fully enjoyed. Someone would more likely perceive the representation of his appearance in the [ocean's] disturbed depth and surge than a memory of pleasure smiling gently amid such throbbing and bodily torment!"

We also have Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 92.25:

"Does it not seem equally unbelievable that someone placed in the greatest torments should say 'I am blessed'? and yet this statement was heard in the very workshop of pleasure 'most blessed' Epíkouros said 'is this indeed: this day I am living' – even while on one side difficulty of urination was tormenting him, and on the other side the incurable pain of an ulcerated stomach."

And (although I shared this recently) Marcus Aurelius , Meditations, 9.41, quoting Epíkouros: "In my illness, my conversations were not about the feelings of my little body ¬ nor was I chatting about such things to those who visited but, while studying nature, I continued with the prior topics, even while in that very state, [studying] how the mind – although participating in such movements [occurring] within my little bit of flesh – remains untroubled, while preserving its own good."

I agree Don, I think both blessedness (i.e., contentment) and indestructibility are necessary qualities of gods. These qualities serve as examples for us -- but our limits in both regards are fully acknowledged, per Philódēmos:

"…the intimacy arising from necessities, in regards to association, gives the emotions over to [that intimacy]: for maintaining intimacy, while existing [together], is not possible without any mixture [of emotions]. Indeed, certainly for us, who are weak and have further need for the necessary things of friendship…"

_{…χρειωδῶν ἡ συμφυλία π[ρὸς τὴν] συνανα[σ]τροφὴν αὐτῆι τὰ πάθη παρ[αδί]δωσιν. οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἔχειν τὴν συμφυλίαν ἄνε[υ] πάσης ἐπιμειξίας ὄντας. ἀμέλει δὲ κ(αὶ) ἐφ' ἡ̣μῶν τῶν ἀ̣σθενῶν κ(αὶ) πρ(οσ)δεγομένων πρ[ὸς τ]ὰ [χρ]ε̣ι̣ώδη τ[ῆς] φιλίας
Philodemus, On The Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 152, fr. 9 (87)}

Philódēmos directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship / intimacy (ἡ συμφυλία) he says that generosity is necessary.