

## Chapter 19

### Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasures

19.0.1. Notoriously, Epicurus considered pleasure to be the good and by that primarily meant that *ataraxia/aponia* was the good. While he allowed of other, kinetic pleasures, these katastematic ones take pride of place. The highest pleasure and greatest good is to be without pain or disturbance, and it is this condition at which all living things naturally aim. It has usually been taken as fairly unproblematic which pleasures are kinetic. All sensory pleasures fall into this category and perhaps some mental ones such as learning. This determines Usener's selection of passages, and it tends to be a point of agreement among commentators who disagree about the nature of katastematic pleasure and its relation to kinetic. Thus Diano, and after him Rist,<sup>1</sup> argue that every kinetic pleasure presupposes the presence of a katastematic one, since any sensory pleasure requires the good, and therefore painless, condition of at least part of the organ in question, and that is another way of saying that there is prior katastematic pleasure in the organ. On the other side Merlan argues for a more positive view of katastematic pleasure, considering it the state of joy of a being free of pain and anxiety. But he agrees that all sensory pleasures are kinetic.

19.0.2. With the nature of kinetic pleasures thus agreed, the point of dispute becomes just how Epicurus thought of katastematic pleasures, and why he used the same word for both kinds. The Diano/Rist position makes katastematic pleasure in danger of being the negative condition of lacking pain or anxiety, and this makes one wonder why Epicurus was not content to join those mentioned by Aristotle (*EN* 1104b24) who thought the best condition one of *apatheia*. On the Merlan view it becomes slightly more intelligible why

<sup>1</sup> Diano (2), (3); Rist (2).

he should not take this route, but still a question why he did not make his point by reserving some word especially for his *summum bonum* and contrasting it with kinetic pleasure. Yet so far is he from doing this that he claims he doesn't know what he could conceive the good to consist in if one takes away sensory pleasure (fr. 10 = U 67), although the good is apparently katastematic pleasure. In general these interpreters feel the pull of the difficulty developed by Cicero, in *de Finibus* I and II, that Epicurus seems to be using the same word confusingly for significantly different and unrelated phenomena.

19.0.3. To begin with we shall try to bring out how any view which sees kinetic pleasures as comprising at least the sensory ones, and as constituting a distinct class from katastematic ones, involves attributing an awkward view to Epicurus. We shall then outline our own interpretation indicating how it meets this difficulty. Only then shall we systematically consider the evidence.

19.0.4. The kind of view we wish to oppose holds that it was an important feature of Epicureanism to insist on dividing pleasures into two sorts, sensory ones on the one hand, and katastematic ones, of which lack of disturbance of mind (*ataraxia*) and lack of pain (*aponia*) are the important examples, on the other. The distinction was important to Epicurus because it was the latter which he wished to put forward as the good in life, and he needed the contrast in order to defend himself against the charge that he was advocating a life of debauchery. He can be seen doing this in the *Letter to Menoeceus* (DL X.131-2) where he says that when we call pleasure the goal we do not mean the pleasures of profligates, but to be without pain of body or distress of mind. The pleasures of profligates are obviously the sensory pleasures, and Epicurus is making it clear that he is putting forward something else as our goal. There are four objections which such views have to meet (see 19.0.6-9).

19.0.5. There are various ways of construing the contrast.

(i) The words might be taken at their face value. In that

case, granted that sensory pleasures are all in the kinetic category it seems that katastematic pleasures are simply conditions of being without various forms of distress. This is certainly the line taken by Cicero, and the views of Diano and Rist at least teeter on the edge of it.

(ii) Epicurus could hardly have intended to use the word 'pleasure' to refer to so negative a condition as lacking distress. He must have been intending to refer to a state of joy achieved in a life from which pain and distress are absent, a joy which is distinct from and independent of any sensory pleasures which might or might not be experienced. This seems to be the view of Merlan.

(iii) Epicurus has not got any special notion of joy, but he is drawing our attention to the fact that it is possible to get pleasure, in fact the greatest pleasure, from realizing that we are without pain. This is suggested by two things: first, Plutarch refers directly (*Non Posse* 1091a-b) to remarks by both Epicurus and his follower Metrodorus to the effect that there is great pleasure in escape from evil (not, of course, death, as De Witt suggests, (p. 154), since for Epicurus death is not an evil): secondly, Cicero (*Fin.* I. xi.37), makes the Epicurean Torquatus insist on the pleasure we get from emancipation from pain. Both sources are supposed to clarify what pleasure Epicurus had in mind as the greatest good, and so should be giving the nature of katastematic pleasure. It seems to us that this would be building a lot on a little evidence. These remarks form a very small part of the accounts of katastematic pleasure and do not feature in any of the major passages on either *aponia* or *ataraxia*. In addition the view is open to the objections below.

19.0.6. As we have pointed out, all these views assume that the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures was one on which Epicurus put a particular emphasis, and that they were different kinds of pleasure, the good in life consisting in some of the latter. It is this feature of all such views which creates the problems. These are as follows:

(i) It is agreed on all these views that the good is *ataraxia* and *aponia*, as distinct from sensory pleasures. But Epicurus is very insistent on the importance of sensory pleasures. This

is most obvious in two quotations given by Cicero (*Tusc.* III. xviii.41-2):

In that book which contains all your teachings [Epicurus,] . . . you say: 'For my part I cannot understand what that good is if one subtracts those pleasures perceived by taste, those from hearing and music, and those sweet movements, too, got from visual perception of shapes, or any of the other pleasures generated by any sense in the whole man. Nor can one hold that joy of mind is alone among the goods. For as I understand it the mind is in a state of joy when it has hope of all those things I have mentioned above, that nature may acquire them with complete absence of pain.' And these are his very words, so that anyone may understand what Epicurus recognizes as pleasure. Then a little lower down he says: 'I have often enquired of those who were called wise what they had left among the goods if they removed those ones, — unless they wanted to emit empty noises; I could learn nothing from them; if they want to boast about virtues and wisdom they will say nothing unless they mean the way by which those pleasures are achieved which I mentioned above.'

Here Epicurus is not just saying that sensory pleasures are a good thing, but that nothing is left to the good life if you subtract them. Indeed virtue and wisdom can only be praised if they are considered as a means to them and joy of mind is entirely dependent on them. Yet on any of the interpretations under consideration one would expect Epicurus to know perfectly well what would be left among the goods if sensory pleasures were subtracted: *ataraxia* and *aponia*. Since these are the good, the loss of the other pleasures would not be catastrophic: one would still have painlessness, joy, or the recognition of the absence of pain. Indeed, one would expect that virtue and wisdom would be shown valuable as productive as these, not of sensory pleasure. Yet these quotations are not isolated and all the ancient critics, admittedly hostile, got the impression that sensory pleasures loomed large in the ideal Epicurean life. So it looks as though at worst we have an inconsistency, at best a confusion into which Epicurus was perhaps led by polemical over-enthusiasm.

19.0.7. (ii) Epicurus is insistent that the senses are the criterion of truth, and in particular the criterion of goodness (DL X.124, 129, 137). This is confirmed by Cicero (*Fin.* I.



ix.30-1) who reports a dispute among Epicureans on the point, Epicurus holding that the good is recognized in perception 'as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet'. What precise form this view took we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter. For the moment it is enough to note that the good is appreciated or grasped in perception. It is easy enough to see how sensory pleasure might be grasped in perception. It is not so easy to see how the various versions of katastematic pleasure might be. If we turn to the first version above we find Cicero (*Fin.* I.xi.39) defending the Epicureans against the following objection: a hand that has nothing wrong with it lacks nothing; but if pleasure were a good, it would lack pleasure; therefore pleasure is not a good. The obvious assumption is that the pain-free hand is without any (felt) pleasure. Cicero's defence is that while this might be an objection to a Cyrenaic it cannot tell against Epicurus since for him the mere absence of pain is pleasure, indeed the greatest pleasure. This objection and the defence against it are used by Cicero to bring out the contrast between familiar sensory pleasures and conditions of being without pain either altogether or in particular organs. He is surely right to claim that if the mere absence of pain is the greatest pleasure then the greatest pleasures pass for the most part unnoticed, and certainly could hardly be given in perception without becoming sensory pleasures. In short, this interpretation makes it hard for Epicurus consistently to hold that the good is given in perception. Of course, Epicurus could say that when we realize that we are without pain we experience the greatest pleasure. This would be the third interpretation above. It would, however, involve *reflection* on our state, a state quite possibly lacking sensory pleasure, and no sensory pleasure is necessary for the state to be seen as good. So this would leave it obscure how Epicurus could hold that the senses are the criterion of goodness. The end of *De Finibus* I.xi does, indeed, provide some evidence that some Epicureans did consider that it was reflection that convinced us that katastematic pleasure is the good, but the same chapter is also evidence that that was not the view of Epicurus himself. The same objection holds with joy: if this is not a sensory pleasure it is unclear how its goodness is given in perception.

19.0.8. (iii) The third objection is that Epicurus seems to be cheating. This is most obvious if we insist on a purely negative account of *aponia* and *ataraxia*. For in this case, as Cicero points out, many people would not agree to call these states pleasures simply in virtue of lacking pain, so that Epicurus would seem to be trading on using 'pleasure' in a new sense while relying on its old sense for part of his argument. But even if we take *aponia* and *ataraxia* to be joy, or the realization that pain is absent, if Epicurus is insisting on the difference between these and the kinetic pleasures of sense, then we have the following oddity: what the senses reveal as good is in fact something quite different from what really is good, for they give experience of kinetic pleasures whereas it is the quite different katastematic kind that is the good.

19.0.9. (iv) Finally, it would be somewhat surprising to find Epicurus allowing the existence of a state of a living thing lacking both pain and sensory pleasure. For according to *PD* 2 there is no life without perception, and, according to the *Letter to Menoeceus* (DL X.124) it is in perception that good and evil are to be found: 'Get used to the thought that death has no relation to us; because every good and evil is in perception; and death is the deprivation of perception.' Good and evil are pleasure and pain respectively and these (DL X.34) are the only *pathē*. One would expect every good state to be a mode of perception, and perception to be the form of life. This is reinforced by the *Letter to Herodotus* (DL X.64-6) where after asserting that the soul brings perception to a body he writes: 'this is why so long as the soul is present, even if some other part is lost, perception never ceases'. As the passage goes on it is clear that this life and perception is a function of motions of the soul-atoms made possible by the protective sheath of the body. The picture is of a living thing in a state of constant motion of its atoms in interaction with its environment, the congenial motions being pleasures (DL X.34), the uncongenial ones pains. There is no place for a static or non-perceptive condition of pleasure.

## 1. Suggested interpretation

19.1.1. We would not pretend that these objections are conclusive, but they do indicate that certain styles of interpretation involve attributing rather obvious awkwardness to Epicurus. An interpretation which does not attribute them is thus far preferable. We shall now expound such an interpretation, and then proceed to defend it against at least the more obvious objections.

19.1.2. The passages quoted by Cicero in *Tusculan Disputations* (cf. 19.0.6) suggest a different picture of *aponia* and *ataraxia* whereby *aponia* is a condition of having sensory pleasures but with no accompanying pain, and *ataraxia* is a state of confidence that one may acquire such sensory pleasures with complete absence of pain. This confidence is itself a positive state. However unadulterated by pain one's sensory pleasures may be, one's pleasure is all too likely to be spoiled by various misapprehensions. These will be false beliefs about death, about the gods, about fancy diet, about the limits of bodily pleasure, about the desirability of long life and so on. These erroneous beliefs disturb the mind (cf. *PD* 10-12, 18-22) and their removal is required for *ataraxia* (cf. passages just referred to and also *DL* X.81-2, 124-6, 130-2). But for *ataraxia* more than the absence of false beliefs is needed: they have to be replaced by true ones. It is these that give confident expectation of a pleasant life, and so constitute the removal of anxiety. In short, those ancient critics who complained that Epicurus laid great emphasis on bodily pleasures would on this view be right: what is important is to get a life of sensory pleasure untainted by pain; *ataraxia* is itself geared to *aponia*, and joy of mind generally is a matter of memory and expectation of unadulterated pleasure, based on true belief. The objection to the pleasures of profligates (*DL* X.131-2) and perhaps the only objection Epicurus has (cf. *PD* 10), is that they fail to remove anxiety. The point with profligates is, presumably, that they erroneously believe fine food to be necessary, fail to see when desire is satisfied, and so pursue their objectives to the point of consequent distress, and so foolishly fear, as threats to their good, things which should not be feared.

## 2. How this interpretation meets the earlier difficulties

19.2.1. If we look at the objections which we held that some styles of interpretation have to meet, it should be clear that this interpretation does not have to meet them. So far as the first objection is concerned it would be no oddity on our view that Epicurus insisted on the importance of sensory pleasure. On the contrary, that is just what he thinks we should be after, with the proviso that we also secure absence of pain.

19.2.2. As to the second objection, on our view *aponia* is not a non-sensory pleasure but a condition of sensory pleasure. What perception reveals to us directly is the goodness of pleasure and the badness of pain and thereby that the only unqualified good is pleasure without pain. Since any painless perception is pleasant, perception reveals the goodness, though not, of course, the achievability, of *aponia*<sup>1</sup>. The value of *ataraxia* is parasitic upon that of *aponia*, since the only *ataraxia* worth having on Epicurus' view is that which comes from pleasant memories and confident expectations of sensory pleasures of a painless kind. These extend, as it were, present pleasures or modify present pains by surrounding them with a pleasurable ambience. Thus the body's pleasures have pride of place.

19.2.3. As to the third objection, Epicurus is clearly not, on our view, using 'pleasure' in a strained sense in applying it to katastematic pleasure. The most that could be claimed is that he is inclined to use '*ataraxia*' and '*aponia*' of conditions of life rather than particular pleasures, but this sort of use had been familiar at least since Plato's *Protagoras*, and is derived from the application of the word to particular pleasures. Whether our view is altogether free from criticism along these lines depends on what account we can give of kinetic pleasure, but at least Epicurus is not straining language, or obviously cheating in calling katastematic pleasures pleasures.

<sup>1</sup> Nor does it reveal the choiceworthiness of individual pleasures (see 20.1.1).

19.2.4. Since, on our view, *aponia* just is a condition of painless perception it creates no expectation that Epicurus might envisage a non-perceiving state as pleasurable. The fourth objection, therefore, simply does not arise.

### 3. Kinetic pleasures

19.3.1. The most obvious objection to the view proposed is that it simply shifts the difficulty elsewhere. A problem with the kind of view discussed earlier was how Epicurus could plausibly put katastematic pleasures into the same class as kinetic ones. On the present view the problem is reversed. Since sensory pleasures have been transferred to the katastematic class, it is a good question what has been left over to count as kinetic. For the moment we shall content ourselves with expounding our answer to this, leaving till later in the chapter an objection to it. The reason for this is that while expounding the answer helps to fill out our picture of Epicurus, and so contributes to the development of the chapter, the treatment of the objection would be a distracting digression.

19.3.2. To begin with, it is important to note that we are not saying that all sensory pleasures are katastematic, although we are saying that *aponia* is a condition of having painless sensory pleasures. The question that one has to ask is what force Epicurus might have given to the terms 'katastematic' and 'kinetic'. The word 'katastematic' is an adjective from the noun '*katastēma*', and we know (cf. Plut. *Non Posse* 1089d = U 68) that one Epicurean expression for *aponia* was 'the well-established *katastēma* (condition) of the flesh'. One might therefore expect that katastematic pleasure is pleasure of the organism in proper condition. We also know (cf. 8.2, 15.1, Appendix B) that during the fourth century, and in many cases associated with the Academy, there had been various analyses of pleasure which had portrayed it as a *genesis*, a replenishment, a movement, or a *katastasis eis phusin* (restoration to the natural state). The purpose of many of these views had been to show that pleasure could not be the good since it was a movement aimed at an end term, and it is the end term that must be the good. Clearly



anyone wishing, like Epicurus, to hold that pleasure is the good, might feel the need, against such views, still in evidence when the *Magna Moralia* was written, to assert that in addition to such kinetic pleasures (pleasures of movement) there are pleasures of the *katastēma*. Indeed, if our view is correct, Epicurus, perhaps taking a hint from Aristotle, seems to have held that when the organism is operating properly it will be in a state of pleasure, and pain is a matter of unnatural operation. This, note, is a view about the organism, not individual organs. At any time a properly functioning organism will be perceiving, but not, of course, with every organ. Many organs will be in good condition, but pleasureless because not perceiving. There is no reason for Epicurus to hold, in Cicero's example (cf. 19.0.7) that a hand without pain experiences pleasure, only that an organism which is perceiving and without pain experiences pleasure.

19.3.3. If this is right two things follow: first, kinetic pleasures are not a different kind of pleasure from katastematic ones; they too are sensory and are a matter of some part of the organism operating properly. When one quenches one's thirst some parts of the organism are working naturally, some not, and there is a steady increase in the area of natural operation; but no different account of the nature of pleasure is needed. Secondly, one would not on this account expect Epicurus to lay great stress on kinetic pleasure in the exposition of his views, except in the polemical context suggested. Otherwise one would not look for any prime role for the distinction in Epicurean theory. This commits us to discounting in large measure the testimony of Cicero, and we shall aim to do that in due course.

19.3.4. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that any view on this subject owes us an account of Epicurus' choice of terminology. On the more traditional view one has to suppose that 'kinetic' is chosen because Epicurus has an account of perception in terms of the movement (*kinēsis*) of atoms. The trouble with this is that Epicurus' account of the organism quite generally is in terms of the movements of atoms, so that it is difficult to know what 'katastematic' is

referring to. This might tempt one to Merlan's version of the contrast in terms of stable (katastematic) as against passing pleasures. There is no evidence that we can find for this version in the original context of Epicurus' writings, though it has to be admitted that perusal of Cicero, and acceptance of his translations, does give some colour to the view. On the other hand, there is evidence in the background to Epicurus for the kind of contrast which we are suggesting, and it fits well with a view which relieves Epicurus of the awkwardness mentioned earlier in this chapter.

#### 4. The ancient evidence

19.4.1. So far we have contented ourselves with pointing out some oddities in certain current interpretations of the katastematic/kinetic distinction and describing an alternative interpretation together with a certain amount of evidence for it from the writings of Epicurus. Anyone familiar with the literature on Epicurus might be forgiven for feeling uneasily that the weight of the ancient evidence is nevertheless heavily against such an interpretation, and that one simply has to accept that Epicurus is in a state of some confusion on the subject. We shall now, therefore, turn to the examination of this evidence. For convenience we shall divide the relevant texts into three groups:

(i) There are passages such as Lucretius IV.627-9, and the passages cited in Usener (408-15) as giving Epicurus' position on kinetic pleasures.

(ii) There is the evidence of Cicero, mainly from the *De Finibus* but also from the *Tusculan Disputations*.

(iii) There is one passage (DL X.136) where Epicurus uses an expression which might be meant to refer to kinetic as distinct from katastematic pleasure.

These passages are usually taken to show between them that the Ciceronian view, that all sensory pleasures are kinetic and katastematic ones form a different class, correctly reflects the position of Epicurus.

19.4.2. (i) *Usener etc.* The passage of Lucretius does not

even seem to have anything to say about the nature of kinetic pleasure unless we already assume that pleasures of sense are kinetic. Lucretius is enquiring into the location of taste and arguing that it is in the palate. The ground for this is that when the food passes down to the stomach the pleasure ceases. Nothing is said as to whether the pleasure is kinetic or katastematic — understandably since he is concerned not with pleasure but the location of perception. The mention of pleasure is purely incidental. Granted that any perception is either pleasant or distressing, and that the taste in question is pleasant, the termination of the pleasure will signalize the termination of the perception. It is only if we know from elsewhere that sensory pleasures are kinetic ones that we can use this passage in discussing the relation between the two.

19.4.3. Other passages are on the face of it more difficult in that they refer to the sensory pleasures as *kinēmata*, or cite them as kinetic pleasures. Thus Plutarch (*Col.* 1122e = U 411) writes 'For they invite one themselves, without need of a teacher, these beautiful, smooth and gentle motions of the flesh, as they (the Epicureans) themselves say.' This certainly suggests that Epicureans, and so probably Epicurus, considered sensory pleasures to be motions. But then, as we have seen, Epicurus would have to think of all pleasures as motions, so that this sort of passage gives no ground for supposing these pleasures to belong to the special class of kinetic pleasures. The other sort of passage is more problematic. Thus Athenaeus (*XII.546e* = U 413) writes 'Epicurus and his followers were fond of kinetic pleasure. I need hardly mention the storms of passion and delicacies which Epicurus often proposes, the titillations, too, and solicitations of the senses.' Clearly Athenaeus considers these sensory pleasures to be kinetic. He does not, however, give us a quotation from any Epicurean declaring them to be kinetic rather than katastematic pleasures, and the question arises which will arise later with Cicero, whether Athenaeus is declaring them to be so because he has read Epicurean texts calling them kinetic, or because he himself believes these pleasures to be *kinēmata* and so assumes them to be kinetic for Epicurus; or perhaps because he is relying on Cicero. As our evidence

stands only DL X.136 has any claim to give us words of Epicurus himself on the nature of kinetic pleasure and its relation to katastematic. While the *Letter to Menoeceus*, the *Principal Doctrines*, and the *Vatican Sentences* have a good deal to say about *ataraxia* and *aponia*, they are silent on the nature of kinetic pleasure. This might strike some as false, and *PD* 18 might be cited: 'Pleasure will not be increased in the flesh when once that which suffers because of lack is removed, but it is only varied.' This is often taken as saying that sensory pleasure only varies the katastematic pleasure achieved when pain is removed. The passage, however, has to be read with Cicero in hand to yield this result. As it stands it has nothing to say about kinetic pleasure. It simply states that there is no increase of pleasure once pain is removed, only variety. As to whether those varied pleasures are kinetic or katastematic, it is silent. It is quite consistent with the view that the process of removal of pain will be a process of extending the area of pleasure, so increasing pleasure, and this process is what has been called kinetic pleasure, but once that process is over there can be no increase of pleasure, only variation according to the perception operative in the painless condition. This variety, however, is variety in katastematic pleasure.

19.4.4. This would not, indeed, be possible if Epicurus thought there could be no variation in katastematic pleasure. This is a view attributed to him by Rist on the basis of *PD* 9. Before turning to that difficult *Doctrine* it is worth asking what reason Epicurus might have for denying diversity in katastematic pleasure. *PD* 18, already cited, makes it clear that he had no general thesis about lack of variety of pleasure. That *Doctrine* does, indeed, indicate that among katastematic pleasures there could be no difference of degree, but that is a different point. If katastematic pleasure simply consisted in the proper, painless, condition of the whole organism, then, of course, there would be but one; but clearly Epicurus distinguishes at least between *ataraxia* and *aponia*, and in claiming that a wise man will be 'happy' on the rack (DL X. 118 = U 601) implies that one could have the first without the second. On the Diano/Rist view, whereby every part of

the organism is capable of katastematic pleasure in virtue of being in a good condition, it is utterly obscure why variety should be denied, since the good condition of one part of an organism will be different from that of another. The only reason for homogeneity that suggests itself here is that a katastematic pleasure is constituted as such simply by the absence of pain in a part of the organism. This entails a heavily negative view of katastematic pleasure, which would certainly leave Epicurus open to Cicero's complaint of equivocation with the word 'pleasure'.

19.4.5. It is not, then, clear why Epicurus would want to hold that katastematic pleasure is homogeneous, except on this negative thesis; and it is clear that he admits of variety among pleasures even if, to concede a point for the sake of argument, that is only in the case of kinetic pleasures. How, then, does *PD* 9 help? The first difficulty is that the text is very much disputed and almost all commentators have suggested emendations. The trouble now is that emendations will seem more or less plausible according to what one thinks Epicurus likely to say, and that weakens the independent evidential value of the *Doctrine*.

19.4.6. As they stand the manuscripts read as follows:

*Ei katepuknou(to) pasa hēdonē (kai) tōi (kai) chronōi kai periodon (peri hodon) to athroisma hupērchen ē ta kuriōtata merē tēs phuseōs, ouk an pote diepheron allēlōn hai hēdonai.*

The brackets contain alternatives. Thus some manuscripts have an active, some a middle or passive verb to start with, they vary in the placing of 'kai' some having just a lacuna, and some separate 'periodon' into two words. Most commentators have taken the middle or passive verb, giving various translations, e.g. 'if every sort of pleasure were added together' (Boyancé), 'if every pleasure were maximized' (Rist), — all of them slightly awkward; the verb means 'condense', but it is not clear what would be meant literally by 'if every pleasure were condensed'. There is then a tendency to keep the first 'kai' (and), drop the second and emend 'periodon', after Rossius, to *peri holon*. The whole



would then read: 'If every pleasure were condensed and continued for a time and through the whole aggregate (i.e. of atoms) or the most important part of the nature in question, pleasures would never differ from one another.' This involves a minimum of emendation. Others have further suggested filling the lacuna of some manuscripts, to read either: 'If every pleasure were condensed both spatially and temporally and obtained through the whole organism' (Diano); or 'If every pleasure were condensed in intensity and temporarily and . . . ' (Bignone). The justifications of these further additions lie in the general views on Epicurus held by their proponents.

19.4.7. Rist thinks that a message can be extracted even though the precise form of the text is left uncertain. He writes: 'According to Basic [= Principal] Doctrine 9, if every pleasure were condensed (*katepuknouto*) and occurred throughout the whole organism, or at least its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another' (Rist (2), p. 114). He cites two passages to illuminate 'condensed'. First, a fragment from the comic poet Damoxenus reads, 'Epicurus thus condensed pleasure, he chewed carefully' (Fr. 2, Kock); secondly, the second century AD sophist Alciphron describes an Epicurean lasciviously embracing a dancing girl. According to the Epicurean this is 'the undisturbed state of the flesh and the condensation of that which enjoys'. Rist thinks it certain from these passages that 'condensing' implies squeezing out the maximum of pleasure. To us the certainty is not apparent. First we have a contemporary comic poet who has obviously come across an Epicurean use of 'condense' and also, presumably, Epicurean statements in favour of the stomach and sensory pleasure. Since chewing can be presented as a form of pounding or condensing he joins the two in a (not very good) joke. There is no reason to suppose that he is offering an interpretation of 'condense', or even that he understood what Epicurus meant. Much the same holds with Alciphron. There is obvious irony in describing the lecher as free of disturbance of the flesh, and again the reference to condensation is either just picking on an Epicurean phrase for ironic purposes for a situation when

a man's limbs are obviously loosed, and/or is suggesting erection of the penis. While Rist's interpretation may be right it is hardly made certain by these passages. After all *PD* 9 may be all these authors had to go on (an easily available source is the most likely), and why should we take them as experts?

19.4.8. Taking 'maximised' as the meaning of 'condensed' Rist argues as follows:

He (Epicurus) says that (i) if all pleasures are condensed, that is, maximised and spread over the whole organism, then pleasures will not differ from one another. (ii) This means that in terms of quality there is no difference between the katastematic pleasure of touch and the katastematic pleasure of taste or sight. (iii) *Qua* pleasure they are equally pleasurable, insofar as they all equally consist in an absence of pain. (iv) Hence it follows that, if they could all affect all parts of the body, they would be indistinguishable one from another. (Rist (2), p.115 (our numbering)).

The argument here is obscure. Sentence (i) rightly preserves the original's generality in referring to *every* pleasure, but it is not clear what is meant by them spreading over the whole organism. If it only means that no part of the organism is without pleasure, it is not clear why there should be no differentiation. If it means that each pleasure is spread through the whole organism, then while this suggests a picture of general confusion, it is utterly obscure what Epicurus is supposed to have in mind. Sentence (ii) just gives a conclusion from a supposedly intelligible sentence (i). Sentence (iii) promises some help, but only doubtfully gives it. After all, absence of pain, for Epicurus, forbids difference of degree only; according to *PD* 18 it allows for variety. It might be, however, that he thought that katastematic pleasures, at least, simply consisted in the absence of pain and so were, *qua* katastematic, indistinguishable in quality as well as degree. But in that case we are left with no argument for the homogeneity of kinetic pleasures, and so the remark about *all* pleasures in sentence (i) remains unjustified. Certainly kinetic pleasures cannot consist simply in the absence of pain, and it is hard to think what the argument for

their homogeneity with katastematic ones is going to be. Sentence (iv) contains all the obscurity of the second possibility for interpreting the latter half of sentence (i). It seems that nothing sensible is being attributed to Epicurus on Rist's interpretation, and nothing that supports a thesis of homogeneity.

19.4.9. Bollack (pp. 267-72) proposes to preserve the reading of some of the manuscripts, and the result would read as follows:

If every pleasure produced condensation, and in a long time, too, and so the aggregate (of atoms) persisted for a period, or the main parts of the nature concerned, the pleasures would never differ from one another.

The result of preserving the text is awkward Greek, but that would be less surprising in Epicurus than elsewhere, and might even be an argument for preserving it. The protasis of the conditional is supposing that each pleasure produces a condensation of the atoms of the organism, thus excluding (so far as possible) the void. If this were the effect of each pleasure and the organism persisted so, or the chief parts of it, then each pleasure would produce a cessation of motion at least in the main parts of the organism, and so they would be indistinguishable. It is possible to interpret the thrust of the doctrine in one of two ways. First, one might take the conditional in the standard logician's way whereby the protasis presents a sufficient condition for the truth of the apodosis. But the condition is not one which Epicurus will want to countenance. Presumably, then, he is relying on the obvious falsity of the apodosis. But the logician's interpretation of the conditional is not the only one possible. Sometimes 'if . . . then' operates like 'if . . . then indeed', where the protasis serves to introduce an absurd condition which would be needed to secure the truth of the apodosis: 'if the optimists were right, then indeed it would be sensible to keep one's money in equities.' Here, the suggestion is commonly that the protasis introduces a necessary and sufficient condition which plainly does not hold. On this version (Bollack's, if we understand him), Epicurus would be drawing our attention

to the obviously impossible condition which would have to hold if there were to be no variety of pleasures. As it is, the organism is always in motion and its patterns of motion vary from part to part, and time to time, and so there is variety of pleasure. On either version the *Doctrine* is hardly arguing for the homogeneity of pleasure.

19.4.10. The position then is that if we keep one manuscript version of the text we can extract a sense, but it gives no support to a thesis of homogeneity: quite the contrary. This version has an active form of the verb 'condense'. Some manuscripts have a passive form which must yield 'If every pleasure is condensed . . . ' Commentators have disputed the interpretation of that phrase, ('aggregated' 'maximized' and 'all pleasures' for 'every pleasure' have been proposed) and have suggested emendations elsewhere in the sentence to yield a sense. Doubtless changes can be made so as to produce an assertion of the homogeneity of pleasure, but the plausibility of such changes will in part rely on the independent plausibility of attributing such a doctrine to Epicurus.

19.4.11. There seem to us, then, no grounds for attributing this view to Epicurus, some grounds for expecting he would not hold it, and possible versions of *PD* 9 which would constitute rejection of it.

19.4.12. It seems, then, that we can interpret *PD* 18 in the way suggested so that once pain is removed we are in a state of katastematic, even if sensory, pleasure, and in that state there is a variety though no increase of pleasure. In fact the main evidence in favour of the view that it is kinetic pleasure which brings variety and that all sensory pleasure is kinetic comes not from the writings of Epicurus but from Cicero and *DL* X.136.

19.4.13. (ii) *Cicero*. In *de Finibus* Cicero is quite unequivocal. Thus in *I.xi.37* he makes Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesman say,

For we do not only pursue that (pleasure) which moves our nature

itself with a certain gentleness and is perceived with a certain sweetness by the senses, but we also have that greatest of pleasures which is perceived when all pain is removed.

Further evidence for the Diano/Rist view comes in *Fin.* I.xi. 39 (see 19.0.7) where Torquatus considers an objection relying on the supposition that a hand in good condition merely is not experiencing pleasure. He considers that the objection would touch the Cyrenaics, but not Epicurus. For Epicurus can admit that the hand wants nothing and claim that for that very reason it has pleasure.

19.4.14. Similar points emerge in Book II. Cicero is developing the objection that two such different things should not be called by the same name. He gets Torquatus to admit that the pleasure of quenching one's thirst is different from that of a thirst quenched, the latter being *katastematic*, the former *kinetic* (II.iii.9–10), and makes two complaints: first, that they deserve different names, and secondly that he is baffled as to what is meant by variation. He understands the idea of different pleasures from different sources, but

I cannot get an adequate grasp of the nature of that variety you mean when you say that we are at the peak of pleasure when we lack distress, but when we enjoy those things which bring a sweet motion to the senses, then the pleasure is in motion (*kinetic*), which brings variation of pleasures, but that pleasure of not suffering is not increased, — though why you call it pleasure I do not know.

Cicero proceeds to press Torquatus to distinguish absence of pain from pleasure and not besmirch the name of virtue.

19.4.15. It seems abundantly clear that Cicero thinks that Epicurus

- (a) distinguishes sharply between *katastematic* and *kinetic* pleasures
- (b) holds that the former consist in the painless good condition of any part of the organism
- (c) holds that all pleasures of the senses are *kinetic*.
- (d) holds that in some way there can be variation of *katastematic* pleasure when pain is removed.



This supports all the Rist position except on the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure. The problem, of course, is to decide how reliable an interpreter Cicero is.

19.4.16. One might well hesitate to take Cicero as gospel. As Rist points out ((2), p. 105) he at least underestimates Epicurus on the subject of what small children desire (*Fin.* II.x.32-xi.39), and there are several points at which one starts to lose confidence. For instance in *Fin.* II.ii.4-iii.7 he argues that Epicurus is not using the word 'pleasure' in its ordinary sense. It becomes clear (cf. II.v.15-16) that the Epicureans generally felt their view misunderstood, and Cicero thinks this is because they perversely persist in using the same word both for the vivid pleasures of the senses and for mere absence of pain. 'Perversely' because 'everyone agrees that pleasure is that by the reception of which the sense is moved and imbued with a certain sweetness' (II.iii.6), and 'That sweet motion by which the sense is exhilarated everyone calls, in Greek *hēdonē*, in Latin *voluptas* (pleasure)' (II.iii.8). This is a doubtful statement, which at least requires forgetting some of the major Greek philosophers apart from Epicurus. Later the point is modified: 'Anyone in the world who knows Latin brings two things under this word (*voluptas*): joy of mind and the gentle arousal of delight in the body' (II.iv.13). No attempt is made to wonder whether this makes any difference nor is any notice taken of Epicurus' use of the word '*chara*' (= 'joy') in relation to katastematic pleasure (DL X.22, 66, 136), which might well correspond to 'joy of mind' to the ruin of Cicero's argument.

19.4.17. In the course of the discussion Cicero challenges Torquatus to say whether the pleasure of quenching one's thirst is the same as that of having quenched it (II.iii.9). The first is kinetic the second katastematic. The pleasure of tasting wine when not thirsty, however, is not considered, though it would be a pleasure of someone whose thirst is quenched and it would be sensory (cf. *Fin.* II.v.16 on the pleasure of eating a good dinner). For Cicero's failure to notice Epicurus' distinction between good and choiceworthy see Chapter 20. None of this shows careful attention to either

the original texts or the refinements of argument. Further, Cicero is clearly unsympathetic to Epicurus, and while he obviously finds it difficult to make consistent sense of him, he is not predisposed to try too hard. The passage cited from II.iii.9-10 (19.4.14) on variation of pleasure shows either that Epicurus was very confused or Cicero has got him wrong: the passage does not suggest that Cicero understood much from his source.

19.4.18. These doubts arise from within Cicero's own text. Another source of doubt is authors other than Cicero. First we shall consider some remarks in Lucretius,<sup>1</sup> and secondly Plutarch's *Non Posse* where he argues that it is not possible to live happily by Epicurus' prescription. In neither does one find any sign that the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure is of any importance in Epicureanism.

19.4.19. Lucretius is mainly concerned with Epicurus' natural philosophy and gives very little attention to the ethical side. At the beginning of Book II, however, we find a passage where he writes of the pleasure of being above the common hurly-burly where people pursue useless ends:

Do you not see that nature's only vehement demand is that pain be quite absent from the body, and that it enjoy with the mind sweet sense free of care and fear? So we see that altogether there are few things necessary for our bodily nature, just what will remove pain and be able to spread a picnic of many delights (16-22).

In the context 'sweet sense' must refer to sensory pleasure. There is no sign of an important contrast between this and katastematic pleasure, which is the good. On the contrary, what the body requires is pleasure-without-pain, where 'pleasure' refers to sensory pleasure. Lucretius shows just the lack of interest in any contrast between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, or between sensory pleasure and the good, which, on our interpretation, one would expect him to show, but which might be surprising if the distinction had the importance for Epicurus that Cicero's text suggests.

<sup>1</sup> We are indebted to Professor A. A. Long for making us realize the significance of this passage.

19.4.20. In his *Non Posse* Plutarch is arguing against the Epicureans to the effect that a life of constant bodily pleasure and tranquillity of mind is impossible. The sometimes sensible criticisms need not delay us. What is important for present purposes is the total lack of any sign that Plutarch saw in his Epicurean texts any stress on an important distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasures. To begin with *ataraxia* and *chara* (joy) are treated as two names for the same thing, and they are geared simply to the body's pleasures, with no hint that this is some non-sensory absence of pain:

'they (the Epicureans) do well indeed,' said Theon, 'and take the way of nature [in passing from the pleasures of the body to the soul] if in their pursuit there they find something better and really more perfect as do men in academic or public life. But if you listen to them shouting in protest that the soul is only constituted to take joy and be calm with regard to present and expected pleasures of the body, and that this is its good, don't you think that they are using the soul as a decanter for the body . . . ?' (*Non Posse* 1088e)

The word translated 'be calm' is '*galēnizein*', which seems to have been a common Epicurean word for referring to *ataraxia*. The coupling of this word with one for to take joy in, and the insistence that tranquillity is directed to present and future pleasure and is not just an absence of distress, suggest that Plutarch saw these words as referring to the same condition, differing at most in that they draw attention to different aspects of it. As to the bodily pleasures, it has already been made clear (1087b-e) that his sources suggested that these were familiar sensory ones. It is true that at 1089d-e Plutarch suggests that the absurdity of their position when applied to bodily pleasure probably explains their retreat to talk of painlessness and established good condition of the flesh; but there is no suggestion that this reflects a distinction insisted on by his opponents; the point is rather that the terminology serves to conceal the otherwise patent absurdity. Plutarch (cf. 1095c, 1098b-d) is as clear as Cicero that Epicurus and his followers insisted on the primacy of sensory pleasure, but he seems not to have noticed any important role being given to the kinetic/katastematic contrast.

19.4.21. What we find in Lucretius and Plutarch is wholly consonant with the interpretation we have offered. It is, of course, unlikely that Cicero invented the distinction, but it is also unlikely that if it loomed large in Epicurean theory it would have been ignored by Lucretius and gone unrecorded by Plutarch. On our view one would expect the distinction to occur in a particular polemical context, so that it is perfectly possible that Cicero found it there and misconstrued the contrast. This would be made easier by two factors: first, that although not all sensory pleasures are kinetic, at least all the kinetic pleasures mentioned would be sensory (note that Cicero himself at *Fin.* II.iii.9–10 cites the replenishment pleasure of quenching as his example of kinetic pleasure) and secondly, Cicero is obviously convinced of an account of pleasures as sensory movements (*Fin.* II.iii.8) and so might understandably take Epicurean talk of kinetic pleasure as referring to just these. One might well complain that it ought to have seemed unlikely that Epicurus, living in the aftermath of Plato, and presumably knowing of those mentioned by Aristotle who thought the virtues to be states of *apatheia*, would have been insensitive to the difference between supposed states of lacking sensory pains or pleasures, and such pleasures. But then Cicero was not a friendly critic. We take it, then, that there is some reason for being suspicious both of Cicero's suggestion of the importance to Epicureans of the contrast between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, and of his interpretation of its nature.

19.4.22. It remains that Cicero is not ignorant of Epicurus. Often he more or less translates independently attested fragments (e.g. *Tusc.* III.xviii.41, *Fin.* I.xi.38; cf. DL X.6, *PD* 18 respectively). The passage on the role of perception, referred to at 19.0.7 shows acquaintance with the literature. At other points it is difficult to know whether Cicero has a source or is speculating. Thus in *Fin.* II.v.16 we find 'But if he thinks that pleasure in motion [kinetic] has to be included [in the good] (for he calls this sweet pleasure "in motion", the one of having no distress "in a stable state") what does he mean?' What we do not know is whether Cicero is quoting or inferring. If the former, the dispute is over, if the latter, it is

alive, and general considerations would favour the kind of interpretation we have offered.

19.4.23. (iii) *DL X.136*. This brings us finally to the one passage of Epicurus where he seems to make a comment on the contrast of katastematic and kinetic pleasures, *DL X.136*. In this passage Diogenes is pointing to some contrasts between Epicurus and his followers and the Cyrenaics, followers of Aristippus. The latter do not recognize katastematic pleasures. According to *DL II.89* they considered *aponia* the condition of someone asleep. But Epicurus recognizes both, and mental as well as physical (in contrast again with the Cyrenaics (cf. *DL II.87*)). Various sources are cited for Epicurus and also for Metrodorus and Diogenes of Tarsus. Most commentators at this point read as follows:

similarly Diogenes, too, in the seventeenth book of the *Epilecta* and Metrodorus in his *Timocrates* say as follows: 'but both kinetic and katastematic pleasure being considered pleasure'. And Epicurus in *Of Choices* says this: 'For *ataraxia* and *aponia* are katastematic pleasures; but joy and well-being are seen in actuality in motion (*kinēsis*).'

This makes Epicurus put joy and well-being down as kinetic pleasures, and would certainly entail that he is not just considering pleasures of restoration to a natural state as kinetic. Indeed, it would be hard to avoid a strongly negative view of katastematic pleasure. It seems that once a pleasure is experienced it becomes kinetic. As we have seen, such a view would raise severe difficulties for Epicurus' view that the good is given in unthinking perception, since it would seem that only kinetic pleasure is so given, while the position requires that katastematic pleasure be so known as the good. There are also certain awkwardnesses in taking the passage in the way proposed. To begin with, we get a single fragment apparently attributed to two authors, and the fragment is not a sentence, but a genitive absolute: 'but both kinetic and katastematic pleasure being considered (pleasure)'. Secondly, we are first given various works in which Epicurus asserts the distinction, then places where his followers do, and finally we return to Epicurus on the same point. Thirdly, we have to



take 'chara' ('joy') and 'euphrosunē' ('sense of well-being') as referring to kinetic pleasures. There are two awkwardnesses here. First, Cicero regularly makes Torquatus use the word 'gaudium' to talk of katastematic pleasure and this suggests (but does not prove) that Epicureans (a) used the natural Greek equivalent 'chara' in this way and (b) did not have a totally 'negative condition' view of katastematic pleasure (cf. DL X.66). This is also borne out by Plutarch's use of 'chara' and its associated verb 'chairein' in *Non Posse*. Secondly, 'euphrosunē' is an unusual word for sensory pleasures and would normally suggest a sense of well-being. In fact 'chara' and 'euphrosunē' seem to correspond to 'ataraxia' and 'aponia' in being their positive counterparts, whereas on the interpretation under consideration we have to take 'chara' as a stand-in for an unspecified class of mental kinetic pleasure (as, perhaps, learning (cf. VS 27)), and 'euphrosunē' as a stand-in for kinetic pleasures such as those of taste, smell, and sexual intercourse, instead of the state of well-being of one who has the pleasures painlessly.

19.4.24. These considerations might dispose one in favour of Bollack's view, though we can find no reason for accepting the contrast which he seems to espouse between *ataraxia* and positive happiness, which is the goal which makes *ataraxia* worthwhile (cf. Bollack, pp. 114–20, 182–6). For the rest his view is as follows: it is clear from DL II.87–9 that Aristippus and his followers thought that the good was bodily pleasure and that there was no other; and that they rejected the Epicurean idea of the good consisting in the removal of all painful areas, seeing that as being not pleasure but a state similar to that of a man asleep. Bodily pleasure they considered to be kinetic and they rejected the pleasure of the stable state. As we have seen there were at that period, apart from Aristippus, both philosophers who thought all pleasures to be *kinēseis* to some state and philosophers who thought the ideal to be a condition of being unaffected by pleasure or pain. In such a context Epicurus would want (a) to assert the existence of pleasures of the natural condition, (b) with his views on the disturbing power of superstition and the pleasures of memory, to assert the importance of mental

pleasures, and (c) to make clear that his ideal was not one of *apatheia*. It seems clear in the first part of DL X.136 that the first two points are being made: that Epicurus insisted on katastematic pleasure as well as kinetic, and on mental as well as physical (though this sentence *might* be asserting that both are mental and physical in line with the *Letter to Herodotus* (DL X.63-6)). The rest might then read as follows

as he (Epicurus) says in *On Choice and Avoidance* and in *On the Goal* and in the first book *On Lives* and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. And similarly Diogenes in the seventeenth book of *Epilecta* and Metrodorus in his *Timocrates* say the same; but with both kinetic and katastematic pleasure being apprehended by the mind. [Note that this is no longer a quotation, but a further attribution by Diogenes Laertius which is then going to be supported by the next fragment.] Epicurus in *On Choices* says as follows: 'While *ataraxia* and *aponia* are katastematic pleasures joy and well-being are seen in actuality by/in motion.'

19.4.25. On this reading there would be no attribution of one fragment to two authors: the genitive absolute gives Diogenes' attribution of a further point to Epicurus, that *both* kinds of pleasure (the Greek suggesting an emphasis on katastematic) have to be apprehended by the mind. This would be making the point that katastematic pleasures are not states of *apatheia*. This is backed up by a quotation from Epicurus which would then be read as saying that while these two negative sounding conditions are katastematic pleasures, joy and well-being are observed by motion. On this reading Epicurus would here be using '*chara*' and '*euphrosunē*' as terms giving the positive sides of the *ataraxia* and *aponia* coins, pointing out, therefore, that katastematic pleasures are experienced. Further, he would be pointing out that they are experienced in motion. This is what he certainly ought to hold in consistency with his general position on perception and is a point he ought at some stage to have made to distinguish himself from those who (like Speusippus?) thought the best state to be one of neither pleasure nor pain.

19.4.26. So far as we can see there is no proof from within the passage that one or other of these readings is right. Each has its awkwardnesses, and how great they appear will

to a large extent be conditioned by one's prior views about Epicurus which will make the various points 'naturally' to be expected or surprising. With our own predilections we incline to Bollack's reading with the proviso, as we have said, that we see no ground for contrasting *ataraxia* and *chara*. To attribute such a contrast would leave Epicurus having something beyond *ataraxia* as the good, contrary to apparently clear statements. Bollack seems led to his contrast in part by a combination of a negative view of *ataraxia* with a laudable feeling that Epicurus could hardly have intended that his good should be indistinguishable from *apatheia*.

19.4.27. With the laudable feeling we are sympathetic, but consider that it can be satisfied without any contrast. *Ataraxia* is achieved by the removal of superstitious fear and false beliefs, the constant memory of the truth (cf. *Letter to Herodotus*, DL X.81-2), and attention to present experience and perception. Now the mind is freed of disturbance and so memory and expectation operate without anxiety. Similarly when physical pain is removed the body operates without pain and that will mean that always some pleasurable and painless perception is occurring, a condition of good cheer.

19.4.28. Bollack finds his contrast in the *Letter to Menoeceus* (DL X.127-9). Epicurus first says that some necessary desires are directed to *eudaimonia*, some to the undisturbed state of the body, some just to life.

For steady consideration of these things knows to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and *ataraxia* of the mind because . . . \* [at this point most commentators would read] this is the perfection of happy life. For we do everything for this reason: not to be in pain or fear; and once we achieve this all the soul's storm is done away with, since the animal has nothing to make for as something it lacks or anything else to seek with which the good of mind and body will be brought to fulfilment.

After the asterisk Bollack would read: 'this, the happy life, is the goal. It is for its sake that we do all we can to avoid pain and fear . . . ' and then as above. This introduces a distinction between *ataraxia* and happy life, the former being not the good, but a necessary means to the latter, which is the good.

19.4.29. While the translation 'this, the happy life, is the goal' is possible it is not mandatory. Nor, of itself, does it secure Bollack's point, since the happy life might consist in *ataraxia*. It is the next part that is important, since on Bollack's translation we try to secure *ataraxia* with a further goal, happiness, in mind. This, again, is possible but not mandatory. Bollack's complaint about the standard translation is that Epicurus is being repetitious; first he tells us that *ataraxia* is the goal, and then tells us (in effect) that *ataraxia* is what we do everything for. But in fact Epicurus seems in characteristic Greek fashion to be appealing to the fact that we do in fact pursue absence of pain and fear to show that it is the *telos* or goal. Further, if Bollack's contrast is at all important to Epicurus, then Epicurus is very bad at underlining it. A little later (DL X.131) he writes 'When we say pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of profligates . . . but not being in physical pain and not being disturbed in mind', yet according to Bollack he has just been saying that not these things, but the happy life is the goal.

19.4.30. The outcome of all this is that there is no conclusive evidence for the view that all sensory pleasures are kinetic. The only firm evidence is Cicero, and while his testimony is unequivocal we have tried to undermine its claim to reliability. Apart from that we either have passages which are no evidence at all, passages where the author might well be fathering his own conception of the kinetic on Epicurus, and a fragment of Epicurus on which the most favourable interpretation makes all experiences of pleasure kinetic, and so, by implication, sensory pleasures, but which might also be saying nothing about kinetic pleasure at all but rather making the point that *ataraxia* and *aponia* are not just negative states, but the experiences of *chara* and *euphrosunē*. In addition the evidence of both Lucretius and Plutarch supports our view that 'pure sensory pleasure' and '*aponia*' 'joy' and '*ataraxia*' are four names for two conditions. The main argument for doubting Cicero and one possible reading of DL X.136 is that both suppose a view of katastematic pleasure and the good which makes it hard to see how it could be appreciated in perception, since any perception-

pleasure is kinetic. This is acknowledged by Rist ((2), p. 102) when he says that the experience of *katastematic* pleasure consists in gentle motions of atoms, so that the difference between the two pleasures comes down to a difference between the steadiness and endurance of the motions. The more one stresses this the less important the distinction comes to look, since any condition, however steady, of a living thing, must according to Epicurus, be a condition of perceiving: but there is no evidence of a special kind of perceiving or object of perception to constitute *ataraxia* and *aponia*. Consequently we should be left with steady long-lasting perceptions over against fleeting ones. It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what *aponia* is. *Ataraxia* is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously.

19.4.31. One advantage of this interpretation is that it fits Epicurus into the philosophical context of the time. It is hard to believe that he would have been unaware of claims about a neutral state, or the possible charge that his ideal was indistinguishable from *apatheia*. So he would probably have a positive account of *katastematic* pleasure. It is probable that 'kinetic' would at that period suggest a view of process towards a state, and he would need to claim other pleasures than that. The interpretation has him do this in a way readily available after Aristotle's defence of Eudoxus, but adapting that way to his own preferred account not in terms of the actualization of capacities, but of the balance of nature, adopting a Platonic, not Aristotelian, criterion of relative pleasantness. It is an interpretation which has the best chance of allowing him to make perception the criterion of the good, and of allowing him to make strong claims about sensory pleasure without playing fast and loose on the nature of pleasure. While it has to be acknowledged that it flies in the face of Cicero, it needs emphasizing once more that Cicero's



interpretation stands in need of defence: it is not supported by extant writings of Epicurus, and attributes views to him which ought to be surprising. Its main support comes from equally unsympathetic and so suspect interpreters. All are interestingly baffled by the apparent inconsistency between eulogizing sensory pleasures and so, presumably, unbridled sensuality, while advocating a life of simple asceticism and lack of disturbance. Perhaps the Epicurean complaint of persistent misunderstanding was justified (cf. Cicero *Fin.* II. iv.12).

### 5. An objection: the Cyreniatics

19.5.1. The interpretation might be objected to on one or both of the following grounds:

(i) Epicurus (Plut. *Col.* 1122e = U 411) used the expression *leia kinēmata* of sensory pleasures (the *iucundi motus* of Cicero *de Finibus* II.iii.8), and this expression is taken from the Cyrenaics, who (DL II.85, 86) defined pleasure as *leia kinēsis* and (DL II.87, 89) explicitly contrasted it with *ataraxia* and *aponia*, which they rejected as not pleasures at all. This makes it certain that in talking of kinetic pleasures Epicurus must have had in mind these *kinēseis* and so sensory pleasures.

(ii) Even if Epicurus did not get his expression '*leia kinēmata*' from the Cyrenaics, it is clear from Diogenes Laertius that they rejected *aponia* as the condition of a person asleep (DL II.89). They obviously did not take it in the way we have suggested, but on the contrary considered it quite distinct from a waking condition packed with sensory pleasure. It is one thing to suggest that Cicero, some centuries later, misunderstood Epicurus, quite another to hold that he was so grossly misconstrued by contemporaries in dispute with him.

19.5.2. To take point (i) first: our sources provide no evidence of when the Cyrenaics formulated their definition of pleasure. Plato does not address himself to any such definition, and while Aristotle criticizes the view that pleasure is a *kinēsis*, those criticized develop the view in order to

show that pleasure is not the good, and so can hardly be the Cyrenaics. This only shows, of course, that the view did not make much impact on those philosophers whose work has survived, but it also leaves us with no positive evidence. It is quite possible that the Cyrenaics devised the view later than Epicurus and even influenced by him. So to the first point we would merely say that ignorance forbids us to give it weight. Point (ii) might seem more weighty, but would only be really strong if we could assume three things: (a) that the Cyrenaics were familiar with Epicurus' work, (b) that they were reliable interpreters, and (c) that their rejection of *ataraxia* (DL II.87, 89) and *aponia* was aimed at Epicurus. Assumption (c) is certainly suggested by the way Diogenes Laertius conducts his discussion on the *Life of Aristippus* (II.86–93) and in the *Life of Epicurus* (X.136–8). In fact, however, the discussion is in terms of contrast rather than controversy, and it would be obviously of interest to Diogenes to spell out the points of contrast between two schools of thought apparently agreeing in their main tenet that pleasure is the good. The detailed listings readily give an impression of original controversial intent; but it has to be remembered that others besides Epicurus used negative expressions for their ideal or had negative ideals. Thus Antisthenes (see 1.1.1) and the naturists of the *Philebus* (see 8.1) both advocated freedom from both pleasure and pain, Pyrrhon of Elis possibly considered *ataraxia* the best state (cf. Cicero *Fin.* IV.xvi.43; SE P I.3–4, 12; Burnyeat (2)), Aristotle refers to those who considered the virtues *apatheiai* (EN 1104b24–5), Speusippus is said to have advocated *aochlēsia* (see 12.1.1) and similar views may well have been rife in the Academy, and a little after Epicurus Hieronymus of Rhodes (Cic. *Fin.* II. iii.8, v.16, xi.35) was advocating similar negative ideals. There were plenty of philosophers against whom the Cyrenaics would want to say (DL II.89) that a state of neither pleasure nor pain was one of no *kinēsis* and so like the condition of one asleep. A commentator like Diogenes might then well apply this view to produce a point of contrast with Epicurus, but we cannot be at all confident that the objection was originally directed at him. Even if we suppose it was, we have no evidence of their

degree of familiarity with or sympathetic attention to the works of Epicurus. In a context where many different philosophers advocated aloofness from (bodily) pleasures and pains it would be easy to misconstrue the negative terms, especially as they were allied to a view that not all pleasures should be chosen and that a simple life was the ideal.

19.5.3. Finally, we have no grounds for supposing the Cyrenaics to be exceptionally sympathetic interpreters of Epicurus, or more gifted at understanding him than is general with philosophers of rival schools.

19.5.4. There is, indeed, one statement by the fourth-century AD writer Eusebius (*PE* XIV.xviii.31 = U 450) to the effect that Epicurus took his start from the Cyrenaics. There is also, however, evidence of the influence of the Democritean atomist Nausiphanes and of connections with the school founded by Eudoxus at Cyzicus. Either or both might have been a stimulus to hedonism. He may also have come under the influence of the Platonist Pamphilus, and later visited Athens when the Academy was still flourishing under Xenocrates (for evidence of these matters see Rist (2), Ch. 1). In short we have no strong evidence for supposing Cyrenaic influence on or connection with Epicurus; whereas we do have some evidence of Academic influence which would make it likely that he thought those views worth combating. The Academy seems to have been one of the homes for views to the effect that pleasure is a *kinēsis*, of the sort which Aristotle set out to refute, and after him the author of the *Magna Moralia*.