Epicurean ethics centers on the pursuit of a pleasurable life. The foundation of this ethical system is built on the belief that pleasure is the highest good (telos), and the natural end of human existence. A key aspect of this system is that "pleasure" is not held to involve sensory stimulation alone, but includes all activities and conditions of life which are not painful.
1. Life Is Desirable And Death Is Undesirable
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2. The Feelings Of Pleasure And Pain
Epicurus identified pleasure as the primary motivator of human action. From birth, humans seek pleasure and avoid pain, indicating that pleasure is a fundamental component of life. As a general rule, pleasure is desirable and pain is undesirable, but circumstances may at times require that some pleasures must be avoided and some pains must be chosen.
What Epicurus meant by "pleasure" has been disputed for two thousand years. That controversy continues today, with some - often influenced by Stoicism or Buddhism or other viewpoints - interpreting Epicurus as advising a life of asceticism, total withdrawal from society, and the pursuit of "tranquility" above all else.
In contrast, those who knew the Epicureans best were clear: they understood Epicurus as teaching that "Pleasure," and not "Tranquility" or any other particular pleasure, should be considered to be the ultimate goal of life. Rather than limiting pleasure to tranquility alone, Epicurus taught that "pleasure" should be considered to include every experience in life that is not painful. Epicurus held this perspective to be correct because Nature gives us only "pleasure" and "pain" by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid. From Epicurus' point of view, if we are alive and feeling anything at all, we are feeling either pleasure or pain, with no middle ground or third alternative. From this perspective, every agreeable experience of life, whether of the body, of the mind, or of the "spirit," comes within the meaning of "pleasure."
”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain
2.1. If You Are Not Feeling Pain You Are Feeling Pleasure
If you are not feeling pain you are feeling pleasure, and so to Epicurus the word "pleasure" includes not only agreeable sensory stimulation of mind and body but also all normal and healthy experiences of mind and body. Both are not painful, and both are therefore pleasurable. Pleasure therefore includes every non-painful moment of life of mind or body, whether "in motion" or "at rest," and not just moments of stimulation:
Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus in Cicero's On Ends 1:39
For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
This position can also be seen in the Epicurean comparison of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:
On Ends 2:16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?” [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is "yes" based on the condition of "not being thirsty" and "the thirsty man who drinks" both being conditions of pleasure."]
Seen in this way, Epicurean philosophy is neither "hedonistic" nor "ascetic," as those terms are generally viewed today. Instead, Epicurus assures us that all types of healthy non-painful function of both body and mind are pleasurable and therefore desirable, and in this way a life full of pleasure is attainable.
2.2. There Is No Neutral State Or Third Alternative
That Pleasure and Pain are separate and unmixed in any particular feeling was important enough to be listed among the top doctrines of Epicurus:
PD03: ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
To illustrate how it is possible to grasp the view that there is no neutral state or third alternative, a parallel may be drawn with Epicurean physics. In Epicurean physics, every specific location in the universe is occupied either by one of two things, matter or void, with no mixture or third alternative.
We can view human life in a similar way. Epicurean ethics holds that everything in life as either agreeable or disagreeable, in other words pleasure or pain. When we remind ourselves of the vast nothingness that passed before our birth and will pass after our death, we see that every moment of life when we are not in pain is worthy of being considered agreeable and pleasurable, and can in fact be so if we approach life with the proper attitude. Even in those moments when we face pain in some part of our experience, we can look to the other parts of our mental and physical experience to find pleasure, and thus more reason for joy than for vexation.
Some will ask: "Are not bodies mixtures of atoms and void, and human lives mixtures of pleasure and pain, and are not these mixtures a third alternative?" The Epicurean response is that mixtures are not third alternatives that destroy the integrity of component parts. In Physics, "Bodies" are properly viewed as existing as combinations of matter and void, but within bodies, matter and void are properly viewed as retaining their individual identities. Likewise, a human life as a whole is properly viewed as existing as a combination of pleasures and pains, but within a life, pleasures and pains are properly viewed as retaining their individual identities. Despite the difference in their levels of observation, both perspectives are valid. As a distinguished expert on Epicurus has written:
"Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers [Epicurus] arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth."
2.3. The Term "Absence of Pain" Means Exactly the Same Thing As "Pleasure"
The insight that makes sense of the entire discussion is that for the reasons stated above, Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It is significant to specify "conditions of awareness" because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:
“…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
"Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be..”
2.4. Continuous Happiness Through Pleasure
By rejecting standard attitudes toward pleasure, Epicurus recognized that absence of pain is pleasure, just as absence of pleasure is pain. Any feeling which is not a pleasure is a pain, and any feeling which is not a pain is a pleasure. Once the error of seeing this formulation in Buddhist/Stoic eyes as nothingness or unity with divine fire is stripped away, the full value of this perspective can be seen: this perspective lays the groundwork for actually achieving a life in which pleasure predominates over pain and in which continuous happiness is possible:
For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. Epicurus is not talking specifically about the most intense stimulation, which we may or may not just to be worthwhile when we consider the scope of our entire life. Epicurus is talking philosophically that the most "complete" condition of pleasure is defined as any condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man will realize that this is the most "complete" pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:
"By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy."
This sweeping redefinition of the life of pleasure - rather than the gluttony or asceticism which his detractors assert - is the hallmark of the Epicurean approach to living. As one biographer of Epicurus observed:
The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
2.5. Pleasure, Not Virtue Or Piety, Is The Supreme Good
In this revolutionary approach to the best life, to the dismay of other philosophers, "Pleasure" is identified as the Supreme Good, rather than Virtue or Piety or Tranquility or Rationality or any other conventional ideal. The Epicureans stated this boldly and emphatically:
Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus In Cicero's On Ends
We are inquiring, then, into what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in Pleasure; Pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, and Pain the Chief Evil.
Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus In Cicero's On Ends
"Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?" (On Ends [40] XII)
2.6. Better To Speak Frankly What Is Of Benefit To All, Even If None Agree, Rather Than Compromise
Epicurus' rejection of commonplace assumptions was by no means limited to the prevailing definition of "pleasure." Epicurean philosophy leads to a re-examination of many other common misconceptions, including those regarding "gods," "virtue," "good and evil," and even the status of "logic."
In Epicurean terms, "gods" do exist, and it is important to act "virtuously," but "gods" are not supernatural or omniscient beings which create universes or control human affairs, and "virtue" is not desirable as an end it itself, but as a means of obtaining pleasure. "Good" and "evil" are not abstract absolutes, but are ultimately evaluations based on sensations of pleasure and pain felt by real living beings. "Dialectical logic" is rejected as misleading, while at the same time "Practical Reason" is embraced as essential for living happily. All of these are important topics to explore and clarify, and that's what we do here at EpicureanFriends.
Quote from Vatican Saying 29
For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.
2.7. We Are Born One And Cannot Be Born Twice
As the Epicureans held, "We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination, and each one of us dies while occupied."
If you too wish to avoid postponing your happiness, we invite you to join with us in studying and applying Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.
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The surviving discussion of pleasure that remains in Diogenes Laertius and Cicero shows that Epicurus was not limiting the term "pleasure" to agreeable stimulation of senses. Epicurus took the position that regardless of whether what is felt arises from stimulation or from simple awareness, there are two and only two categories of feelings - pleasure and pain - with no middle ground or third condition.
All feelings in life, whether stimulated or not, are considered by definition to fall within either one category or the other. If you are conscious of your condition at all, you are at all times feeling either pleasure or pain. While you can feel many things at one time in separate parts of your mind and body, a single feeling at any part of your mind and body at a particular moment is one or the other never both or some third condition. As to the feelings being two, the authorities include:
Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends 1:30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
As to the position that you are feeling either one or the other at all times, the authorities include:
On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
As to the two conditions being separate and unmixed in any particular feeling:
PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
All of those taken together mean that Epicurus did not limit pleasure to what we generally think of as sensory stimulation, but included within pleasure all states of awareness of life that are not felt to be painful. You can see an explicit example of that here in regard to discussion of one's hand in its normal state of affairs, whenever it is not in some affirmative pain:
On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
This position can also be seen in the Epicurean comparison of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:
On Ends 2:16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?” [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is "yes" based on the condition of "not being thirsty" and "the thirsty man who drinks" both being conditions of pleasure."]
This means that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It is significant to specify "conditions of awareness" because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:
On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be..”
This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. He is not talking about the most intense stimulation, he is talking philosophically about the most pure and complete condition of pleasure where pleasure is defined as a condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man is about to consider this condition to be the most complete pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:
On Ends 1:56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
On Ends 1:62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
So how can a condition of absence of pain be considered pleasure? The answer is that absence of pain can be considered to be pleasure, and in fact the total absence of pain can be considered to be the highest pleasure, because we are considering pleasure to include not just sensory stimulation, but also to include all conditions of awareness of life, mental or bodily, which are not painful, regardless of whether those conditions result from stimulation or from simple awareness of pain-free existence.
An application of this perspective can be seen in Principal Doctrine 09: "If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." This can be interpreted to show that Epicurus understood that the many and various types of pleasure differ in intensity, in duration, and in location of the body that they effect, but that regardless of these differences, the many ways in which pleasure is experienced are all properly considered to be within the wider meaning of the word "pleasure."
This may appear to be a word game, but it is not. It is the assertion that the normal healthy default condition of life is and should be considered to be pleasurable whenever it is not painful. I think Norman DeWitt says it best:
“Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 (emphasis added)
“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."
3. The Role of Desires In The Pursuit of Pleasure And Pain
Epicurus categorized desires into three types: natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither natural nor necessary. Natural and necessary desires, such as the need for food and shelter, must be satisfied to maintain a healthy and happy life. Natural but not necessary desires, like the craving for luxury foods, can enhance life but are not essential. Desires that are neither natural nor necessary, such as the pursuit of wealth and fame, are more difficult to obtain, and frequently lead to anxiety and dissatisfaction. As a general approach, evaluating desires to identify which of these categories they constitute will be of assistance in predicting the amount of pleasure and pain likely to be encountered as a result of their pursuit. In the end, however, the goal sought is that of "greatest" pleasure, which must be determined according to individual context and preference, and which is not subject to objective classification.
4. The Calculus of Advantage
Epicurus introduced a practical approach to ethics known as the calculus of advantage, which involves evaluating the consequences of our actions in terms of pleasure and pain. This rational method helps individuals make choices that maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By carefully assessing the potential outcomes of actions, one can achieve a pleasureable life, and always have more reason for joy than for vexation. This approach emphasizes the importance of wisdom in guiding ethical decisions and achieving long-term happiness, but does not make wisdom a goal in itself.
5. The Importance of Friendship
Friendship holds a major place in Epicurean ethics due to its productiveness in contributing to pleasure and happiness. Epicurus held that friendship is the a primary tool for obtaining security and comfort, helping individuals face life's challenges. Friendship should be based on mutual benefit and trust, enhancing the quality of life. Epicurus considered the cultivation of friendships as one of the highest pleasures and a vital component of a happy life.
6. The Rejection of Superstition and Fear
A central tenet of Epicurean ethics is the rejection of superstition and irrational fear, particularly the fear of gods and death. Epicurus argued that study and resulting understanding of natural world dispels these fears. He taught that any gods which may exist take no participation in human affairs, and that death is simply the cessation of sensation, which should not be feared, because all good and evil comes through sensation. By understanding these truths individuals can greatly reduce mental pain and anxiety, and they can focus on pursuing happiness through pleasurable living.
7. The Principle of Justice
Epicurus held that justice does not exist in the absolute, and that the application of the term "just" or "unjust" to something is dependant upon time, place, and other circumstances. As a result, justice become primarily a social agreement in which the individuals involve agree not to harm each other. Epicurus held that relationships of justice arise naturally due to the pursuit of pleasurable living, and are not defined or handed down by gods or by ideal concepts. Actions which are considered unjust, on the other hand, when they produce concern over retribution and resulting disturbance of peace of mind.
8. The Pursuit of Self-Sufficiency and Independence
Epicurus advocated that as a practical matter material wealth, fame, and political power, often do not lead to happiness. He therefore advocated for the pursuit of a lifestyle involving self-sufficiency and independence, emphasizing that these provide freedom from the fickleness and dependence on the crowds. Epicurus pointed out that since all aspects of human life which are not painful are pleasurable, pleasure is generally relatively easy to attain and sustain without material wealth, fame, and political power, and that pain is generally relatively easy to avoid or endure.
9. Continuous Pleasure
A unique aspect of Epicurean ethics arises from the consideration of all experience which is not painful to be pleasurable, as this attitude leads to the possibility of continuous pleasure. Epicurus taught the person who chooses and avoids wisely can expect always to have more reason for joy than for vexation, which leads to a continuous state of the predominance of pleasure over pain and therefore happiness.
10. How Long Should We Seek To Live?
See discussion here: How Long Should We Seek To Live?
11. Infinite Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than A Limited Life
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12. Death
See discussion here Death also Death is Nothing To Us And There Is No Reward Or Punishment After Death
13. Happiness And Its Relationship To Pleasure
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14. Life
- Life Is Desirable
- Infinite Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than A Limited Life
- The Best Life
- How Long Should We Seek To Live?
15. Death
16. Good And Evil
- All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation
- There Is No Good But Pleasure
- There is No Evil But Pain
17. Virtue
- The Nature of Virtue
- Piety - The Proper Attitude Toward The Gods
- Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End in Itself. Virtue Is Not The Same For All People, Times, And Places, And Virtue Is Instrumental To Pleasure Rather Than An End In Itself
- The Virtue Of Prudence
- The Virtue Of Friendship
- The Virtue Of Courage
- The Virtue Of Justice
- The Virtue Of Honesty
- The Virtue Of Confidence
- The Virtue Of Beneficence
- The Virtue Of Temperance
- The Virtue Of Considerateness
- The Virtue Of Hope
- The Virtue Of Independence And Self Sufficiency
- The Virtue Of Remembering And Presence of Mind
- The Virtue Of Proper Political And Social Relations
- The Virtue Of Gratitude
- The Virtue Of A Sound Mind
- The Virtue Of A Sound Body
18. Choice And Avoidance - Principles of Daily Decisionmaking
- There Is No Necessity To Live Under The Control of Necessity - Rejection of Determinism
- There Is No Fate Or Fortune
- Desire Is Not Inherently Painful Or Pleasurable
- Selecting Among Desires Using To The "Natural," "Necessary," And "Empty" Categories
- Weighing Pleasures And Pains
- Activity, Rest, And Procrastination
