Posts by Onenski

Thanks for your answer, Cassius.

Quote from Cassius

So why do you not consider your position to be hard determinism? (I see you called it "hard incompatibilism.")

"Hard incompatibilism" is Derk Pereboom's position and it means that whether the world is deterministic of indeterministic, we don't have free will. Another possible term is "Skeptic of free will".

Quote from Cassius

it seems to me that Epicurus thought that "reality' is what we perceive (or experience might be better word). And as I think has already been mentioned by several people in several ways, we perceive that we have the ability to make choices.

Well, reality is more than what we perceive, because, as you usually recall, Epicurus thought that we can infer the existence of things that we can't perceive.

That, I hope, also means that we can be wrong in our experiences. Think about Müller-Lyer illusions: we can't stop "perceiving" two equal lines with opposing arrows as if they were different in magnitude. The same happens with other illusions, like that of the Sun going around the Earth because we see it rising every morning. Or the size of the Sun or the Moon. Indeed, we can infer the real nature of the world and see that we were wrong with those illusions.

Psychological facts can also be explained and criticize in that way. Beliefs are the product of a complex net of personal experience, culture, and a lot of other factors. Belief in free will can be an illusion too (we don't know it, but we can't assume it isn't just because).

Quote from Cassius

Of course the meaning of "appropriately" is going to be entirely contextual, but I would not consider it helpful to my own or to other people's lives to consider myself or them to be unable to make choices

The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it). People will keep making choices, the difference will be how independent they think they are.

Hi, everybody. You know that I sympathise with Hard Incompatibilism (the idea that we don't have free will nor moral responsibility).

The debate is: we human beings assume that we are free to choose what we do and we assume that every event in the universe can be explained by prior causes. For incompatibilists these to assumptions are, evidently, incompatible. Those who affirm that we are free and responsible (so that the world is indeterministic) are libertarians (traditionally in the debate Epicurus is considered a libertarian).
Those who defend that every event has prior causes are determinists.
Compatibilist think that, in fact, both assumptions are compatible: we can affirm that we have free will and we are moral responsible in a deterministic world. I think Epicurus is not a compatibilist.

Hard Incompatibilism says that if the world is deterministic or indeterministic is the same: we have no free will, nor we are morally responsible.

1. I'd like to suggest a question: why the burden of proof is on the side of skeptics of free will and not the other way.

2. Kalosyni , I think you mention something about the capacity of control. The idea of deterministic views is that that capacity can be explained scientifically by previous causes. From my perspective, accepting determinsim doesn't need to imply that you have to be in your house doing nothing. Instead, implies to understand that you are not exempt to the chains of causes in the universe. If the notion of "agency", as Martin prefers to refer instead of "free will", is associated with self-control, I guess determinism would say that agency can be explained. So, agency would not incompatible with determinism. But, I don't know what Martinthinks.

2. Cassius, the ethical worry is one of the motivations but not the justification:

Quote from Cassius

In other words, this debate is usually driven by ethical issues rather than simply wanting to know more about "natural science."

The debate is metaphysical with ethical implications. Philosophers want to know in favor of which conclusion we have better arguments. The same applies to the metaphysical question on the existence of God, universals, the existence of time, and so on. So, the main reasons to accept determinism, compatibilism or libertarianism are metaphysical not ethical.
3. TauPhi, the ethical implications bring up consequences on our human practices. In a world in which we accept as a fact that we are free and responsible of our actions we consider that rewards, punishments, jail, gratitude, resentment, guilt, proud, and others, are justified. If we thought differently, we'd have reasons to change those practices. Effectively, as Peter Strawson argues, we have reactive attitudes (guilt, resentment, proud, forgiveness, gratitude, etc.) and it's hard to feel differently when we interact with other people. However, our practices can be unjustified anyway.
4. DavidN, your reconstructions are straw-man fallacies. The Victimhood argument particularly, besides being more ironic than descriptive, goes into revictimization. Addictions, for example, are public health problems, not a mere matter of choice.
The chapter dedicated to Quantum Mechanics in Determined I think is very reasonable. Do you think was simplistic?
5. I highly recommend to read Sapolsky's Behave, even more than Determined in order to understand his point. Sapolsky offers a reconstruction of the causes of behaviour. The evidence he finds obvioulsy is not conclusive, but he adds to the debate the picture some people need to see how strongly, using Pacatus terms, our decisions are constrained.

I believe that Epicurean philosophy and Free Will Skepticism can be reconciled, but in order to do so I will need a deeper understanding of both things and a better capacity to explain my ideas.

Thanks for the post, Cyrano, I enjoyed it as much as I enjoyed your slides on your hero Cyrano de Bergerac.

And just to complement the reference,

Quote from Cyrano

But seriously, I would like to comment on the Plato/fascism matter. Better still, go to Google and enter “Was Plato a fascist?” There you will encounter many websites discussing the question

In a long book called "The Open Society and Its Enemies" (written in 1945) Karl Popper argued vehemently that Plato was a Proto Totalitarian. I guess that book is the source of many of the articles in internet that you mention.

Thank you very much, Cassius and Kalosyni. This is for me a day of reflection about past pleasures, and an opportunity to be aware of how good is to be alive with very great people such like you, my epicurean friends. 😃

(I must admit too that I like that Epicurus' birthday and mine are so close 🤭)

Quote from Kalosyni

Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

For me, another way to see it, Kalosyni ,

is that the fact that you believe in free will has an explanation that goes beyond your control. It means that you grew up in a certain context, with some genes, certain hormones, that you've had certain experiences, live in a certain cultural context, etc. that explain why you have that belief.

It doesn't mean that your are like a puppet that it's controlled by someone else, it means that even your desires and beliefs are the product of a chain of events prior to you. It also means that there's not a Self above your body who can make choices: you are your body and this body it's immerse in a natural world with laws and different levels of explanation.

It also means that we, human beings, don't have a very special ability, which suspiciously other animals don't have, to make choices out of nothing. Even our small choices have their context and explanation.

Unfortunately, debate on free will tends to focus on very local choices, not in the history of how your intention was formed. For some people is more important to prove that I made certain choice freely, without see any context of my history, than to see what brought me here to choose that thing.

Quote from Pacatus

Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

There's an important nuance to make. There can be unpredictability even under deterministic processes. In chaotic systems, which can be understood under deterministic functioning, we can't predict the results, but that doesn't mean they are random.

Quote from Godfrey

Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness?

That also apply to emergent complexity.

For relevant purposes randomness present in quantum mechanics it's not strong enough to produce relevant consequences to the functioning of neurons (which can be the first level of explanation of human behavior).

I've read these things in Sapolsky's book Determined (another recent book about this is Kevin Mitchell's Free Agents, this was suggested by Godfrey last Wednesday).

As I said up, I think this neuroscientific discussion can be enriching for epicurean philosophy, because as it's understood in the debate, Epicurus was a libertarian about free will. That means that, arguably, Epicurus thought that a deterministic world is incompatible with free will. But between those two options he defends the existence of free will, which imply that we live in an indeterministic world (that's why he defends the swerve).

Kevin Mitchell defends that the brain has evolved to work in an indeterministic way so that it can make choices that permits an adaptation to a very changeable world (like a quantum computer). Sapolsky, on the other side, defends that human behavior works in a deterministic way, so we're not morally responsible of what we do.

See you later, guys!

Thank you for your great comments, Cassius and Pacatus .

I recognize that one of the theses that Epicurus would not have renounced is precisely free will. And to deny it would be to move away from Epicurean philosophy.

Skepticism about free will, I think, is a personal position of mine, and it is perhaps the one that makes me wonder things like: if the study of nature pointed out that we do not have free will, would Epicurus accept it? Or couldn't it be that Epicurus was wrong about this question just as he was wrong about the size of the Sun? Or also, if what matters is practical life for ordinary people, then would it be valid for us to accept things like biases just because we feel it although they are unjustified?

There is a conflict (apparent or real), which D'Holbach recognized, between the study of nature and the belief in an exclusive capacity of human beings not to be subject to prior events, or just those that are convenient for attributing moral responsibility.

I recognize, Cassius, that for the moment it would be very hard for people to live without that belief. The same was said about the belief in God: that people would behave immorally, that one cannot trust in an atheist, or that life would become meaningless. One of my personal projects consists in thinking about a possible way of life that integrates free will skepticism and epicurean philosophy.

In any case, I don't want to be heterodox enough to say that Epicurus was wrong, or anything like that. I know that the purpose of the forum is to discuss Epicurean philosophy as closely as possible to its original sources, and that does not involve a defense of free will skepticism.

What may possibly be pertinent is to seek, over time, a stronger and more robust understanding of Epicurus' position vis-a-vis this kind of skepticism.

Quote from Pacatus

“Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent

That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?

I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.

Thank you, Cassius.

Thanks for this thread, Cassius. I like and agree with D'Holbach, specially for his naturalism and skepticism of free will. Did you find something on the implications of determinism to moral life?

For example, contemporary proponents of free will skepticism (such as Derk Pereboom) recognize the elimination of desert and, therefore, the absence of justification of punishments, rewards, guilt, resentment, gratitude and pride (which I honestly consider positive for human societies).

There are at least two versions of this Vatican Saying.

In one side, Usener, Bailey, Long and Sedley, Marcovich:

Quote

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολαύσεως.

"The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment" [Bailey]

In the other side, Bignone, Arrighetti and Enrique Álvarez:

Quote

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>.

"The production of the greatest good and (the) release from evil (happens at) [the same time]." [Epicurus Wiki]

"The same time corresponds to the birth of the greatest good and the dissolution of evil." (Enrique Alvarez, translated)

Here's Alvarez's comments:

"Given the difficulty of finding a clear meaning to the text as it is offered in the codex, the sentence has raised several hermeneutical possibilities and various modifications have been proposed.

We have followed Bignone's interpretation (with which Arrighetti also agrees), who observes in the sentence a polemic on the question of pleasure against the Platonic point of view put forward in the Philebus, where Plato considers pleasure as a γένεσις ("process," "becoming") and, consequently, admits the existence of mixed pleasures, that is, of processes in which pleasure can occur mixed with pain. If, in the light of the Letter to Meneceus and KD3, we understand that the greatest good referred to in the sentence is pleasure, conceived by Epicurus as deprivation of pain, with the addition of <τοῦ κακοῦ> proposed by Bignone, VS42 would come to say that pleasure and pain cannot coexist at the same time; therefore, when the greatest good is generated (i. e. pleasure), the greatest evil (i. e. pain), dissipates.

Usener, whose criterion Bailey, Long and Sedley and Marcovich have followed, proposes to correct ἀπολύσεως ("dissolution", "elimination") by ἀπολαύσεως ("enjoyment"), interpreting the sentence as describing a type of pleasures whose enjoyment (ἀπόλαυσις) is simultaneous with their generation or development (γένεσις), i.e., those cases in which the genesis of pleasure coincides with its enjoyment, such as the exercise of philosophy (cf. VS27). Bailey cites precisely VS27."

What do you think, Don ?

Thank you very much for your answer, Don!

Quote from Don

I'm not sure if you shared Alvarez's work before or not, but (at the risk of repeating)

I don't remember, I think I shared it only in the chat of one of the zoom meetings. XD

By the way, today Joshua proposed a possible collection or list of texts about Epicureanism in languages different from English. Possibly Alvarez's thesis can be one of those texts.

Hi, Don ! Today we were talking about this VS and I shared a philological question with Cassius , Joshua , Kalosyni and Steve.
I have a translation that follows a slightly different version (I think it's only one word) from that used by Bailey, Arrighetti, Long and Sedley, etc. It's this:

Quote

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

This is Alberto Enrique Álvarez' translation (the Spanish guy who wrote a dissertation on the Vatican Sayings):

Quote

"We must laugh as well as philosophize, manage the house and take care of the rest of our private affairs, and by no means express angry maxims when we declare the maxims of philosophy."

And these are some of his comments:

"The sentence has undergone numerous modifications. In our version we have opted, like Bollack, to keep the textual version of the manuscript, since it has a satisfactory sense and syntax, and in the conviction that, in this case, it is possible to keep the transmitted text without variants.

[...]

This version [Bailey's version] recovers the importance of laughter as a vital mark of epicureanism; but, by replacing ὀργῆς ("anger", "wrath") by the adjective ὀρθῆς ("straight"), the axis of opposites laughter / wrath (γελᾶν / ὀργή) that articulates the sentence is lost, and the text is structured in such a way that the main syntactic units do not reflect contents of equal hierarchy. As we interpret it, from the main verb δεῖ ("it is necessary") two infinitives depend at the same syntactic level: γελᾶν ("to laugh") and λήγειν ("to stop"); and, in turn, dependent on γελᾶν ("laugh") and introduced by the preposition/temporal adverb ἅμα ("at the same time") we find φιλοσοφεῖν ("philosophize"), οἰκονομεῖν ("manage the house") and χρῆσθαι ("take care of").

Now, the philosophically relevant doctrine is exhausted in the infinitive group γελᾶν ("to laugh"), while the branch of λήγειν ("to cease") remains practically as an addition that has little to do with the previous clause and by itself possesses little philosophical entity.
In the version we offer, the sentence opposes laughter (γελᾶν) to anger and, in general, to violent passions (ὀργή) as philosophical-vital moods."

I don't know if his comments or the translation are correct. I think it can be interesting that you tell us your point of view.

Quote from Cassius

Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.

What's his argument?

Quote from Cassius

how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards?

Which possible epicurean standards (or procedure) do you have in mind?

Are you looking for a foundation or justification of the standard(s) in question?

Quote from Cassius

But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable?

I'll try to answer. Have you considered that maybe the "what" is less important than the "how"? I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.
So far as we know, the virtous life is the best way to live a pleasurable life: prudently, safely, friendly, painlessly, etc. Virtue is sensible to context: it tells that you'll get a lot of pleasure with food if you're hungry, thay you'll get pleasure with water if you're thirsty, that you'll enjoy a videogame if you're bored, or that you'll enjoy reading a book if you're in the mood to do it.
Not everybody enjoys the same things evidently, but it's also true that not everyone is in the same circumstances or have the same background.

Maybe you will think that my answer is circular, because virtue is the instrument to maximize plesaure. So when I recommend a virtuous way to live I'm just saying that a pleasurable life is that with pleasure. My point is that Epicurus recommended a life with prudence, and I think now I understand why it's the source of pleasure: prudence indicates how you can maximize the pleasure (reduce pain) with any activity (even if you're in bed with kidney stones).

So my answer is: possibly that thing that can bring pleasure to everyone, no matter their context, age, education, etc., is virtue (specially prudence). A shepherd without prudence will waste his resources and time. The good news is that we don't need to be Epicurus, or Socrates, in order to have prudence.

I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute.

The hypothetical scenario reminded me a quote by John Stuart Mill that probably you know: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).

I do think there are standards to evaluate pleasures and pains among people but they're not necessary, but contingent. (After all, we are human beings, of course we share plasures and we share the absence of pain as a goal to achieve.) Cassius, I think you won't find an activity that brings pleasure in all contexts: human nature it's not about immovable truths but about change.

Finally, I know the Letter to Ideomeneus is beautiful and inspiring, but I really doubt Epicurus was really having pleasure in the previous moments of his death. So, if I had to give an answer, I'd prefer to live like the shepherd, but better I prefer to be me, in this place and this time.

See you tomorrow

I'll be there!

Quote from Cassius

HsiehKW I haven't had as chance to read up either but do you have a web link you recommend for the basics?

I found this:

A Brief Guide to Embodied Cognition: Why You Are Not Your Brain

blogs.scientificamerican.com

And a more detailer source is this:

Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Happy Birthday, Charles! Joy and health for you. Have a nice day!

Quote from Don

This exercise also brings to light a problem with just accepting "Oh, Vatican Saying X is just identical to Principal Doctrine Y. Nothing to see here." Yes, they may be *almost* identical, but if they're not entirely, how does that affect our reading of each? Vat.gr.1950 is dated to 1300-1350 CE, so not as early as some of the earliest manuscripts for Diogenes Laertius which go back to the 12th c, I believe. How do the VS/PD correlations look in reference to the earliest Laertius manuscripts? Vat.gr.1950 is getting its versions from somewhere!

From Enrique Alvarez' dissertation I found this comment:
"VS13 presents σοφίας in the Codex Vaticanus version, probably due, as Bollack (1974: 430) conjectures, to a confusion with σοφία that the copyist had just written in the previous line; the substitution by φιλίας, following the text of Diogenes Laertius (Dorandi 2013: 820), has been unanimously accepted. This modification having been made, the sentence agrees with PD27."
Hope this helps!