Posts by Bryan

Quote from Twentier

Demetrios of Lakon wrote a book entitled On the Form of the Gods (is that right?)

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.

Quote from Julia

incorporeal entities ("software") inhabiting fancy bio-mechanical space ships ("hardware"), which repair

Although the only incorporeal entity is the void, which cannot think or do anything at all. Nothing incorporeal can act or be acted upon.

Certainly, the environment supporting gods is naturally occurring between the kosmoi by automatic infinite processes of nature (just as the environment supporting waterfalls is naturally occurring on Earth by automatic finite processes of nature).

Great topic!

It almost seems that the idea of instinct was wrapped into the idea of determinism, which loomed so large that Epicurus feels he needs to assert that we are not all instinct -- but have something in ourselves that can generally transcend instinct.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43): ^[Sedley] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44): ^[Sedley] by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we rebuke, oppose and reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116: ^[Sedley] If someone won't explain this, and has no auxiliary element or impulse in us which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name. He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion. And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to.

Quote from TauPhi

from the gods or to the gods

Quote from Cassius

it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too... But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia

Yes, I agree all around -- films (τὰ εἴδωλα) come off every object. We can focus on films that come off other objects toward us, but we cannot direct the films that come off us toward other objects.

48b ...for there is a continuous flow from the surface of bodies – not noticeable by decrease due to replenishment – preserving the position in the solid and arrangement of atoms for a long time...

49b For external objects would not imprint their nature of color and shape through the air between us and them... without certain impressions coming to us from the objects (of the same color and of the same shape) according to the size that fits into the vision or mind, by means of swift movements.

Quote from Don

feel free to pepper your writing and conversation with νή Δία! "By Zeus!"

Yes, by Zeus! Epicurus really does use this with great frequency. I started saying "nē Día!" almost as a joke in place of an interjection (in place of a "curse"). Over time "nē Día!" has become a genuine reflexive interjection.

Excellently done -- and a beautiful composition! I swear, this looks like an image from a dream that I recently had. Thank you for sharing.

500 years ago modern science also disagreed with Epicurus -- and now more nearly agrees with him.

Quote from Don

(4/2b/?)

2b! But really all 1.

Quote from Little Rocker

sensation itself contains cognitive content

It seems to me that Epicurus coalesces mental sensation with sensation from the other sense organs -- and distinguishes all these sensations from thought.

^{[10.49, Bailey]} For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any sort which pass from us to them — nearly so well as if models, similar in color and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our sight or into our mind.

You see with your eyes with the same mechanism that you see mental images: the eidola creates both, and in the same way. And, of course, the process of the eidola contacting or entering the body is not a process that involves logic (even if we are focusing on specific contacts/sensations).

Quote from Little Rocker

It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true. They just can't rule it out (DL 10. 51).

Absolutely. Our measure of truth can extend beyond sensation -- by reference to sensation. As Epicurus often says about his considerations of the non-visible, "none of these things are contracticed by the senses."

Thanks again!

The last line of Lucian's "The Dependent Scholar" may be a quote from Epicurus, it ends:

"Remember the words of the wise man: ‘Blame not Heaven, but your own choice.’"

Quote from Little Rocker

And a general concept (e.g., 'horse') that serves as the starting point for investigation, doesn't that require repeated experiences

It is the repeated experiences that serve as the starting point for the investigation / formation of concepts.

Using our direct alogical sensations as tools (our measuring sticks of truth) we then use our logical functions and memory for such activities as investigation and formation of concepts.

Thank you for the conversation!

Hello Little Rocker, thank you for the question!

Our measure of truth is pre-cognitive sensation.

10.38b Ἔτι τε ^[1]τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς ^[1]τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε ^[1a]διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ^[1b]ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ^[2]τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη – ὅπως ἂν καὶ ^[A]τὸ προσμένον καὶ ^[B]τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

It is necessary to always preserve ^[1]the senses and simply^[1]the present impressions, whether ^[1a]of the mind or ^[1b]of any of the criteria, and likewise ^[2]the existing feelings – so that we may also have that by which we will interpret ^[A]what is pending confirmation and ^[B]what is unseen.

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When we focus on our [1a] mental images we have a pre-cognitive sensation of that mental image -- just as when we focus our [1b] eyes on something we have pre-cognitive sensations of that thing.

With this context, we have Bailey very correctly translating "ἐννόημα" as "mental image."

10.38a: Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.

For it is necessary that the primary concept is seen for each word and in no way has need of proof – if we are to have that to which we will refer the inquiry, uncertainty, or belief.

^[Hicks] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving, this being necessary – if we are to have [something] to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

^[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation – if we are really to have [a standard] to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

Quote from Cassius

Hicks definitely has the upper hand that on the rack the wise man will still cry out.

I had not fully appreciated the fact that, when his excellent edition of Diogenes Laertius was published, Hicks had already been blind for over 25 years.

Wikipedia says "Between 1898 and 1900 Robert Hicks became blind, but he nevertheless produced most of his major works after this time, aided by his wife." They even produced Latin dictionary in braille. I think his translation of the letter to Herodotus is in some ways better than Bailey's.

Hello Remus, welcome!

I am not familiar with the Memoria Press version, but I would like to recommend Hans H. Ørberg's Lingua Latina per se Illustrata series (link). Everything is in Latin from the beginning, but illustrated and simple.

Quote from TauPhi

two answers may be correct: 'uncountable' is set as the correct one but I don't see how 'finite' is wrong

Certainly true! I selected "uncountable" and never read to "uncountable but not infinite." At least I think that is what happened. That was my only issue -- great quiz!

42c. And of each shape: the similar ones are completely infinite ¬ but in their differences: they are not completely infinite, but only innumerable.

^[Hicks] The like atoms of each shape: are absolutely infinite ¬ but the variety of shapes: though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

^[Bailey] And so in each shape: the atoms are quite infinite in number ¬ but their differences of shape: are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

Some highlights from "Nigrinus" by Lucian (translated by Fowler).

33. There is no satisfaction to be got out of the costliest viands before consumption; and after it, a full stomach is none the better for the price it has cost to fill it. Ergo, the money is paid for the pleasure snatched in transitu.

23. Not wealth, but the envy that waits on wealth, is the object of their desire. The truth is, gold and ivory and noble mansions are of little avail to their owner, if there is no one to admire them. If we would break the power of the rich, and bring down their pretensions, we must raise up within their borders a stronghold of Indifference.

15. He whose ears must be tickled with lascivious songs, and the voluptuous notes of flute and lyre — let all such dwell here in Rome; the life will suit them. Our streets and market-places are filled with the things they love best. They may take in pleasure through every aperture, through eye and ear, nostril and palate; nor are the claims of Aphrodite forgotten. The turbid stream surges everlastingly through our streets; avarice, perjury, adultery — all tastes are represented. Under that rush of waters, modesty, virtue, uprightness, are torn from the soul; and in their stead grows the tree of perpetual thirst, whose flowers are many strange desires."

Excellent work on your website, Twentier, thank you! The only books I have on Philodemus' Rhetoric are Hubbell's translation (that Cassius shared) and Clive Chandler's work on books 1 & 2, did you use/find any other sources?

Great job guys, thank you!

Well said Joshua, at 36:50 "it is not the prolepsis that is wrong -- while the sensory input is streaming into our senses, the mind is adding it's own layer to that -- and this layer of opinion is where error comes in. In all of these cases, if you are not aware of that ongoing process, it becomes very difficult to distinguish what is true from what is not true."

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The description of the prolepsis was excellent all the way through! "The distinction, which seems very clear to us, between the senses and the mind may not have been made to the same degree among the Epicureans in the ancient world."

Well said and certainty true!

10.49a Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

It is also necessary to understand that – by something entering from the outside – we see forms and think.

^[Hicks] We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them.

^[Yonge] Also, one must admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge of forms.

^[Bailey] Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes.

Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.

Laertius gives ⁽¹⁾sensations, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ^(x)anticipations and ⁽³⁾image-based focus of the mind.

Epicurus himself says ⁽¹⁾sensation, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾the whole visual focus of the mind

There is no discrepancy, but if there was, it is the anticipations that are the addition by Laertius -- because both mention ⁽¹⁾sensation, ⁽²⁾feelings, and ⁽³⁾mental focus.

Quote from Cassius

there's no reason to split the term into two, and that it's best to think of there being only three categories

Quote from TauPhi

I don't think the fourth criterion is a mistake.

You are both correct. Fundamentally any and all sensation is our measure of truth -- we receive information from all impressions from the outside world that interact with our body.

^{10.51a [Hicks]} For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.

^{10.51a [Bailey]} For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.

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The anticipations are just as momentary as your sight -- and your use of them can improve in the same way: over time you can increase your discipline/ability to focus on what is real, as Epicurus says "through the influences entering from the surrounding environment, taking the guidances towards improvement." (P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124).

Epicurus also says, in Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43) ^{[Sedley 20C.1]} From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us...