I'm going to miss few of the meetings as I'm away until the end of the month. See you all in August.
Posts by TauPhi
-
-
If you're going to wrestle people out of the jail of supernatural religion you're going to need to replace "god" with something, and "atoms" is only a part of the picture. The rest of the picture as a whole requires "infinity" to be plausible and persuasive to people of normal intelligence - and people of normal intelligence shouldn't be asked to accept "trust the scientists" or "trust the mathematicians" any more than they accept "trust the priests" as an explanation.
I don't think it's fair to make such generalizations about people. I got myself out of the jail of supernatural religion as a teenager and I don't recall I've ever felt a need to replace "god" with anything particular. I seem to live my life, try to understand what's it about but I don't have irresistible need to fill myself with any absolutes. I'm ok with the realisation that I probably will never know what's it all about and I still find joy in trying to know. I don't think I'm noticeably less or more intelligent than a normal person and yet I don't want to be persuaded into anything by anyone. I want to grasp what I call reality the best I can based on my learning and understanding and not on trust or persuasion.
-
In fact, I would say that the implication of what Epicurus has stated that we should do - MOST OF ALL -- is that we should study the principles of infinity and take them to be correct. We should not consider them to be "mind-blowing' at all, but they should be second nature and taken to be as obvious and easy to understand as anyone for the past 2000 years has taken the incorrect "In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth..."
Epicurus was a dogmatist after all, so I guess the above claim is reasonably true.
Personally, as an Epicurean friend (not an Epicurean), I'm not convinced we should take anything to be correct on "believe me, dude" argument. Before we take something to be correct I find it more reasonable to focus on study and suspend definite judgements until we figure out a way to prove or disprove something (Pyrrho pays me to say this every Tuesday).
As of now, infinity of the universe (among other infinities) is neither obvious nor easy to understand (or prove) to humanity.
-
Have fun chewing on all of that!
I had so much fun chewing on all of that, I chewed it all up twice. Thank you, Joshua . Amazing research.
-
I'm mentioning it here because I don't want to pollute Joshua 's post on translation of Lucretius as it is shaping to be something special, but for those interested, Joshua mentioned 'The Satires of Juvenal' at the end of his first post. Take a look at satire X (starting at page 260 in Joshua's link). You'll find a lot of Epicurean influences in this satire including, once more, the theme of 'lathe biosas'.
Satire X is not strictly Epicurean as the gods there are painted as the 'standard' ones but I think you'll find a lot of interesting points there, nonetheless.
Direct link to Joshua's post:
-
'De Bono Vitae Humilioris' is an anonymous poem from Codex Vossianus Q 86 published in 'Anthologia Latina'. Translation comes from John Colin Dunlop's 'Selections from the Latin Anthology: Translated into English Verse' (1838). It is considered to be an Epicurean poem praising 'Lathe Biosas' lifestyle. The date of creation is unknown but it's suspected to be around 1st century AD.
Small are my treasures, my domain is small;
But quietude makes that blameless little, great:
My tranquil mind no tremors agitate—
Heedless if men my days should slothful call.
Go! Seek the camp—ascend some curule throne—
All the vain joys that sway the bosom taste!
Mean though I am, by no distinctions graced,
Still, (while I live,) I call the hours mine own.Est mihi rus parvum, fenus sine crimine parvum,
sed facit haec nobis utraque magna quies.
pacem animus nulla trepidus formidine servat
nec timet ignavae crimina desidiae.
castra alios operosa vocent sellaeque curules
et quicquid vana gaudia mente movet.
pars ego sim plebis, nullo conspectus honore,
dum vivam, dominus temporis ipse mei.Relevant links:
Isaac Vossius - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.orgCodices Vossiani Latini — Brill
Latin Anthology - Wikipedia
Laudator Temporis Acti: Dominus Temporis Ipse Mei -
Tau Phi and several others are firmly in what I will call the - "What the heck was Epicurus doing messing with the definitions of words?!?#!&^????" camp.
When people start to mess with the definitions of words which are generally accepted, they mud the waters, cause communication breakdowns and create incomprehensible mess. Epicurus created a system of philosophy, not an incomprehensible mess so I don't think I am in the aforementioned camp.
I think Epicurus tried to convince people to think about the ideas behind some words from different perspective and prove how this new perspective is more beneficial. This is one of the reasons I don't consider myself an Epicurean. It's not because I don't like unnecessary redefinition of words (which I don't). I don't agree with some Epicurean ideas - like the idea of gods. When Epicurus talked about gods, he tried to explain how the accepted idea of gods is ridiculous (to great success, I may add) but he still thought about them as gods in generally accepted meaning of the word. He wasn't an atheist in disguise. He was a pious man honestly believing Epicurean gods exist. And this IDEA is what I don't agree with.
-
Maybe somebody can convince me that the above chain reasoning is not a fair summary of Epicurean theology, but to the extent it *is* a fair summary, I am personally 100% convinced of its validity!
I never thought I would say it, due to our differences in this subject matter, but I like your post Cassius . Thank you for not using 'gods' when writing it. Now, if I could convince you to drop 'theology' in favour of something like 'cerebration of nature' just to make sure we don't have anything supernatural in the equation, I'm sure we could go for a beer, or a barrel of it, and talk and think about what is possible in this universe and how to get where we want to get using nothing more magical than our good friends: matter and void. Maybe it wouldn't be strictly Epicurean conversation, but having an Epicurean and an Epicurean friend talking sounds good enough to me.
-
I know that Tau Phi speaks for a significant group here, but because I have interacted so much with him personally I also feel sure he would not want his post to be interpreted as stifling free discussion of the topic.
I only speak for myself and you're absolutely right Cassius - I'm not trying to stifle the discussion. Quite contrary - I clearly present my point on trying to translate 2.5 thousand old physical theory into modern times but it's only my point of view. Nothing more. I don't reserve the right to be correct and I wholeheartedly encourage others to join the discussion and present their ideas. There are a lot of insightful minds in the forum and I believe some interesting points could be raised here.
-
I will probably re-title this and perhaps move it to physics, but we need at least one thread to discuss possible physical mechanism by which Epicurus' theory of images is treated as possibly containing at least a grain of truth and possibly much more.
Epicurean (well, technically Democritean) physical mechanism of images is wrong at the core. Two millennia back nobody could possibly come up with the concept of electromagnetic radiation, photons reflecting off of objects and optical mechanism of eyes. The objects constantly emitting eidolas which move through the air and which are directly interacting with us is a theory all right, but saying 'it has a grain of truth and possibly much more' is like saying that when a caveman blew the dust off a rock he discovered how a pneumatic press work. There is a grain there in the form of air pressure but linking it to a pneumatic press several thousand years later is stretching a point a tiny bit.
I would even argue that Epicureans should have figured out by themselves that the theory of images was flawed. If I can come up with below scenarios, I'm sure much brighter minds of the past should have thought about it as well.
If every object constantly emits eidolas, what about objects that are made up with 2 atoms only? Two atoms combined already make an object and according to the theory, that object should start emitting constant flow of eidolas. But if it does, one of two things happen (probably more, but I don't want to think about it for too long):
1) the object disappears instantly
2) the object is instantly replenished by exactly the same 2 atoms (which would require conscious assembly abilities of atoms and atomic theory would be proven wrong)Another problem is eidolas pushing though the air. If everything emits eidolas in every direction all the time, it's impossible to use air as medium of transportation due to infinite conflicts of direction resulting in some sort of 'eidola tornadoes'.
I guess Ancient Greeks were perfectly capable of raising such concerns and if there are Epicurean solutions to the above concerns, feel free to point them out as I'm not aware of them.
My point is, let's appreciate ingenuity of Greek philosophers who were capable of extraordinary though experiments without access to almost any scientific knowledge, but let's not try to paint them as pneumatic press operation experts.
-
-
I stumbled on this today while working on something else. And it reminded me of initial conversation in this thread:
This is a physical sense that stems from contact -- impressions of particles entering your body -- just like all the other senses. We can only form propositions after we have this sense/contact.
In some circumstances you may focus on being physically touched by the images of trees that are around you, at other times you may focus on being physically touched by circumstances in a way that produces a sense of guilt (or lack of guilt) or a sense of justice (or lack of justice), at other times you may focus on being being physically touched by the images of the gods.
Just as we have an innate ability to sense trees with our eyes, we have an innate ability to sense gods with our mind.
It's from Catherine Wilson's 'Epicureanism: A Very Short Introduction':
"According to the account given in Cicero’s dialogue on this topic, the Epicureans believed that the gods were not perceived by the senses but by the intellect, via images arising from the ‘innumerable atoms’ that compose thoughts and dreams. While some commentators appear to believe, on the basis of a problematic preposition in Cicero’s text, that these images flow from the gods, in the manner of the ordinary idola emitted from solid objects, this does not seem to be what Epicurus had in mind. Rather, the texts suggest that our thoughts flow to the gods on account of the images."
I don't want to make this topic even more complicated, but I'm curious about the direction of the images' flow. Can someone confirm if the images flow from the gods or to the gods according to Epicurus?
-
The pursuit of "meaning" is itself meaningless, in exactly the same way that repenting of "sin" is meaningless. Meaning isn't real, sin isn't real, the thetans of Scientology aren't real. Don't allow yourself to be made distressed by things that aren't real!
Be careful Joshua . If you add to this: '...and try to live your life in a way that's subjectively worth living, nonetheless.' you might accidentally get yourself invited to the next Annual Absurdism Convention as a panelist taking part in a discussion titled: 'What to do with 42 when you ask about life, the universe and everything'. You may also get a free t-shirt, an instant coffee and a stale doughnutoutttut... eh, donut.
-
Welcome! UnPaid_Landlord
I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context.
Ha! You're not the only one. Now there are at least three of us here thinking about Absurdism. I don't know exactly what's the link, but I always found Absurdism interesting. Maybe Epicureanism and Absurdism are like moths and fire or peanut better and jelly or something... probably not.
Anyway, if someone wants 10 mins introduction to Absurdism in humorous yet surprisingly insightful way, follow the link. (warning: Parental Advisory Explicit Content)
-
Welcome! UnPaid_Landlord
I'll be curious at some point to find out what you take Absurdism to be and why it intrigues you because I've been thinking about it some in the Epicurean context.
Ha! You're not the only one. Now there are at least three of us here thinking about Absurdism. I don't know exactly what's the link, but I always found Absurdism interesting. Maybe Epicureanism and Absurdism are like moths and fire or peanut better and jelly or something... probably not.
Anyway, if someone wants 10 mins introduction to Absurdism in humorous yet surprisingly insightful way, follow the link. (warning: Parental Advisory Explicit Content)
-
I suppose the question is whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων). You could think the Epicureans were taking it as an additional criterion from a straightforward reading of the Letter to Herodotus itself. See DL X 38, and especially 51 (τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων). But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?
Image perceptions of the mind are 'senses at the distance', so to speak. According to Epicureans every object (most likely with the exception of singular atoms and the void - but let's not go there right now) emits images - εἰδωλα. That's why we have two ways of detecting objects:
1) direct contact - eidolas do not make any difference as we have exposure to the objects themselves. In this scenario, the senses are criterion of truth (take precedence) for image perceptions of the mind, which in simpler terms, makes the 4th criterion irrelevant.
2) indirect contact - we get the truth about objects by their eidolas sent to us at the distance (this is the example of a round tower in Epicurean terms). In this scenario, the 4th criterion is crucial and it is considered a full-fledged criterion of truth (equal to the other canonical three criteria) allowing us to know the truth about objects outside of direct sensations.
The answers to your questions Little Rocker are probably something like that:
whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων).
Yes, most likely and probably he reserved the three canonical criteria for 'perfect conditions of getting to the truth' without complications arising from 'suspension of belief' due to eidolas' possible distortions resulting from the distance between the observer and the object.
But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?
The ability to know truth about our surroundings outside of the direct contact.
-
-
Well, I thought, why not to check the remaining two as well?
I didn't see anything wrong with the canonics one.
Physics one is my favourite of the three but I have few suggestions:
- there are two very similar questions about these topics: shapes of the atoms, the swerve, and nature of atomic motion - please consider removing 3 repetitive ones
- in the question about the number of different shapes of the atoms (the first one on the topic) two answers may be correct: 'uncountable' is set as the correct one but I don't see how 'finite' is wrong
- in question 12 (if I remember correctly) there's a typo in one of the answers. 'atoms and either' probably should be 'atoms and ether'
-
I checked out the Ethics one. My suggestions/observations:
- in question about fears change 'which irrational fears' to '... fear(s)'. Otherwise you already suggest more than one fear which makes majority of options apparently incorrect
- there are 2 questions in a row about categories of desires which are almost identical
- these are followed by another asking about how many categories there are. The correct answer is set to 4. If I'm wrong, ignore this one, but I always thought there are 3: natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary and empty ones
-
We have Epicurus' words on the issue. Epicurus tells us exactly what the anticipations are in PD 24:
Lining the two sources up like that is a reminder of DeWitt's view that the reference to "the Epicureans generally" adding a fourth criteria was arguably a mistake.
These two comments makes me realise I may understand less about Epicurean criteria of truth than I previously thought... and previously I thought: 'Damn, what did those crazy Epicureans smoke?'
Bryan , can you explain why do you think PD 24 is about anticipations? To me, it is about every criteria of truth except anticipations. The way I see it, it's about all momentary (that is right here, right now) criteria: senses, feelings and image perceptions of the mind. Anticipations are different to these because they are not only 'right here, right now'. They are lasting (they create permanent mental imprints).
For that reason, I don't think the fourth criterion is a mistake. It's linked with other 'momentary' criteria and it serves similar function there to 'properties' and 'accidents' which are linked with 'permanent' anticipations.
Please don't hesitate and point out flaws in my thinking as I really would like to confidently say one day: 'Hey, I get it now. Those Epicureans were not as crazy as I thought.'
