In my arguments with some Christians over the years (who equated “faith” with a source of knowledge itself), I came to define “faith” as “an attitude of confidence in the face of uncertainty.”
[This also seems to accord with some practical (e.g., in sports) psychology.]
Needless to say, those Christians continued to claim that they actually knew things by faith … 
GPT Jesus! 
Who wants a GPT Epicurus? 
Here is an in-depth article I just came across (because I daily peruse El Pais – to get out of the U.S. news bubble a bit). It addresses the extreme resource needs and impact on local environments and communities of AI data centers (not global warming stuff, but immediate and potential near-term impacts).
I don’t see anything of partisan politics, but social and economic issues are addressed. For example: “... several of these complexes are currently extracting water from underground aquifers that are in a critical state. These natural reserves also provide water to the populations living in nearby rural communities.”
I think it’s worth a considered, close read.
Oh! Sorry for the confusion!
Ah, wasn't you! The article had the -ai in quotes, and you can use quotes in Google to make sure your search includes the specified terms. So the confusion was mine.
Just tried it! It works.
I tried, and it didn't work with the " " around the -ai, but did without them.
Google's AI summaries at the top of ALL my searches are intrusive and far and away useless the large majority of the time. I still use Google, but I'm rapidly being more likely to use other search engines for this exact reason.
I just read an AP article on the large environmental impact of AI data centers, in terms of energy and water usage, and heat generation. One of the contributors wrote that beginning Google searches by typing “-ai” eliminates the AI overview feature.
I think the ethical problem here is full disclosure.
Fair point.
Just as an aside – it seems we’re bordering (lightly, I want to stress) on Brave New World stuff here. Would you rather share physical sexual intimacy with a real person (no matter their imperfections) – or with a “perfect” robotic substitute? (Okay, now we’re into the Stepford Wives … 
)
Respectfully I don't think I would reach that same conclusion myself.
Respectfully … we disagree. 
Since we’re into hypotheticals: imagine watching the most exciting baseball game you’ve ever seen – and discovering that it was all CGI, done so well that you thought you were seeing actual human players at the top of their game. I would feel cheated.
Or imagine that you've just listened (in the auditorium) to a brilliant, moving "performance" of your favorite symphony (say, Beethoven's Ninth) -- only to discover that the actual orchestra players were just going through the motions (including the conductor), while the actual music was an AI-generated recording. I would feel cheated.
Or imagine the "discovery" of a heretofore unknown symphony by Beethoven -- that turns out to be an AI generated fake. No matter how "good" it seems, I would rather listen to an imperfect rendition of Beethoven's Ninth.
[After all, imperfection is part of the human aesthetic -- part of the beauty of it -- as Japanese culture has deeply understood.]
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BTW, thanks for the challenging discussion! You're not an AI bot are you? 
And if in fact someone posted a poem that so appealed to you that you in fact found it to be one of the most enjoyable poetic experiences of your life to read it, would you then wish that you had never read it if you found out later it had been generated by AI?
Yes. For the same reason that I would rather listen to YoYo Ma play the cello, than a robot who played the same concerto perfectly.
And I am not saying that I couldn’t be fooled by a sufficiently “aesthetic” AI – but that would just make me sad and angry. Art, like passion, is a human affair.
On the poetry site where I publish my poems, AI-generated poetry is generally forbidden. A number of poets who run poetry contests there require that your entry include a statement that no AI was used in writing the poem – without that statement, you are disqualified.
I wholeheartedly approve that sentiment.
I just found this website which has recipes:
https://www.britishmuseum.org/blog/cook-clas…greece-and-rome
Is your experience full to the brim when you have a little water and air and water? Mine is not, and I hope to live a significant number of additional time and experience more pleasures that I can reasonably hope to experience.
Epicurus did NOT live a life from which singing and dancing and joy and delight had been banished.
Principal Doctrine 5 - An Epicurean sees virtue as important for a happy and pleasurable life because it is the means to a happy and pleasurable life - virtue is itself not the end goal but is the way that leads to a pleasurable life.
In addition to PD5, there is also this --
Letter to Menoiceus 132: “Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.”
Here is a Wiki article on Virtue Ethics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics
“Some modern versions of virtue ethics do not define virtues in terms of well being or flourishing, and some go so far as to define virtues as traits that tend to promote some other good that is defined independently of the virtues, thereby subsuming virtue ethics under (or somehow merging it with) consequentialist ethics.”
This seems to be the move made by Lawrence Becker (sort of the “founding father” in academic circles of modern Stoicism) in his A New Stoicism. He essentially defines virtue as something necessary to enhance and sustain “effective agency” toward some (any) endeavor. Effective agency is necessary (though not sufficient) to the successful outcome of any endeavor. He makes some other (to me very questionable, to say the least) moves to try and salvage a Stoic virtue ethics from being a thoroughgoing consequentialism. I think he fails – and once again reminds of Emily Austin’s essay suggesting that modern Stoics are really disguised Epicureaans. (Becker also dismisses any notion of an intelligent, providential universe. And he seems to hedge on eudaimonia as telos.)
Aretḗ
This does at least remove “virtue” from any particular “moralism”. And I think that moves it closer to the original Greek term aretḗ (ἀρετή) – as "excellence" of any kind – especially a person or thing's "full realization of potential or inherent function." (Which may include, but does not strictly refer to, “moral virtue”).
And: “The ancient Greeks applied the term arete (ἀρετή) to anything: for example, the excellence of a chimney, the excellence of a bull for breeding, and the excellence of a man.” Since this view seems focussed on functional values, it seems closer to consequentialism to me.
I’m sure that Don can contribute more on this …
I'm not that familiar with Russell either. I just vaguely recalled his defense of universals.
Words like "heap" and "good" are useful even though they have no mathematical precision, but it needs to be understood that these words lack not only mathematical precision but any intrinsic meaning of their own absent reference to the individual items that are being described in summary.
Epicurus is arguing that "pleasure" as a concept has no meaning apart from the individual instances of pleasure which are contained within the summary term. Of course the concept is very useful as a way to communicate ideas, but Plato and the others are asserting that there is an absolute realm of ideas where there is a "perfect" or "form" of pleasure, and that pleasures are pleasures because they somehow mystically partake in this form or idea.
These ideas are overlapping in two threads -- but, here again, I think you nailed it.
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Admin Edit Note 8/11/2025: the other thread referred to, is here.
I would presume that what this means is that abstractions such as "color" or "good" do not have an independent existence apart from the things that we are describing as colored or good. Nor do "happiness" or "pleasure" as concepts have any independent meaning apart from individual instances of real people experiencing real feelings.
On the other hand, words such as "color" and "good" are useful, and so everyone - including Epicurus - uses them.
I think that is about as good a summary argument against the actual existence of such universals as “redness” or “goodness” – while retaining their semantic usefulness – as one could expect.
As one process philosopher that I once read put it: it is the error of assuming that for every “substantive” that we have in our language, there must be an actual “substance” (existent). Once you abandon Platonic idealism, such universals also fall away (Bertrand Russell notwithstanding).
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LATE EDIT: And, as you point out in another thread, those concepts can have meaning only in terms of contextualized actual individual experience.
Clearly just because something can be imagined does not make it possible
Agreed, of course. But, the so-called “sorites problem” (where I agree with TauPhi* ) aside, I recall that in modal logic there is a principle that would lead to something like this:
If it is logically necessarily possible that X exists in some (possible) world, then – in a model of infinite (logically) possible worlds – X will (necessarily) exist in at least one of them.
[My italics and underlines.]
Of course, it’s not logically necessarily possible that I have really understood all of that … 
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[This type of thinking has been offered as a “proof” of “God.” But if a “god” so defined is not logically possible (e.g. is defined incoherently) – let alone logically necessarily possible – then such a god cannot exist even within a model of infinite possible worlds.]
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* I am reminded of a similar language issue in the later Wittgenstein. We, in ordinary discourse, generally have sufficient understanding of what someone says when they use a phrase like “a heap of sand” (or even “a heap of love”) without needing an arithmetical rule.
I'm a big fan of this poem, but I feel it's acutely anti-Epicurean. "Raging against the dying of the light" brings to mind a bitter and agonising response to dying.
I agree that it's not Epicurean. However, I have always read "rage, rage against the dying of the light" as defiance (perhaps even a kind of "heroic" defiance), rather than bitterness. Remember, it is Dylan speaking to his father, not his father speaking ...
