Posts by Little Rocker

I suppose I'm playing Devil's Advocate here, but I admit that I struggle to understand the point of introducing some of the explanations except to have multiple ones--that eclipses are caused by bad air, that the moon comes into and out of existence daily, etc.

Quote from Cassius

I can't imagine that in his intention to refute the skeptics who said that "nothing is knowable" he would have erased any distinction between "the more and less probable.

Maybe it wouldn't be so strange to concede equipollence in some cases to explain why you reject it in others.

I mean, don't get me wrong, in some ways he's at least in the ballpark of recommending the intellectual virtues of science-- considering multiple explanations when sensory evidence won't settle the question, humility about the possibility that future science will refute you. I just need to look at the text again to see if he's ever like, 'but don't generate implausible explanations just to muddy the water,' or 'but you should feel free to narrow it down to the more probable.' Or, 'sure, there's only one actual best explanation, but we would all do well to recognize our intellectual limitations when it comes to discovering it.'

Quote from Cassius

Would you not add the important caveat that he would recommend not getting invested in finding "the" actual explanation when you know in advance that that isn't going to be possible due to the lack of evidence?

Yeah, I'm not really opposed to that caveat, and I don't like it when people claim that the only reason Epicurus cares about science is whenever it helps us get rid of fear of the gods and death. But I also think he seems pretty clear about what he considers 'most important' scientifically (namely things that help us psychologically and practically). And it strikes me that he so often treats the multiple explanations as equally compelling. It's like you might want him to say, 'but this entirely material account of lunar eclipses seems a bit more likely than the one where the moon has a bright and a dark side.'

I'm also somewhat sympathetic to people who point out that blocking multiple explanations in the context of matter and motion seems ad hoc when more than one material account is consistent with the phenomena, even if it has turned out to be wrong.

Quote from Martin

Whereas the formation of preconceptions from sensations may be interpreted as a precursor of science, the feelings as another leg of the Epicurean canon go much further than the narrow scope of science.

This seems right to me. Martin mentioned Rosenberg (and I might add Paul and Patricia Churchland), and one of their key theses is 'eliminativism' about mental states. I have heard Rosenberg say we should dispense with 'feeling' language altogether.

Quote from Kalosyni

There is Epicurus and his canonics...and wondering if there is a name or label for the part which says to be sure you are bringing up multiple hypothoses and do not settle too quickly onto one explanation for causes of phenomenon?

I've seen this just called 'Epicurean multiple explanation' or treated as the 'Doctrine of Multiple Explanation.' And it seems super relevant to what Martin wrote earlier.

I was reminded of a passage I read recently about Epicurus' indifference to finding the right explanation. Actually it seems like more than indifference--he actually recommends not getting invested in finding the actual explanation.

Quote

'The ethical and epistemological turn in Epicureanism has the curious effect that what has appeared to many modern commentators to be the most materialistic and least teleological of ancient philosophies (in short, the most scientific) represents at the same time a deliberate turning away from examination, experiment. and the elimination of competing hypotheses for astronomical, cosmological, and meteorological phenomena' (Lehoux).

Not that we need another vote here, but it seems to me it's got to be 'from the gods' because the reliability of perception depends on the sense-impression being received passively.

I agree that we should be cautious about all reconstructions, and I'll be curious to see what AI starts doing with these.

Quote from Don

And I believe that the πᾶν doesn't have the usual definite article for it to refer to TO PAN "The All" "the universe." The author (again could be Philodemus or Phaedrus) could be referring to "all (somethings)" and not The All.

Yeah, the missing to is puzzling, though I guess I might expect a panta if it were modifying 'all Xs.' Unless that gamma is actually a tau, of course, then it is panta instead of pan gar.

Quote from Twentier

Another intriguing example of prolḗpseis comes from Philodemos' On Piety, where he writes, “For [the] All [pân] […] is thought of, just as Time [khrónos] is defined, as being a naturally formed generic conception [prólepsin]” (Col. 66.3-6). I find this interesting because Philodemos makes a comparison between "the universe", "time" and "the god(s)".

Cool! I find this interesting, too, in part because Epicurus makes a point of saying we shouldn't investigate time like we investigate the prolepseis of objects that are 'observed within ourselves' (Letter to Herodotus 72). But he never says explicitly whether there's nevertheless a prolepsis of time that is different than the ones we have of objects.

This is a great conversation! So maybe it would help for a moment to take it out of the more modern, Camus context, and put it in the Ancient and Epicurean context. I say that in part because I'm not sure Epicurus and his contemporaries actually thought the central problem to solve was suffering. So in the Ancient context:

First, for reasons that remain somewhat unclear, Democritus claimed to laugh at humanity, and some later texts turned this into a kind of a maniacal laughter at human absurdity. So there was some at least popular understanding that atomism makes it ridiculous to take various human activities seriously. Second, we of course have that Lucretius passage where he's looking down from the enlightened perspective of philosophy on all the idiots living their daily lives.

So as I understand it, absurdity depends on two perspectives, the one that inhabits life from the subjective experience and the one that looks down on it from a dispassionate, critical perspective, whether that's 'gods-eye view' or 'the perspective of the universe.' And when you occupy the dispassionate perspective, the upshot is supposedly something like 'all these activities are meaningless,' but then life forces you to return to your subjective experience and treat all those things as if they're meaningful nonetheless. And that can be disorienting.

But I suspect Epicurus is trying to avoid that by showing that the gods-eye perspective and our own lives can mirror one another, or coincide. I was recently reading a James Warren article and marked the following passage, which I think will resonate with Cassius :

Quote

'It seems quite possible that someone will not laugh constantly at his fellow humans once he has come to the Epicurean godlike view of the universe, nor will he cease to live a life, and take pleasure in living that life. That is not to say, however, that he will be living with an unchanged subjective view of his life and its pleasure, with a new objective view running concurrently. Physiologia does not leave intact all previous values....The agent will take pleasure in living a life, in friends, in various pursuits, and is always fully conscious that this finite and particular life takes place within a universe of infinite kosmoi, made of infinite atoms infiinetly moving in an infinite void. Yet that cosmology does not devalue the life; pleasures are still pleasures and so are still valuable per se. It is still possible to attain ataraxia, and thus to rival the gods in the matter described in my discussion of Vatican Saying 33. Indeed, an understanding of Epicurean cosmology is an essential part of attaining ataraxia' ('Epicurean Immortality,' Warren).

So in other words, as I take it, there's nothing from a cosmic perspective that makes pleasure worthless. But a lot of unpleasant things we pretend are important might very well lose their meaning from a cosmic perspective.

Quote from Kalosyni

We are born only once and cannot be born twice, and must forever live no more. You don't control tomorrow, yet you postpone joy. Life is ruined by putting things off, and each of us dies without truly living." - VS14

This could be use some re-wording, so it sounds more upbeat, lol...

...perhaps this:

We are born only once, and we cannot predict when we will die - don't postpone your joy or put off truly living this life.

(Maybe I'll need to work on paraphrasing that one a bit better).

Kaloysni is right--this is one of those times when Epicurus could have used a good editor! Maybe:

Look, we only have one life, and even tomorrow is not promised to us, so please, let's not dither our precious time away when we could be living joyfully.

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Admin Note:

This post has been copied and moved from the Welcome Thread of Unpaid_Landlord, whose personal introduction stated:

"...have explored many philosophies starting from advaita vedanta /Non-dualism (Hinduism), then Buddhism and zen Buddhism, then taoism (china) then to western philosophy, from stocism to now finally Epicureanism and Absurdism.

It has been quite a fascinating journey but I feel like settling down with Epicureanism and Absurdism for now at least

Skeptism is on the list to explore for the future

My current philosophical inclinations :-

Epicureanism and Absurdism"

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Welcome, Unpaid_Landlord! You'll find you're in very good company. I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context. As I understand it, some people (generally critics) take Absurdism to result directly from an Epicurean-style purposeless universe. The line of reasoning seems to be that once we're not here for a reason and with a purpose, we have to manufacture all the meaning out of thin air. And all the effort to manufacture meaning, at least when you take a moment to reflect on it, can feel like an absurd sort of charade, an elaborate game of pretend called 'Meaning.' Is that in the ballpark of your conception? Because I suspect Epicurus is truly concerned to find a response to that particular absurdist worry.

Again, welcome!

Welcome, Unpaid_Landlord! You'll find you're in very good company. I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context. As I understand it, some people (generally critics) take Absurdism to result directly from an Epicurean-style purposeless universe. The line of reasoning seems to be that once we're not here for a reason and with a purpose, we have to manufacture all the meaning out of thin air. And all the effort to manufacture meaning, at least when you take a moment to reflect on it, can feel like an absurd sort of charade, an elaborate game of pretend called 'Meaning.' Is that in the ballpark of your conception? Because I suspect Epicurus is truly concerned to find a response to that particular absurdist worry.

Again, welcome!

Don, you are amazing! There's a lot happening here:

Quote from Don

Col.31: Epicurus, in a letter to Polyaenus, writes: "(It is necessary for us) to conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard (kriterion). Let us sacrifice to those gods devoutly and fittingly on that proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions on matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems. And concerning obeisance (προσκυνήσεις) in [Epicurus's] On Lifecourses [Περί βίων]"

Here's an attempt at rendering its content: Divine nature (its blessedness and indestructibility) constitutes (either fully or partially) the kriterion of benefit. So expressing some form of reverence to that nature benefits us. For that reason, we can comply in good faith ('devoutly'/'justly') with the acts of worship required by law. However, we Epicureans will make such sacrifices free from the disturbing opinions of the many about what it means to 'benefit' from the gods.

So on my take, the question Polyaenus has asked is: 'is it impious to comply with the laws requiring sacrifices, given that we don't think the gods reward people in exchange for sacrifices?' Because surely, there was a question about whether they participated simply to avoid breaking the law or with some measure of sincerity.

Quote from Don

Our minds don't seem to grasp eidola from their air to conceive of things.

Say it ain’t so, Don! I mean, at least Santa emits eidola, right?!

Quote from Don

Where do you come down on Cicero? Valuable? Reliable? LOL I find Cicero insufferable as a commentator, but he preserved some pivotal information... but how much to trust him as a conveyor of Epicurean teaching?....Curious also about your view of using the Herculaneum material: Philodemus, the fragments of On Nature, and so on. I'm inclined to make use of it where there is a reasonable amount of intact text, but skeptical of a lot of what might need "reconstruction."

Cicero, though largely hostile, and burdened with the conceit of a talented undergrad, does seem to me to have one redeeming quality—his Academic Skepticism required him to take seriously and weigh competing positions, never fully accepting any of them. And his bestie was an Epicurean. So I generally take his reports of Epicurean views seriously, unless it seems to set the Epicureans up for a too easy dismissal by Cicero’s subsequent critique or has the vague odor of emblematically Roman interests that Cicero might have picked up from Philodemus. And unless he’s the only one to say something that radically alters a general understanding.

I take Philodemus with a dose of caution for the reasons you mention—the text is fragmentary, and reconstruction is sometimes guided by the view of the person producing the reconstruction. The use of AI in reconstruction, though, interests me. I’m also a bit wary of Philodemus because he taught Romans, and Romans were a weird lot.

Quote from Don

I just don't think we'll find exact parallels of prolepseis from a modern understanding... but I remain open to the idea!!

Yeah, I think if Epicurus is a radical empiricist of the sort that many people take him to be, where the mind contributes nothing to 'complete' perception, and more importantly, to the generation and refinement of prolepseis, then he had the wrong view. Nothing bad about that because some people still have that view—it’s not a settled question. But I think developmental psychology and animal research show that cognitive systems come prepared to structure the key parts of experience using built-in capacities for abstractions, especially those required to navigate the environment. And honestly, given his Cradle Argument and his view that humans, like animals, are hedonists, I suspect Epicurus would privilege the evidence from those experimental fields, even against his own view, if it got him what he wanted in the end.

Quote from Cassius

I think the entire history of Epicurus is warped almost beyond recognition by trying to interpret him in terms of ideas that he never thought or considered plausible.

Yes, exactly this.

Quote from Don

On the one hand, it seems to me, we're trying to get a grasp on Epicurus's understanding of the mind and sensations and prolepsis and how he understood thought and memory etc. On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc....I'm beginning to think it might be better to simply acknowledge that the two frames are irreconcilable, and move on to understanding each (the ancient and modern) separately.

For what it's worth, I tend to have two criteria that guide my efforts to 'figure Epicurus out':

Criterion 1: the text is the chief constraint. If we want to take Epicurus on his own terms, the text itself has to support, or at least not decisively rule out, a viable reading, and I prefer, all things considered, to keep my body of primary text reasonably narrow (as in, what we have from Epicurus, not what Plutarch or Clement of Alexandria say about Epicurus).

Criterion 2: I know this is contentious, but I also think we should seek the most philosophically and empirically charitable account the text can sustain. That means we should rule out interpretations that unnecessarily saddle Epicurus with untenable positions, if a more plausible position can be attributed to Epicurus within the bounds of textual evidence. Which is to say I think it's totally fine, Don, to consider whether Epicurus might be in striking distance of what might count as a viable contender of a view today. I think it's always good to ask, 'how close is he to our current understanding?' Even if, in the end, it turns out the answer is, 'nowhere near.'

I suppose the question is whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων). You could think the Epicureans were taking it as an additional criterion from a straightforward reading of the Letter to Herodotus itself. See DL X 38, and especially 51 (τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων). But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

Quote from Bryan

Our measure of truth is pre-cognitive sensation.

Apologies if this is getting laborious, but I guess I'm starting to think this is actually what we disagree about. First, I suspect Epicurus thinks that sensation of external objects includes cognitive content as part of a package deal.

See DL 10.49: the outlines "enter us [from the objects], entering the vision or the intellect according to the size and fit [of the effluences]...And whatever presentation we receive by a form of application, whether by the intellect or the sense organs....this is the shape of the solid object." trans. Inwood and Gerson.

So in other words, I'm not sure sensation of the external world can be pre-cognitive because sensation itself contains cognitive content. But perhaps by 'pre-cognitive' you're taking 'cognitive' to involve the processing of or reflection on the contents of intellect--making inferences, etc.

Even then, though, it doesn't seem to me that Epicurus considers sensation (including its associated cognitive content) the only measure of truth, though it initiates inquiry and can constrain what's true. It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true. They just can't rule it out (DL 10. 51).

Thanks, Bryan. I think that helps me better understand your view. So it makes sense to me (and I think there's textual evidence to suggest) that Epicurus might think the intellect, like the sensory organs, receives eidola ('films') of an intelligible variety. And if that were true, the intellect, like the eyes, 'perceives' the objects. Then we could say that intellect and sensation really are closely tied, as Joshua was suggesting. But then a complete perception of an object would involve a faculty of intellect, right, not only sensory organs?

And a general concept (e.g., 'horse') that serves as the starting point for investigation, doesn't that require repeated experiences, if not of horses, then of animals other than horses with which to contrast it? And would that not require memory? So if there is a 'criterion' of horse, then it seems to me that it must depend on thought and memory. And I admit that I think that if Epicurus doesn't think that, then I'm not sure his view is plausible.

Quote from Don

Quote from Bryan

Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.

I'm not seeing prolepsis as a faculty of thought. To me, there's only recognition of meaningful patterns on which thought can work to assign names or concepts.

So I'm getting a bit turned around about a rather fundamental thing, I'm afraid. It has always seemed to me that prolepseis can only result from the exercise of thought and memory. Am I reading you both correctly as denying that thought and memory play a key role in prolepseis?

Quote from Bryan

τὰ Συμβεβηκότα	Coniūncta	"Inseparable Characteristics"	"Properties"	Fundamental qualities, Inherent attributes
τὰ Συμπτώματα	Ēventa	"Separable Characteristics"	"Accidents" "Symptoms"	Potential qualities, Incidental attributes
This outline is specific to Epicurus. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα.

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This is interesting. So as the dictionary entry would have it (LSJ?), for Epicurus, Συμβεβηκότα are properties without which a thing would cease to be what it is but that do not feature in the definition. Do you think that's because those properties are not sufficient to distinguish a particular thing from everything else, as someone like Plato demanded of a definition? Would that mean something like, the gods' properties of being 'immortal and indestructible' are definitional, but that the gods having the property of 'living being' is one of τὰ Συμβεβηκότα?

Quote from Don

I used that exact quote in an anti-Creationist editorial written for my high school newspaper after a creationist came to our school and presented during an assembly.

I remember that when my high school biology teacher announced that we would be studying evolution for the next few weeks, she said she wanted to impress upon us from the outset, and for us to tell our parents, that we would be studying it as 'only a theory.' *Still* contentious in the schools in 1994.

Quote from Twentier

(Along those lines, every group of humans seems to have independently intoxication is memorable, and—what I continue to emphasize is not only not a coincidence, but is rather a fundamental feature of spirituality—almost every religion incorporates an intoxicant or intoxicating practice into the heart of their rituals).

Love that you hedged with the 'almost every' here because those of us raised old-school evangelical were regrettably taught that sobriety was close to godliness. I was told, no joke, that Jesus did not actually turn the water in to wine, but into grape juice!

Epicurus would also likely have access to some older reports that suggested universality and relativism of religious practice, including Herodotus' reports of his travels. And while It's probably already showed up in a previous discussion, one of my favorite Presocratic fragments is from Xenophanes:

"But if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own-horses like horses, cattle like cattle."